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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate relationships between treatment 
knowledge, beliefs and outcome in Panic Disorder and/or Agoraphobia (Panic-Ag). 
Research from the psychotherapy and medical literature indicates patients’ treatment 
knowledge and beliefs, specifically acceptance of the treatment rationale (ATR), 
expectancies of treatment outcome (ETO) and treatment self-efficacy (TSE), are 
associated with clinical outcomes for a range of disorders. However, methodological 
limitations surrounding measurement of these constructs have undermined 
conclusions and/or such relationships have not been investigated in the field of 
Panic-Ag.  
Relationships between treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome in Panic-Ag were 
examined using a 2 phase procedure. Phase 1 involved developing measures of 
treatment knowledge, ATR, ETO and TSE using patient and clinician samples. The 
psychometric properties of these measures were found to be satisfactory. Phase 2 
investigated associations between treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome 
following cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) among 41 Panic-Ag participants. 
Measures were administered at pretreatment and 6-months posttreatment. It was 
hypothesised that treatment knowledge, ATR, ETO and TSE would be related to 
outcome, with associations mediated by belief in catastrophic cognitions. Of 4 Panic-
Ag outcome measures (panic attack frequency, panic sensation severity, frequency of 
catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance), results indicated improved 
treatment knowledge was significantly associated with frequency of catastrophic 
cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance. Posttreatment TSE was significantly 
associated with panic attack sensation severity, frequency of catastrophic cognitions 
and agoraphobic avoidance. Contrary to the hypothesis, ATR was not related to 
outcome.  
Similar findings concerning TSE and ATR were obtained in an independent sample 
of 34 Panic-Ag participants. Exploratory analyses found that pretreatment beliefs 
including outcome expectancies were unrelated to outcome. Mediational analyses 
revealed relationships between TSE and outcome were partially mediated by belief in 
catastrophic cognitions while relationships between treatment knowledge and 
outcome were not. Results are discussed in light of previous research, 
methodological limitations, clinical implications and future research directions.
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Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and Outcome in Panic 
Disorder and Agoraphobia: Is There a Relationship?  
Introduction to Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia 
Panic Disorder is a disabling anxiety disorder marked by recurrent 
unexpected episodes of brief, overwhelming physical symptoms consisting of heart 
palpitations, dizziness, shortness of breath, sweating, gastrointestinal distress, chills 
or hot flushes, numbness or tingling, feelings of unreality and a fear of dying or loss 
of control (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In addition, fears of developing 
further attacks, worry over consequences (e.g., heart attack, going insane) and/or 
significant behavioural changes to prevent recurrence (e.g., avoidance of activities 
that trigger such sensations, restriction of travel, avoidance of being alone) emerges. 
Panic disorder often co-occurs with agoraphobia where specific situations are 
avoided or feared due to fear of embarrassment or absence of help should a panic 
attack occur (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
The prevalence of panic disorder and/or agoraphobia (Panic-Ag) is relatively 
high with recent epidemiological studies in developed nations estimating 12-month 
prevalence rates between 1.6% and 2.8%, and lifetime rates of 2.1% to 5.1% 
(Andrews, Henderson, & Hall, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2005; Grant et al., 2006; 
Kessler et al., 2006). The condition is associated with comorbid poor physical health 
and health perceptions (Schmidt et al., 2003; Schmidt & Telch, 1997), elevated rates 
of depression (Brown & Barlow, 1992; Johnson & Lydiard, 1998), substance use 
(Cosci, Schruers, Abrams, & Griez, 2007; Marshall, 1997), and suicidal ideation and 
attempts (Boden, Fergusson, & Horwood, 2007; Goodwin & Roy-Byrne, 2006). 
Panic-Ag is also a costly disorder from a social and economic perspective (Batelaan 
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et al., 2007; Edlund & Swann, 1987; Leon, Portera, & Weissman, 1995; Rees, 
Richards, & Smith, 1998; Salvador-Carulla, Segui, Fernadez-Cano, & Canet, 1995) 
with increased rates of medical service utilisation (Rees et al., 1998; Roberge et al., 
2005; Weissman, 1990), absenteeism, unemployment and financial dependence 
(Edlund & Swann, 1987; Leon et al., 1995).  
Current practice guidelines advocate the use of cognitive behaviour therapy 
(CBT) as the first line of treatment for Panic-Ag (American Psychiatric Association, 
1998). Randomised controlled trials consistently demonstrate CBT to be effective for 
Panic-Ag (for reviews see Gould, Otto, & Pollack, 1995; Mitte, 2005; Westen & 
Morrison, 2001), with up to 87% of patients achieving panic-free status (defined as 
no panic attacks in the last month) at posttreatment (Landon & Barlow, 2004) and up 
to 81% remaining panic free at 1 to 2-year follow-up (Clark et al., 1994; Craske, 
Brown, & Barlow, 1991). However, the criterion of panic-free status is not an 
accurate and/or sensitive measure of true patient improvement since improvement 
rates markedly decrease when more conservative outcome criteria are applied. For 
example, a cross-sectional 2-year follow-up study by Brown and Barlow (1995) 
revealed that although 75% of patients were panic free, only 57% met criteria for 
high end state functioning (defined as no panic attacks in the last month and clinician 
severity rating of Panic-Ag as mild or below). When definitions of successful 
outcome include high end-state functioning and no further requirement for treatment, 
the percentage of patients classified as having successful outcomes reduces to 48%. 
Further, when even more stringent criteria of high end-state functioning at both 3-
month and 2-year follow-up, no panic attacks in the past year and no further need for 
treatment are applied, successful outcome rates reduce to 21%. Similarly, a meta-
analysis of CBT conducted by Westen and Morrison (2001) found the average Panic-
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Ag patient remained at least mildly symptomatic at posttreatment and 35% sought 
additional treatment within 18 months of completing CBT. Thus although CBT is 
beneficial for the majority of Panic-Ag patients, there is further room for 
improvement. Therefore, the identification of processes and mechanisms associated 
with successful treatment outcome is crucial to improving the effectiveness of CBT.  
CBT for Panic-Ag is based on Clark’s (1986) cognitive model which 
underscores the importance of catastrophic misinterpretations of harmless panic 
sensations in the maintenance of the disorder. CBT is assumed to be effective by 
assisting patients to identify, challenge and replace catastrophic cognitive 
interpretations with more realistic, less threatening ones. Considerable evidence has 
accumulated over the last two decades supporting the validity of the cognitive model 
and CBT produces a reliable decrease in both catastrophic cognitions and panic 
severity. However, it is unclear whether cognitive change is the cause or effect of 
treatment improvement. Furthermore, changes in catastrophic cognitions account for 
less than one third of the variance associated with symptom improvement (Hofmann 
et al., 2007) suggesting the influence of other contributing elements. This thesis aims 
to explore additional potential factors related to treatment knowledge and beliefs that 
may potentially influence the effectiveness of CBT.  
 
Treatment Compliance 
It is argued within the literature that the effectiveness of CBT is contingent on 
patient compliance with treatment recommendations (Burns & Spangler, 2000; 
Edelman & Chambless, 1993; Kazantzis, Deane, & Ronan, 2000; Kazantzis, Ronan, 
& Deane, 2001; Schmidt & Woolaway-Bickel, 2000; Westra & Dozois, 2006). 
However, treatment non-compliance is common (Sanderson & Bruce, 2007), with up 
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to 60% of patients failing to complete specific CBT directives as assigned (Helbig & 
Fehm, 2004). Patient treatment non-compliance therefore represents an important 
impediment to treatment outcome.  
To ensure compliance, at least four conditions must be present. Patients must: 
i) understand information presented 
ii) be accepting of the treatment rationale 
iii) believe treatment will be helpful, and  
iv) have sufficient self-efficacy to implement therapeutic strategies. 
A breakdown in any of these conditions may result in treatment non-
compliance, while fulfilment of one condition does not guarantee fulfilment of others 
(Raynor, 1998). Although CBT treatment outcome studies often assess the extent to 
which therapists adhere to the content of treatment manuals (treatment integrity), the 
majority rarely include measures assessing patients’ knowledge and beliefs about 
treatment. Such studies implicitly assume that once patients are exposed to treatment 
information (the treatment rationale and application of techniques), they effectively 
understand information provided, accept it unquestioningly, believe it will be helpful 
and feel confident in applying it. However, as Primakoff, Epstein and Covi (1986) 
stated, “it is not sufficient to record what therapists ‘prescribe’ in order to know how 
much self-administered treatment the cognitive therapy patient actually ‘absorbs’” 
(p. 434).  
As will be discussed below, research from the psychotherapy and medical 
literature has identified patients’ knowledge about treatment, and beliefs about the 
treatment rationale, helpfulness of treatment and self-efficacy to implement 
techniques, as fundamental factors that potentially interfere with the “psycho-
availability” of CBT, resulting in poorer treatment outcomes. However, these issues 
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have either not been rigorously investigated in the area of Panic-Ag or 
methodological limitations preclude firm conclusions being drawn. Hence, this thesis 
aims to examine relationships between patients’ treatment knowledge, beliefs and 
outcome following CBT for patients with Panic-Ag. Significant associations with 
such variables have important clinical implications that may enhance the 
effectiveness of CBT in reducing the burden of the disorder for both sufferers and 
society at large. Before examining the extant literature surrounding these issues, a 
discussion of the cognitive model and evidence in support of cognitive mediation of 
treatment effects will be reviewed.  
 
 
The Cognitive Model of Panic-Ag 
Clark (1986), in his seminal paper shaping current conceptualisations and 
treatments of Panic-Ag, advanced a cognitive model of panic highlighting 
catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations as central to the aetiology and 
maintenance of Panic-Ag. This model proposes that Panic-Ag patients 
catastrophically interpret benign bodily sensations of anxiety, stress and arousal as 
evidence of imminent physical, mental or social danger; for example, heart 
palpitations may be misinterpreted as a sign of impending heart attack. A vicious 
cycle is set up such that catastrophic interpretations result in increased autonomic 
arousal causing anxiety symptoms to intensify, thereby reinforcing misinterpretations 
culminating in a panic attack. Associating specific situations (e.g., shopping centres, 
driving) with feared physical sensations lead patients to fear and/or avoid such 
situations and develop agoraphobia. Hence, according to the model, catastrophic 
cognitions about bodily sensations mediate panic attacks as well as associated 
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avoidance and disability. Treatment based on the cognitive model therefore consists 
of techniques focussed on reducing patients’ belief in catastrophic cognitions. 
 
Treatment Components of CBT for Panic-Ag 
There are three primary treatment components aimed at modifying 
catastrophic cognitions in Panic-Ag: psychoeducation, cognitive restructuring and 
exposure (in vivo and interoceptive) (Rayburn & Otto, 2003). Psychoeducation 
involves the provision of accurate information about the nature and physiology of 
anxiety and panic. Patients are informed of the fight or flight response, a 
physiological reaction enabling individuals to either fight or flee upon perceiving 
danger, and its relationship to panic attacks. Panic attacks are considered false alarms 
activated when individuals perceive physical or social threat (e.g., “I’m going to have 
a heart attack”, “I’m going to embarrass myself”) in the absence of real danger. 
Subsequently, patients are introduced to the concept of catastrophic 
misinterpretations of physical sensations and their role in perpetuating an anxious 
cycle ending in a panic attack. The impact of hyperventilation on the production of 
physical panic sensations is discussed and the medical reality of such intense 
physical sensations explained. 
Cognitive restructuring involves assisting patients to identify underlying 
catastrophic misinterpretations of panic and teaching methods to challenge faulty 
threat appraisals. Patients typically overestimate the probability and/or cost of 
potential panic outcomes. Inflated probability and cost estimates are challenged 
either through examining evidence from past experiences or by conducting 
behavioural experiments which involve subjecting thoughts to reality testing. For 
example, if patients have the thought, “I am going to collapse” upon feeling dizzy 
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and lightheaded, this could be tested by standing without holding onto any supports 
while feeling panicky to determine whether or not they fall.  
In vivo exposure involves confronting feared situations associated with panic 
such as shopping centres, lifts, public transport and driving. Interoceptive exposure 
involves deliberately inducing panic sensations (e.g., dizziness, shortness of breath, 
palpitations) through various exercises such as hyperventilating, breathing through a 
straw, running on the spot and spinning. A graded approach is used where patients 
construct a hierarchy of feared situations/sensations ranging from mildly to severely 
anxiety provoking and then systematically confront easier tasks before progressing to 
more difficult ones. In addition, exposure is accompanied with a gradual fading of 
avoidance, escape and safety seeking behaviours (i.e., reliance on people or items 
such as medication or mobile phone). In this way, exposure therapy, although often 
regarded as behavioural in nature, also has a strong cognitive focus; when used as a 
behavioural experiment, patients can test whether predicted catastrophes eventuate.  
In essence, CBT adopts a psychoeducational approach (Blagys & Hilsenroth, 
2002) where therapists present information and teach skills to help patients identify, 
test and replace cognitive misinterpretations and unhelpful behavioural responses 
with more realistic, less threatening ones. The process of change, however, requires 
patients to actively participate in therapy through learning, understanding and 
consistently applying skills. 
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Evaluation of the Cognitive Model of Panic-Ag 
 Clark (1986, 1996) delineated four predictions arising from the cognitive 
model: 
1. “Panic patients will be more likely to interpret bodily sensations in a catastrophic 
fashion than individuals who do not experience panic attacks. 
2. Procedures that activate catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations will 
produce an increase in anxiety and panic in panic disorder patients. 
3. Panic attacks can be prevented by reducing patients’ tendency to interpret bodily 
sensations in a catastrophic fashion.  
4. Sustained improvement after the end of any treatment (whether psychological or 
pharmacological) will depend on cognitive change having occurred during the 
course of therapy” (Clark, 1996, p. 322). 
These four predictions have received considerable research support over the 
last 20 years (Austin & Kiropoulos, 2008; Austin & Richards, 2006; Clark, 1993; 
Clark et al., 1994; Clark et al., 1997; Craske et al., 1991; Ehlers, Margraf, Roth, 
Taylor, & Birbaumer, 1988; Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993; 
McNally & Foa, 1987; Rapee, Mattick, & Murrell, 1986; Sanderson, Rapee, & 
Barlow, 1989; Schneider & Schulte, 2007; Telch, Silverman, & Schmidt, 1996; 
Westling & Öst, 1995) thus supporting the validity of the cognitive model for Panic-
Ag. Evidence related to cognitive mediation of CBT’s treatment effects will now be 
reviewed.  
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Cognitive Mediation of CBT for Panic-Ag  
  To demonstrate that the effectiveness of CBT is cognitively mediated, three 
criteria must be satisfied (Hofmann et al., 2007; Oei, Llamas, & Devilly, 1999): 
i) CBT must be demonstrated to be effective in reducing panic severity and 
catastrophic cognitions  
ii) Effective CBT must produce greater change in catastrophic cognitions relative 
to other treatments (e.g., medication, relaxation) 
iii) Change in catastrophic cognitions produces the observed treatment 
improvements. 
Research investigating these criteria is reviewed below. 
 
Criterion 1: Effective CBT Produces Changes in Catastrophic Cognitions 
The majority of studies that have incorporated cognitive measures in their 
evaluation of the efficacy of CBT for Panic-Ag have found significant reductions in 
both catastrophic cognitions and panic severity following treatment. In their review 
of studies published between 1983 and 1996, Oei et al. (1999) found 15 of 16 studies 
demonstrated CBT to be effective in producing significant cognitive changes in the 
desired direction. Since this review, subsequent researchers have reported similar 
significant reductions in the frequency and strength of belief in catastrophic 
cognitions (Arntz, 2002; Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 2005; 
Clark et al., 1999; Öst, Thulin, & Ramnerö, 2004; Poulton & Andrews, 1996; 
Richards & Alvarenga, 2002; Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, Gelder, & Clark, 2007; 
Wenzel, Sharp, Brown, Greenberg, & Beck, 2006). Percent reduction of catastrophic 
cognitions calculated from the data in their articles ranged from 17.4% (Bouchard et 
al., 1996) to 86.1% (Clark et al., 1999), with one study demonstrating 100% 
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reduction of primary catastrophic cognitions in five of seven patients treated with 
purely cognitive procedures (Salkovskis, Clark, & Hackmann, 1991). Hence, it 
would appear reasonable to conclude this aspect of cognitive mediation has been 
satisfied. 
 
Criterion 2: Effective CBT Leads to Greater Change in Catastrophic  
Cognitions Relative to Other Treatments  
CBT programs for Panic-Ag have been compared against pharmacotherapy, 
traditional exposure (in vivo and interoceptive) and relaxation therapies. Results 
differ according to type of therapy administered. 
 
CBT vs. Pharmacotherapy  
Two randomised controlled trials investigated cognitive change in CBT 
relative to pharmacotherapy and found results consistent with cognitive mediation of 
CBT. Clark et al. (1994) investigated 40 Panic-Ag patients and found CBT (n = 20) 
led to approximately twice as much improvement than imipramine (n = 20) on 
measures assessing catastrophic cognitions. At 3-month posttreatment, calculations 
from their data revealed CBT produced a 95% reduction in scores on the Body 
Sensations Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ, Clark et al., 1988) relative to 46% for 
imipramine. Similar results were shown for the Agoraphobic Cognitions 
Questionnaire (ACQ, Chambless, Caputo, Bright, & Gallagher, 1984) with CBT 
producing a 66% reduction in scores relative to 36% for imipramine. More recently, 
Hofmann et al. (2007) found catastrophic cognitions significantly mediated 
improvement in eight out of nine tests of mediation for CBT (n = 73) but in none of 
three tests of mediation for imipramine (n = 18). Hence, results from two 
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independent studies provide evidence of greater cognitive change for CBT than 
pharmacotherapy; however, different findings have been observed when comparing 
CBT to non-pharmacological therapies. 
 
CBT vs. Exposure Therapy 
 Studies comparing CBT with exposure therapy (involving prolonged 
exposure in the absence of specifically challenging catastrophic cognitions) on 
degree of cognitive change revealed mixed findings. Of eight studies, five found 
equivalent rates of cognitive change (Arntz, 2002; Bouchard et al., 1996; Burke, 
Drummond, & Johnston, 1997; Michelson, Marchione, Greenwald, Testa, & 
Marchione, 1996; Öst et al., 2004); one study found CBT led to significantly greater 
levels of cognitive change than exposure therapy (Salkovskis et al., 2007), while 
another found CBT produced greater change than guided mastery (an exposure-based 
therapy solely focused on increasing patients’ sense of mastery in feared situations) 
on two of three cognitive measures, with equal change on the third (Hoffart, 1995b). 
In contrast, a further study (Williams & Falbo, 1996) found CBT produced 
significantly less cognitive change than guided mastery.  
In explaining these discrepant results, sample sizes were low in the 
Salkovskis et al. (2007) study (n = 8 per group), hence their findings may have been 
affected by sampling error. Furthermore, the duration of exposure treatment was only 
3.25 hours (in comparison to 20+ hours in traditional exposure treatments), 
suggesting longer exposure periods may be necessary to yield cognitive change 
observed in other studies.  
The discordant findings may also be attributable to researcher allegiance 
effects (Luborsky et al., 1999), that is, better results are consistently obtained for 
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treatments that researchers have an allegiance with. As the Clark and Salkovskis 
group have been responsible for the development of contemporary CBT programs 
based on the cognitive model and the Williams group developed the exposure-based 
treatment of guided mastery, the differential findings are consistent with researcher 
allegiance effects. 
In summary, CBT and exposure therapies generally produce equivalent 
amounts of cognitive change. On this basis, both treatments are assumed to reduce 
anxiety through the same mechanism of changes to catastrophic misinterpretations of 
physical symptoms (e.g., Bouchard et al., 1996; Margraf, Barlow, Clark, & Telch, 
1993). It is postulated that patients learn their feared bodily sensations are harmless 
through either direct experience (i.e., exposure) or verbal discourse (i.e., cognitive 
therapy plus reality testing with behavioural experiments). Such an interpretation 
suggests treatment effects for both CBT and exposure therapy may be cognitively 
mediated. Thus, to determine whether CBT produces greater cognitive change than 
other therapies, a treatment such as relaxation therapy, that does not focus on 
correcting harm-related interpretations of panic symptoms (either directly or 
indirectly), should provide a better test of cognitive mediation.  
 
CBT vs. Relaxation Therapy 
 Of five comparative studies of CBT versus relaxation therapy, four did not 
yield significant differences between these interventions (Barlow, Craske, Cerney, & 
Klosko, 1989; Beck, Stanley, Baldwin, Edwin, & Averill, 1994; Carlbring, Ekselius, 
& Andersson, 2003; Öst & Westling, 1995). Only the study by Clark et al. (1994) 
found CBT led to significantly greater cognitive reduction relative to applied 
relaxation. With four of five studies showing non-significant differences, results 
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suggest that treatments not focussed on challenging catastrophic cognitions bring 
about equivalent levels of cognitive change. In explaining these counter-intuitive 
findings, Öst and Westling (1995) suggested reductions in panic severity generalised 
to improvement on cognitive measures; that is, cognitive change was a consequence 
or by-product of treatment improvement, similar to the way scores on self-report 
measures of depression and general anxiety also often decrease following successful 
treatment for Panic-Ag.  
Results from a recent meta-analysis of CBT and relaxation therapy for Panic-
Ag found the mean effect size of between-groups differences on cognitive measures 
was 0.48 (range = 0.10 to 1.08) indicating that overall, CBT produced greater 
cognitive change at posttreatment than relaxation therapy (Siev & Chambless, 2007). 
However, the only study finding a significant difference between CBT and relaxation 
in this meta-analysis was Clark et al.’s (1994) study suggesting researcher allegiance 
effects may have biased the outcome of this meta-analysis. Luborsky et al. (1999) 
found that correcting for researcher allegiance effects in meta-analyses of treatment 
comparison studies reduced observed differences between treatments to non-
significant levels. Therefore, had Siev and Chambless (2007) assessed and controlled 
for allegiance effects in their meta-analysis, it is likely no significant difference 
would have occurred between the two treatments in the amount of cognitive change 
achieved.  
 In summary, in order to justify cognitive mediation of CBT’s effects, CBT 
should produce greater cognitive change relative to other therapies that do not target 
cognitions directly. However, the majority of studies comparing CBT with either 
exposure therapy or relaxation found these treatments did not differ significantly 
from CBT in cognitive changes produced. Some supportive evidence for cognitive 
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mediation is obtained from limited research comparing CBT with pharmacotherapy. 
Evidence in support of cognitive mediation across all three treatment comparisons 
(i.e., CBT vs. pharmacotherapy, exposure therapy and relaxation) emanates from the 
Clark and Salkovskis group (Clark et al., 1994; Salkovskis et al., 2007) who 
developed the cognitive model of Panic-Ag. Given their findings were partially 
replicated by only one of seven studies comparing CBT with exposure and none of 
four studies comparing CBT with relaxation therapy, one possible explanation is the 
influence of researcher allegiance effects in accounting for results obtained. Thus, the 
second criterion required for cognitive mediation receives only weak support. 
 
Criterion 3: Treatment Improvement is Produced by Change in 
Catastrophic Cognitions  
 Although CBT has been shown to reduce panic severity and catastrophic 
cognitions, the possibility remains that observed changes in catastrophic cognitions 
are the result of improvements in panic severity (Öst & Westling, 1995) rather than 
its cause. Stronger support for cognitive processes underlying the effects of CBT can 
be demonstrated by showing that changes in catastrophic cognitions occurring during 
treatment are predictive of symptom improvement (Casey, Oei, & Newcombe, 
2004), and that maintenance of treatment gains is dependent on degree of cognitive 
change (Clark, 1986). 
 Several studies have found that greater changes in catastrophic cognitions 
during CBT predicted better treatment outcome at posttreatment and up to 1-year 
follow-up (Casey, Newcombe, & Oei, 2005; Hoffart, 1998). Furthermore, stronger 
endorsement of catastrophic cognitions at posttreatment has been linked with poorer 
outcomes at posttreatment and 1-year follow-up (Clark et al., 1994; Clark et al., 
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1999; Westling & Öst, 1995), thus providing additional evidence supporting 
cognitive mediation. However, the cross-sectional design of these studies still cannot 
exclude the possibility that changes in catastrophic cognitions occurred as a 
consequence rather than a cause of symptom improvement (Cho, Smits, Powers, & 
Telch, 2007; Westling & Öst, 1995). Research incorporating regular assessment of 
catastrophic cognitions during the treatment period is required to clarify directions of 
causality.  
Bouchard and colleagues (2007) addressed the issue of causality in a study 
incorporating a 6-week pretreatment phase, an 18-week treatment phase and a 6-
week posttreatment phase. These authors examined daily belief ratings of primary 
catastrophic cognitions and panic apprehension over this 30-week period in 12 Panic-
Ag patients who responded positively to CBT. Using multivariate time series 
analysis, changes in catastrophic beliefs preceded changes in panic apprehension in 
only six patients (50%). The authors noted that despite remaining panic free, many 
patients still endorsed catastrophic cognitions at a low to moderate degree (Bouchard 
et al., 2007). Hence, effects of CBT are only partly mediated by catastrophic 
cognitions. Indeed, Hofmann et al. (2007) found catastrophic cognitions accounted 
for only 20% to 30% of the change in panic severity.  
In summary, independent studies show CBT reduces catastrophic cognitions, 
and reduction in catastrophic cognitions during treatment is associated with 
decreased panic severity at posttreatment and follow-up, supporting cognitive 
mediation of treatment effects. However, similar rates of cognitive change also occur 
with non-cognitively focussed treatments and a study investigating causality found 
improvements in panic severity were not preceded by cognitive change in half of 
patients. Hence, it remains uncertain whether cognitive change is the cause or effect 
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of symptom relief. Furthermore, it is unclear whether catastrophic cognitions are the 
primary underlying mechanism contributing to treatment change or whether non-
specific factors common to many treatments, such as patients’ knowledge and beliefs 
about treatment, are also involved in mediating the effectiveness of CBT.  
 
Role of Treatment Knowledge and Beliefs 
As stated, CBT requires patients to actively participate in treatment, however 
non-compliance with therapeutic instructions is common (Helbig & Fehm, 2004). In 
order to effectively comply with treatment instructions, patients must know what 
they are supposed to do (Jette, 1982). Patients cannot implement treatment advice 
that they do not understand or remember. Given Panic-Ag patients present to 
treatment with high rates of anxiety and depression, such mood and arousal states 
frequently interfere with cognitive processes (e.g., attention, concentration, memory) 
essential for learning and retaining information (Asmundson, Stein, Larson, & 
Walker, 1994; Barbee, 1993; Lucas, Telch, & Bigler, 1991). If it is assumed CBT is 
effective through transfer of specific therapeutic information and techniques, it 
follows that even highly effective CBT treatment programs will fail if patients are 
unable to recall or comprehend what is discussed during treatment (Schraa & Dirks, 
1982).  
Investigations into provider-patient communication in patients with medical 
disorders have repeatedly demonstrated that patients forget much of what they are 
told (Ley, 1988), and of information recalled, misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations are common. Hence, poor treatment knowledge promotes 
unintentional non-compliance, which in turn contributes to compromised treatment 
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outcomes. However, even despite knowing what to do, patients may deliberately 
decide not to adhere to treatment recommendations. Such intentional non-
compliance is often influenced by patients’ beliefs about treatment (Horne, 1999) 
which have been shown to adversely affect treatment outcome. Research from the 
wider psychotherapy and medical literature has identified patients’ beliefs 
concerning the treatment rationale, the helpfulness of treatment and their self-
efficacy to apply the therapeutic techniques as being highly influential to treatment 
outcome. Before reviewing the literature on patients’ beliefs about treatment, 
patients’ knowledge of treatment and its impact on clinical outcomes will be 
discussed, commencing with a definition of treatment knowledge.  
 
 
Patient Knowledge of Treatment  
Definition of Treatment Knowledge 
The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, Fourth Edition (2004) defines 
knowledge as “Awareness or familiarity gained by experience (of a person, fact or 
thing); a theoretical or practical understanding of a subject, language, etc” (p. 777). 
Numerous studies have investigated relationships between patient knowledge and 
various clinical outcomes, for example, treatment compliance, illness control, quality 
of life, with results ranging from no association (e.g., Blalock et al., 2000; Chan & 
Molassiotis, 1999; Coates & Boore, 1996; Ho et al., 2003; Ivens & Sabin, 2006; Lee, 
Wing, & Wong, 1992; Sands & Holman, 1985; Scherer & Bruce, 2001) to significant 
positive associations (e.g., Abramowitz, Franklin, Zoellner, & DiBernardo, 2002; 
Barth, Campbell, Allen, Jupp, & Chisholm, 1991; Croquelois & Bogousslavsky, 
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2006; Kallich, McDermott, Xu, Fayers, & Cella, 2006; Kim et al., 2007; Kronmüller 
et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2003; Ngamvitroj & Kang, 2007; Ni et al., 1999; Soriano, 
Rabe, & Vermeire, 2004; Surawy, 1989; Weiss et al., 2003). However, patient 
knowledge is a broad term encompassing knowledge of diagnosis, symptoms, 
pathophysiology, further investigations, risks associated with procedures, prognosis 
and treatment instructions/advice. Such differing definitions of patient knowledge 
may in part explain these discordant findings (Eraker, Kirscht, & Becker, 1984).  
This thesis will confine its investigation of patient knowledge to the domain 
of treatment. For this thesis, treatment knowledge is defined as the patients’ 
awareness, familiarity or understanding of treatment information, instructions, 
recommendations or advice provided by treating clinicians considered necessary to 
control, cure, manage or prevent their presenting condition. Evidence of treatment 
knowledge, for example, would be provided if the doctor told a patient he/she needed 
to take one tablet in the morning with food every day to control hypertension and the 
patient was able to correctly remember and understand instructions (irrespective of 
actual behavioural compliance). In the CBT domain, treatment knowledge may 
include an understanding of the treatment rationale and ability to describe how to set 
up and complete a behavioural experiment in order to test catastrophic cognitions. 
Accurate understanding of treatment may be considered to reflect a deeper 
degree of knowledge than merely having an awareness of treatment. Obtaining an 
estimate of the degree of knowledge a patient possesses is dependent upon the 
manner in which such knowledge was assessed. 
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Assessment of Treatment Knowledge 
Treatment knowledge can be assessed through a range of methods including 
written tests, interviews and behavioural observation; however all methods require 
information to be stored in and retrieved from memory. The most common method 
for assessing patients’ treatment knowledge is to elicit their recall of information 
provided in relation to treatment. Ley (1988) distinguished between free recall, cued 
recall and probed recall. Free recall refers to patients freely reporting what the 
clinician has said. Cued recall is when cues are provided and patients are asked what 
was said in specified areas (e.g., “What was said about your medication?”). Probed 
recall is when patients are persistently questioned on a topic until they cannot recall 
any more information. Procedural differences influence the amount of information 
patients report. For example, probed recall with a cue elicits more information than 
cued recall without probing, which in turn elicits more information than free recall 
alone (Kortman, 1992; Tuckett, Boulton, & Olson, 1985). 
Other methods of assessing treatment knowledge involve administration of 
written questionnaires. The format of questions can be open-ended short-answer 
questions (e.g., Jarvie, Espie, & Brodie, 1993b; Westra et al., 2004), true/false style 
(e.g., Rees, Abed, & Sheard, 2003; Westreich, Levine, Ginsburg, & Wilets, 1995) or 
multiple-choice (e.g., Baker, Uus, Bamford, & Marteau, 2004; Pande et al., 2000). 
Multiple-choice methods, however, assess recognition memory of treatment 
information rather than recall and may therefore yield a different estimate of the 
proportion of knowledge obtained as compared to recall methods.  
Recall methods, although assessing the quantity of information patients 
retain, may not provide a true measure of patients’ knowledge of treatment 
instructions since recall of treatment does not guarantee understanding of instructions 
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or concepts conveyed. Patients often interpret information in a different way from 
how it was intended, as documented by Mazzullo, Lasagna and Griner (1974). These 
authors interviewed 67 medical patients on their understanding of common 
prescription labels and reported 52% thought a tablet for fluid retention actually 
caused, rather than reduced, fluid retention. As highlighted by Mazzullo et al. (1974), 
such misinterpretations may impact on a patient’s implementation of treatment (e.g., 
avoidance of taking the tablet upon noticing signs of oedema), resulting in 
unintentional non-compliance and poorer treatment outcome.  
Patients’ understanding of treatment provides a more accurate evaluation of 
treatment knowledge. Several different approaches have been used, including self-
report, use of expert judges and behavioural (or quasi-behavioural) observation (Ley, 
1988). Examples of self-report items to assess understanding include, “How well do 
you understand how to take your medication?” (Heisler, Bouknight, Hayward, Smith, 
& Kerr, 2002) and “I did not understand today’s health information, because it was 
too complicated for me” (Lukoschek, Fazzari, & Marantz, 2003).  
The use of expert judges to assess understanding involves using individuals 
highly knowledgeable about illness and treatment to interview patients about 
treatment recommendations. Any jargon or terms used by patients are queried to 
determine their interpretations of such words (Tuckett et al., 1985). For example, if a 
patient said they took a tablet for fluid retention, their interpretation of fluid retention 
would be carefully probed. Discrepancies between patients’ interpretation of what 
was told and what the doctor actually meant are taken as evidence of reduced 
treatment knowledge.  
Finally, behavioural observation is perhaps the most reliable method for 
assessing patients’ treatment knowledge (Cleaveland & Denier, 1998). This method 
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involves asking patients to specify or demonstrate the behaviours required for 
treatment compliance. An example of behavioural observation to assess diabetes 
treatment knowledge would be, “Show me how you would sterilise your needle.” 
In summary, assessment of treatment knowledge involves having patients 
recall what they were told, either orally or through questionnaires. Recall methods 
estimate the quantity of information retained, however, they do not ensure 
information recalled is correctly interpreted. Assessment of patients’ understanding 
of treatment information through interview or behavioural demonstrations can 
provide a more valid impression of patients’ treatment knowledge. Regardless of 
methods used, research from the medical literature clearly demonstrates patients’ 
recall and understanding of treatment is frequently flawed. 
 
Recall of Treatment Instructions 
Numerous researchers have found patients’ free recall of treatment 
instructions to be poor. Such investigations began with the work of Philip Ley and 
his colleagues. In his earliest report, Ley and Spelman (1965) interviewed 47 first-
time attendees of a medical outpatient clinic shortly after consultation (0 – 80 minute 
delay). These patients recalled only 44% of treatment instructions provided. In later 
studies with 20 and 157 general practice patients, Ley and colleagues found patients 
recalled only 28% and 44% of treatment instructions/advice, respectively (Ley, 
Bradshaw, Eaves, & Walker, 1973; Ley et al., 1976). Similar rates of recall (44% – 
52%) were found in rheumatology patients (Anderson, Dodman, Kopelman, & 
Fleming, 1979), although lower rates were observed after a longer delay period (> 1 
week, 0% – 39%) (Joyce, Caple, Mason, Reynolds, & Mathews, 1969).   
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Several large-scale, multi-site studies found high proportions of patients were 
unable to recall specific treatment instructions when knowledge was assessed via free 
recall. Among 1,751 patients, Kravitz et al. (1993) found 68.4%, 54.9% and 39.6% 
of patients with hypertension, diabetes and heart disease failed to recall 
recommended self-care behaviours, respectively. More recently, Flock and Stange 
(2004) found, on average, 58% of 2,670 primary care patients were unable to recall 
health behaviour recommendations.  
As stated, type of recall method influences the amount of information 
remembered. Kortman (1992) used both free and cued recall to assess what 28 
patients with tendon injuries remembered about treatment and found more 
information was recalled in response to cues. For example, of five instructions 
provided, all 28 patients (100%) failed to recall at least one instruction without cue; 
however this percentage dropped to 64.3% (18 of 28 patients) with the addition of 
specific cues. Indeed, other studies found higher rates of recall using cued recall 
methods. Bertakis (1977) found patients attending a family practice clinic recalled 
63.2% of treatment information shortly after their consultation. Among 32 Panic-Ag 
patients, Westra and colleagues found 68% of psychoeducation information was 
recalled immediately after presentation (Westra et al., 2004).  
Even higher recall rates were found by Tucket et al. (1985) in 328 general 
practice patients using a probed recall method. Following patients’ consultation with 
the doctor, a third party judgement was made regarding key points of the 
consultation patients were expected to know. The authors found 97% and 95% of 
patients recalled all key points regarding treatment and prevention, respectively. 
Such high recall rates are inconsistent with findings from other investigators and 
likely reflect differing procedural methods concerning operationalisation of treatment 
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knowledge (key points vs. number of statements made), assessment of recall (probed 
recall vs. free recall) and sample characteristics (repeat attendees vs. first-time 
attendees with a new illness). Patients making a second or third visit tend to recall 
more information than patients presenting with a new illness (Ley, 1988). 
In summary, patients are unable to spontaneously recall between one third 
and over one half of treatment information. However, providing a cue or probing can 
yield higher recall rates. Assessment of what patients recall does not necessarily 
imply they understand the information or comprehend it in the same manner as it was 
intended. Studies examining patient understanding of treatment indicate instructions 
and advice provided by doctors are often misinterpreted or not understood by 
patients. 
 
Understanding Treatment Instructions 
With regard to patients’ self-reported understanding of treatment, between 
14% and 43% of patients reported that they did not understand what they were told 
about treatment (Ley, 1988; Lukoschek et al., 2003). Heisler et al. (2002) recently 
surveyed 2,000 patients receiving diabetes care, eliciting their understanding of 
treatment using a self-report scale from 0 to 100. On average, patients scored 76.3, 
indicating a substantial gap between perceived current and ideal understanding of 
treatment.  
A disadvantage of relying on patient self-report to assess understanding is the 
risk that patients’ believe they understand information when in actuality they do not, 
thereby potentially overestimating treatment knowledge (Ley, 1988). For example, 
although patients in Anderson et al.’s (1979) study recalled 49% of treatment 
information, the authors noted that much of what patients recalled was incorrect. Of 
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what patients believed they were told, 39% was found to be either imagined to have 
been said or misinterpreted. Similarly, Tucket et al. (1985) found that while over 
90% of patients recalled key points regarding treatment and prevention advice, 
discrepancies in the interpretation of what was said between doctor and patient was 
evident in 25% of cases.  
Researchers who interviewed patients to assess understanding of treatment 
found high rates of treatment non-comprehension. Kerzman, Baron-Epel and Toren 
(2005) differentiated between patients’ reported knowledge and correct knowledge 
about medication therapy. Among 288 patients discharged from hospital, only 35 
(12%) reported knowledge about required lifestyle changes, and 20 of those (57%) 
demonstrated incorrect knowledge. Therefore, correct knowledge of necessary 
lifestyle changes was demonstrated in only 15 of 288 patients (5.2%).  
Lack of treatment understanding is considered a major contributor of 
patients’ non-compliance with treatment regimens, with reports revealing 32% to 
58% of patients fail to accurately understand or comprehend medication schedules 
(Brody, 1980; Hulka, Cassel, Kupper, & Burdette, 1976; Parkin, Henney, Quirk, & 
Crooks, 1976) and up to 98% misunderstand instructions regarding timing of doses 
(see Ley, 1988, for a review). One further study reported 82% of medical patients 
discharged from hospital were either unaware, or had incomplete understanding, of 
treatment advice despite over half receiving a written copy (Ellis, Hopkin, Leitch, & 
Crofton, 1979). Such high rates of treatment non-comprehension are worrying as 
inadequate knowledge adversely affects treatment compliance and subsequently 
affects health outcomes.  
Using behavioural observation, a more ecologically valid measure of patient 
treatment knowledge, Watkins and colleagues (Watkins, Williams, Martin, Hogan, & 
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Anderson, 1967) found similar results. Sixty diabetic patients were asked to 
demonstrate daily diabetic management routines. Over 76% of patients were 
classified as having unacceptable performance on urine testing and 93.3% were 
considered to perform inadequately in at least one of three diabetic management 
areas expected to directly affect diabetic control.  
Thus, whether treatment understanding is assessed via self-report, interview 
or behavioural methods, patients frequently demonstrate insufficient knowledge of 
treatment and its requirements. Patients cannot adhere to advice they do not 
remember or understand. It follows that poor treatment knowledge promotes 
treatment non-compliance which in turn adversely affects the effectiveness of 
treatments and contributes to reduced clinical outcomes. Therefore, it is important to 
identify variables associated with patients’ knowledge (and related issues 
surrounding memory and learning) so strategies can be directed towards improving 
acquisition and retention of information among patients at risk of misunderstanding 
and/or forgetting treatment.  
  
Factors Associated with Knowledge, Memory and Learning  
Of studies investigating factors associated with patient knowledge, the 
majority assessed knowledge concerning a range of health issues (e.g., diagnosis, 
symptoms, prognosis, tests required); hence it is unclear whether such findings 
generalise to the more specific issues of treatment knowledge per se. The following 
section describes relationships between variables theoretically expected to share 
associations with patient knowledge and related constructs of learning and memory 
(i.e., cognitive abilities necessary for knowledge acquisition and retention). 
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Specifically, the role of age, education, intelligence, anxiety and psychotropic 
medication will be examined. 
 
Age, Education and Intelligence  
The relationship between age and knowledge shows an inconsistent 
association. Some studies reported a negative relationship between increased age and 
amount of information recalled (Anderson et al., 1979; Croquelois & Bogousslavsky, 
2006; Ellis et al., 1979; Joyce et al., 1969; Kronmüller et al., 2006; Ley et al., 1976; 
McPherson, Smith, Powers, & Zuckerman, 2008; Surawy, 1989; Westra et al., 2004), 
while several studies reported no significant association (Brody, 1980; Flocke & 
Stange, 2004; Kayaniyil et al., 2009; Kerzman et al., 2005; Kortman, 1992; 
Lukoschek et al., 2003; Rees et al., 2003) and another found an age effect such that 
older patients knew more than their younger counterparts (Ley & Spelman, 1965). 
  Education level has often been associated with patients’ knowledge, with 
more educated patients recalling or understanding more information (Beeney, Dunn, 
& Welch, 1994; Bertakis, 1977; Ho et al., 2003; Kayaniyil et al., 2009; Kronmüller 
et al., 2006; Lukoschek et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2003; Reid et al., 1995; Scherer & 
Bruce, 2001; Westra et al., 2004; Yeh, Sung, Yorker, Sun, & Kuo, 2008) although 
others failed to replicate this association (Flocke & Stange, 2004; Kerzman et al., 
2005; McPherson et al., 2008). Of the few studies examining the relationship 
between intelligence and patient knowledge, higher intelligence was related to 
greater patient knowledge (Beeney et al., 1994; Ley, 1988; Ley & Spelman, 1965; 
Reid et al., 1995). 
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Anxiety  
Mixed finding have been observed for the relationship between patient 
anxiety and information recalled. Ley and Spelman (1965) reported a Yerkes-
Dodson-type inverted U-shape relationship between anxiety and recall of medical 
information, where patients with moderate levels of anxiety remembered more than 
those with higher or lower anxiety. In contrast, a positive linear relationship between 
anxiety and recall was observed by Anderson et al. (1979), indicating patients with 
low anxiety recalled less information. The above patients were medical patients 
rather than patients with anxiety disorders, the latter of which often exhibit clinically 
higher levels of trait anxiety. 
Among patients with anxiety disorders, attention and concentration (cognitive 
processes essential for memory and learning) are negatively affected (Barbee, 1993) 
and result in inefficiencies in the acquisition and retention of treatment knowledge. 
Adults with Panic-Ag scored significantly lower on measures of verbal learning and 
verbal and visual recall than non-anxious controls (Asmundson et al., 1994; Lucas et 
al., 1991), although another study failed to replicate this effect (Gladsjo et al., 1998). 
Such discrepant findings may be attributable to differences in neuropsychological 
tests, sample sizes and medication status. Medication status is important as some 
psychotropic medications, notably benzodiazepines, are associated with deficits in 
memory and learning as described below. 
 
Psychotropic Medication  
 Pharmacological treatment guidelines for Panic-Ag have shifted away from 
using benzodiazepines and instead recommend antidepressants, particularly selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), as first-line pharmacological interventions 
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(American Psychiatric Association, 1998). Despite these changes in prescribing 
recommendations, Bruce et al. (2003) reported benzodiazepines are still the most 
commonly prescribed medication for Panic-Ag. The effects of benzodiazepines and 
antidepressants on cognitive functioning will now be discussed. 
 
Benzodiazepines 
Impairment in cognitive functioning associated with benzodiazepine use has 
been documented in numerous studies (see Barker, Jackson, Greenwood, & Crowe, 
2003, for a review). Benzodiazepines may cause anterograde amnesia, that is, 
reduced memory for events occurring after administration of the drug (Ashton, 
1995). Mintzer et al. (2001) postulated that benzodiazepines cause impairments in 
episodic memory (memory for personally experienced events), specifically at the 
level of encoding. Thus, memory is impaired for information presented to patients 
while affected by the drug, even when tested under drug-free conditions.  
Of particular clinical importance, benzodiazepine use has been shown to 
affect patients’ learning and memory of information presented during CBT. Westra 
et al. (2004) compared 16 daily benzodiazepine using Panic-Ag patients with 16 age- 
and education-matched non-medicated Panic-Ag patients on memory of 
psychoeducation information regarding the development and treatment of Panic-Ag. 
Benzodiazepine users recalled significantly less information relative to their non-
medicated counterparts (58% vs. 78%, p < .05); furthermore, benzodiazepine status 
was a stronger predictor of memory performance than education and age, accounting 
for 38% of variance. Thus, benzodiazepine use appears to adversely affect memory 
and recall of treatment knowledge in patients.  
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Antidepressants 
Contrary to the case of benzodiazepines, minimal evidence suggests 
antidepressant use contributes to cognitive impairment. Antidepressants with the 
highest anticholinergic side-effect profile, namely tricyclics (Noble & Benfield, 
1997), have been found to negatively impact memory performance after acute initial 
administration (Naudon, Hotte, & Jay, 2007), however tolerance to such effects tends 
to develop within 1 to 3 weeks of use (Danion, 1993). In contrast, SSRIs are less 
cognitively impairing than tricyclics (van Laar et al., 2002). One study reported a 
significant negative effect of paroxetine relative to placebo on a delayed recall word 
list task using healthy volunteers taking the drug for 2 weeks (Schmidt, Kruizinga, & 
Riedel, 2001); however, the authors noted the effect was weak (words recalled: 
paroxetine = 11.0, placebo = 11.6, p < .05), likely due to paroxetine’s anticholinergic 
effects and may be clinically relevant only for elderly individuals more sensitive to 
anticholinergic induced memory impairment and slower to develop tolerance to such 
effects (Danion, 1993). 
In summary, although inconsistent findings exist, adults who are older, less 
educated, of lower intellect, highly anxious and/or benzodiazepine users during 
treatment appear at increased risk of experiencing difficulties in acquiring and/or 
retaining treatment information. From a clinical perspective, assuming a causal 
relationship between treatment knowledge and outcome exists, these factors could 
flag patients who would benefit from receiving additional interventions to enhance 
treatment knowledge. 
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Relationship Between Treatment Knowledge and Clinical 
Outcomes 
Within the literature, clinical outcomes refer either to (a) treatment 
compliance, or (b) treatment outcome (symptomatic improvement). Interpretation of 
research examining relationships between patient knowledge and outcomes is 
hampered by inconsistencies in definitions and assessment of patient knowledge. 
Most studies do not purely focus on treatment knowledge but include other related 
aspects of knowledge (e.g., aetiology, prognosis, Ho et al., 2003; Scherer & Bruce, 
2001; Watkins et al., 1967). Ley (1988) argued that specific aspects of knowledge 
should theoretically hold different relationships with outcome. For example, 
knowledge of the treatment regimen for hypertension is a prerequisite for medication 
compliance and blood pressure control. Knowledge of the illness may also affect 
medication compliance (and therefore blood pressure control) but it is not as 
necessary as knowing how many tablets to take. Studies incorporating other aspects 
of knowledge are therefore likely to underestimate the true relationship between 
treatment knowledge and clinical outcomes. Bearing these limitations in mind, 
research on this issue will now be reviewed. Studies examining the relationship with 
treatment compliance will be discussed first followed by studies comparing patient 
knowledge with treatment outcome.  
 
Treatment Compliance 
 Ley (1988) reviewed 16 studies published between 1967 and 1986 examining 
the relationship between knowledge and compliance in patients with medical 
disorders. He categorised studies into those assessing patients’ understanding (14 
studies) and those assessing memory (two studies). Correlations between 
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understanding and compliance ranged from .02 (German, Klein, McPhee, & Smith, 
1982) to .73 (Parkin et al., 1976), with a mean of .36. Variations in patient disease 
characteristics, demographics and scope of patient knowledge assessed are likely to 
explain the discrepant findings. The relationship between memory and compliance 
was slightly lower with a mean correlation of .29.  
 Since Ley’s (1988) review, significant positive associations between 
knowledge and compliance have been reported by other researchers in diabetes 
(Barth et al., 1991; Kravitz et al., 1993), hypertension (Kim et al., 2007), heart failure 
(Ni et al., 1999), asthma (Kolbe, Vamos, Fergusson, Elkind, & Garrett, 1996; 
Ngamvitroj & Kang, 2007), HIV (Miller et al., 2003; Weiss et al., 2003) and 
depression (Yeh et al., 2008). Knowledge was typically assessed via questionnaires 
(multiple-choice or true/false formats) although some studies interviewed patients 
(Kravitz et al., 1993; Miller et al., 2003). Where correlations were provided, the 
magnitude of coefficients were similar to the average reported by Ley (1988). For 
example, correlations of .38 and .33 (Barth et al., 1991; Ni et al., 1999, respectively). 
However, other researchers failed to find significant associations between knowledge 
and compliance (Ho et al., 2003; Lee et al., 1992; Sands & Holman, 1985; Scherer & 
Bruce, 2001) for reasons comparable to those cited above, namely differing disease 
populations, patient characteristics, illness severity and extent of knowledge 
examined. 
 Within the psychotherapy literature, significant positive correlations between 
patients’ treatment knowledge and compliance have also been reported. In a study 
involving 28 patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Abramowitz and 
colleagues (Abramowitz et al., 2002) found patients’ understanding of the treatment 
rationale for exposure/response prevention correlated .57 with clinician ratings of in-
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session treatment compliance and .34 with homework compliance. More recently, 
among 61 depressed inpatients, Kronmüller et al. (2006) reported higher treatment 
knowledge for depression was associated with increased self-rated proactive 
problem-oriented coping (r = .41, p < .001). Thus, evidence to date suggests patient 
knowledge (specifically treatment knowledge) is related to compliance behaviour in 
psychotherapy, although findings are mixed for medical disorders.  
 
Treatment Outcome 
Within the medical literature, significant associations between patients’ 
treatment knowledge and outcome have been found, although other studies reported 
non-significant findings. The discrepant results appear due to differences in aspects 
of knowledge examined (treatment knowledge vs. illness knowledge), knowledge 
assessment procedures (questionnaires vs. interview) and psychometric properties of 
knowledge instruments, as illustrated in the fields of diabetes and asthma.  
McPherson et al. (2008) recently interviewed 44 diabetic patients and found 
greater treatment knowledge was strongly associated with better glycemic control (r 
= -.61, p < .001, lower score reflects better glycemic control) and accounted for 40% 
of the variation in blood glucose levels. Using a diabetes knowledge questionnaire, 
Meadows et al. (1988) reported patients with good metabolic control (n = 17) had 
greater treatment knowledge than those with poor control (n = 38; 61.0 vs. 52.3, p < 
.01), and Surawy (1989) replicated this association using the same questionnaire in 
25 patients, finding a correlation of -.55 between overall treatment knowledge and 
metabolic control.  
However, using a different measure, the Diabetes Knowledge Questionnaire 
(Dunn et al., 1984), other researchers failed to find significant relationships (Chan & 
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Molassiotis, 1999; Coates & Boore, 1996; Dunn, Beeney, Hoskins, & Turtle, 1990). 
Ceiling effects were observed for the knowledge measure used in these three studies 
indicating a lack of sensitivity in differentiating between levels of patient knowledge 
(Beeney et al., 1994; Coates & Boore, 1996), thus reducing its clinical and 
theoretical usefulness.  
In contrast, two early studies found negative relationships whereby patients 
with poor control had greater knowledge of the disease (Watkins et al., 1967; 
Williams, Martin, Hogan, Watkins, & Ellis, 1967). A possible explanation for this 
unexpected result is that patients with poor control may have had a greater number of 
associated problems requiring additional interventions, staff contact and diabetes 
education, resulting in their acquiring more knowledge, yet other factors contributed 
to poor metabolic control (Williams et al., 1967). When examining the relationship 
between treatment knowledge and outcome in diabetes, controlling for number of 
complications would be useful to clarify the association.  
Within the asthma literature, Soriano et al. (2004) interviewed asthma 
patients regarding their treatment knowledge and found those with poor asthma 
control (n = 179) had significantly less knowledge than those with good control (n = 
252) (77.4 vs. 93.6, p < .01). However, other researchers using asthma knowledge 
questionnaires (Ho et al., 2003; Scherer & Bruce, 2001) failed to replicate this 
relationship with a range of outcome measures (asthma attack frequency, emergency 
department visits, hospitalisations). However, the reliability of the knowledge scale 
used by Ho et al. (2003) was low, thus undermining their conclusions. Furthermore, 
items from these asthma knowledge questionnaires incorporated non-treatment 
related knowledge (prevalence, aetiology, symptoms). For example, an item from the 
asthma knowledge questionnaire used by Scherer and Bruce (2001) was, “The 
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number of people with asthma in the United States is approximately ______.” Such 
items provide a diluted measure of treatment knowledge, thereby weakening its 
association with outcome. 
In the psychotherapy domain, to date only Abramowitz and colleagues 
(2002), in their study of 28 OCD patients described above, investigated the 
relationship between treatment knowledge and outcome. Controlling for pretreatment 
symptom severity, comprehension of the treatment rationale correlated -.65 with 
treatment outcome (p < .01), indicating patients demonstrating greater understanding 
of the rationale had less severe symptoms at posttreatment. Moreover, 
comprehension of the treatment rationale was the strongest predictor of treatment 
outcome (in comparison to in-session and homework compliance ratings).  
In summary, studies from the medical and psychotherapy literature have 
found patients’ knowledge of treatment is related to clinical outcomes, whereby 
greater knowledge is associated with increased compliance and improved treatment 
outcome. Although conflicting findings abound, studies confining their examination 
to treatment knowledge (Abramowitz et al., 2002; Kronmüller et al., 2006; Meadows 
et al., 1988; Surawy, 1989) tended to yield higher correlations with compliance and 
outcome than those including other aspects of patient knowledge (Ho et al., 2003; 
Scherer & Bruce, 2001; Watkins et al., 1967). However, as discussed below, the 
majority of studies have substantive methodological problems regarding the 
measurement of knowledge, rendering conclusions regarding the true relationship 
unclear.  
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Methodological Limitations 
Brown (1990) described the measurement of knowledge in the diabetes 
literature as being “seriously flawed” (p. 57) with few studies using measures with 
demonstrated validity and reliability. Such concerns are equally applicable to the 
assessment of knowledge within the wider range of medical and psychiatric 
disorders, with numerous studies utilising unvalidated measures of patient 
knowledge to examine relationships with treatment outcome in the fields of 
congestive heart failure (Ni et al., 1999), diabetes (Barth et al., 1991; Heisler et al., 
2002), hypertension (Sands & Holman, 1985), HIV (Miller et al., 2003; Weiss et al., 
2003), renal patients (Durose, Holdsworth, Watson, & Przygrodzka, 2004), patients 
on lithium therapy (Lee et al., 1992) and OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2002). Although it 
is possible that patient knowledge of treatment is not related to expected clinical 
outcomes, the lack of robust correlations may in part be due to the psychometrically 
unsound knowledge assessment instruments utilised in these studies. 
Another important methodological problem previously alluded to concerns 
the content of knowledge measures; many scales combine items assessing treatment 
knowledge with other information regarding symptoms, aetiology and illness 
prevalence (Ho et al., 2003; Scherer & Bruce, 2001; Wigal et al., 1993) thereby 
diluting the measure of treatment knowledge. As argued by Ley (1988), these other 
aspects of knowledge theoretically hold weaker relationships with outcome as they 
are not essential for treatment compliance. Therefore, treatment knowledge needs to 
be separated from other aspects of illness information when investigating the 
relationship between treatment knowledge and outcome.  
Providing an objective assessment of patients’ knowledge is also essential 
when examining the relationship between knowledge and outcome. The impressive 
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negative correlation of -.65 reported in OCD patients (Abramowitz et al., 2002) must 
be interpreted with caution. Not only were patients’ comprehension of treatment 
rationale rated on a single-item Likert-type scale (ranging from 0 = poor to 6 = 
outstanding) with no information provided on the validity or reliability of either the 
measure or its scoring system, but also such ratings were made by the patient’s 
therapist following the final treatment session. Hence, these were non-blind ratings 
potentially prone to therapist-bias. For example, improvements shown by patients 
over the course of treatment may have inadvertently influenced therapists to 
conclude such patients had greater understanding of the rationale than those showing 
less change, resulting in an inflated association between treatment knowledge and 
outcome. Despite these limitations, should such an association exist, the clinical 
implications for treatment delivery are significant. 
On the basis of the studies reviewed above, deficits in patients’ treatment 
knowledge have been identified as a factor that can substantially hinder involvement 
in therapy. In clinical practice, both patients and clinicians may believe patients 
understand treatment and its rationale, when in actuality they do not. This 
phenomenon has been described as an “illusion of knowing” (Glenberg, Wilkinson, 
& Epstein, 1982); an individual’s belief that comprehension has been attained when 
in fact it has not. If ignored, such an illusion may represent a major obstacle to 
patients effectively learning and applying treatment techniques, which in turn could 
impair treatment outcome. To counteract this illusion, clinicians are recommended to 
regularly assess patients’ treatment knowledge and correct areas of confusion or 
misunderstanding. 
 
Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
 
39 
Summary 
Research data indicate that patients often forget and/or misunderstand much 
of what they have been told about treatment. Factors associated with poorer 
treatment knowledge include older age, less education, lower intelligence, greater 
anxiety and benzodiazepine use. While not specifically examined in relation to CBT 
for Panic-Ag, studies investigating relationships between patients’ treatment 
knowledge and clinical outcomes have produced conflicting and inconclusive results. 
Several studies suggest increased knowledge is associated with better treatment 
compliance and outcome, with a greater number failing to demonstrate such 
relationships. Variations in definitions and scope of knowledge, disorders, patient 
populations, severity levels and clinical outcome variables contribute to the 
inconsistent findings reported.  
Conclusions regarding the true relationship between treatment knowledge and 
outcome have also been hampered by the use of knowledge measures with poor or 
unknown psychometric properties, often containing items assessing information 
extraneous to treatment, or that rely on subjective ratings of patient knowledge. 
Hence, one aim of this thesis is to extend the existing literature by developing a 
valid, reliable, sensitive and objective measure of patients’ knowledge of CBT for 
Panic-Ag to more accurately determine whether greater treatment knowledge is 
associated with improved outcome in this patient group. If such a relationship is 
present, clinicians are recommended to presume patients’ understanding of treatment 
is imperfect and apply steps to ensure adequate comprehension.  
However, even with such knowledge enhancing strategies, compliance rates 
in medical disorders are estimated to increase from 50% to only 66% to 76% (Ley, 
1986). Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationship between treatment knowledge 
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and outcome is only moderate at best. Therefore, treatment knowledge is a necessary 
but not sufficient factor for treatment compliance and successful outcome. Patients 
may choose not to comply with recommendations despite full comprehension of 
treatment information.  
Horne (1999) asserted patients’ beliefs about treatment are the “hidden 
determinant of treatment outcome” (p. 491). Prior to commencing therapy, patients 
hold an abundance of pre-existing beliefs regarding a range of issues that impact on 
their willingness to engage in therapy. These beliefs are based on personal 
experiences as well as information from family and friends, the media and other 
health practitioners (Leventhal, Diefenbach, & Leventhal, 1992). Clinicians’ 
treatment recommendations must compete with these beliefs and if discrepant, such 
advice may be dismissed (Donovan, Blake, & Fleming, 1989), contributing to 
reduced treatment outcomes (Horne, 1999).  
Even with sound understanding of treatment and its rationale, patients may 
not accept it as relevant to their problem, hold low expectations of its helpfulness 
and/or lack confidence in implementing treatment procedures dictated. Indeed, 
patients’ acceptance of the treatment rationale, expectancies of treatment outcome 
and self-efficacy to implement therapy have been identified as specific treatment 
beliefs critical to the success of any therapy program. Commencing with acceptance 
of the treatment rationale, the next sections will discuss the clinical importance of 
these beliefs and review their relationships with treatment outcome. 
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Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale  
Definition 
Acceptance of the treatment rationale is defined as the extent to which 
individuals believe or agree the rationale for treatment (including the aetiology of the 
problem and treatment procedures) is relevant and helpful to their problems (Addis 
& Carpenter, 2000; Fennell & Teasdale, 1987). Acceptance of the rationale has been 
assessed in numerous ways, for example asking patients, “To what extent does the 
treatment you are receiving match with your ideas of what helps people in 
psychotherapy?” (Addis & Jacobson, 2000). In addition, independent judges have 
rated patient responses to the rationale. For example, the response, “It’s like a mirror. 
Now I understand it, I can work on it,” reflects a high degree of acceptance (Fennell 
& Teasdale, 1987, p. 264). Treatment credibility, on the other hand, reflects patients’ 
perceptions of how logical treatment appears (Kazdin, 1979). For instance, an item 
from Borkovec and Nau’s (1972) treatment credibility scale is, “How logical does 
this treatment seem to you?”  
Acceptance of the treatment rationale differs from rationale credibility as, 
although they are likely to be positively associated, it is conceivable that a rationale 
regarded as logical may simultaneously be poorly accepted. To illustrate this point, a 
doctor may provide a highly cogent explanation of how imbalances in serotonin level 
cause and maintain depression, thus requiring prescription of serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors. The patient, while perceiving the treatment rationale to be logical, may 
still reject it if it is incompatible with his/her ideas of what caused the problem and 
what is needed to achieve recovery. Instead, the patient may believe negative 
childhood experiences are at the root of his/her psychological distress, hence 
treatment should involve discussion of childhood issues. Items assessing acceptance 
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of the rationale typically have a more personal focus  in contrast to credibility ratings 
(e.g., “Antidepressants are an effective treatment in general” vs. “Antidepressants are 
an effective treatment for me”) (Addis & Carpenter, 1999).  
 
Importance of the Treatment Rationale 
The treatment rationale, although widely differing in content, is considered to 
play a central role in all psychotherapies, including CBT. Frank (1982) referred to 
the treatment rationale as a conceptual scheme or “myth” that attempts to provide a 
persuasive explanation to account for and explain the patient’s distressing symptoms. 
The rationale also sets the stage for prescribing specific treatment procedures or 
“rituals” designed to promote recovery (Addis & Carpenter, 2000). Beck and 
colleagues ascribed considerable importance to the presentation of a convincing 
treatment rationale early in CBT to encourage treatment compliance (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Indeed, withholding the rationale for treatment is associated 
with decreased acceptability of and willingness to use therapeutic instructions (Lee, 
Uhlemann, & Wikman, 1994) and reduced treatment change (Oliveau, Agras, 
Leitenberg, Moore, & Wright, 1969).  
A credible treatment rationale has the potential to heighten positive 
expectations regarding benefits of therapy, with the latter being related to positive 
treatment outcomes (as discussed in the next section). Nau, Caputo and Borkovec 
(1974) empirically demonstrated that rationale credibility was related to expectancy 
of improvement across three studies using snake-fearful adults (study 1: 8 = 49; 
study 2: 8 = 18; study 3: 8 = 86). Participants were presented with a rationale for 
one of several treatment procedures (including systematic desensitisation and 
placebo procedures). They were instructed to rate the credibility of treatment 
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rationales and role-play expected treatment effects during an approach test after 
imagining they received 5 weeks of that therapy. That is, their simulated response to 
treatment served as a behavioural measure of expectancy of treatment improvement. 
Credibility ratings for the total group correlated significantly with participants’ 
simulated treatment response for all three experiments (r = .30 – .60, p < .02).  
Regarding treatment outcome however, perceived credibility of the treatment 
rationale holds an inconsistent relationship. Morrison and Shapiro (1987) found 
patients’ credibility ratings correlated significantly with overall clinical improvement 
for 40 patients receiving CBT or relationship-oriented therapy for depression or 
anxiety. However, using the same scale, other researchers failed to identify rationale 
credibility as a significant predictor of outcome in patients with Panic-Ag (Ramnerö 
& Öst, 2004) and Generalised Anxiety Disorder (Borkovec & Costello, 1993; 
Borkovec & Matthews, 1988). Differences in diagnoses, therapies and temporal 
administration of measures may account for the conflicting findings.  
As noted, the mere presentation of a credible rationale does not guarantee all 
patients will accept it. While rationale credibility holds an inconsistent relationship 
with outcome, research suggests acceptance of the rationale is more strongly related 
to patients’ aetiological beliefs and clinical outcomes.  
 
Relationship Between Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale and 
Clinical Outcomes 
For the treatment rationale to be accepted it must be congruent with patients’ 
pre-existing beliefs and conceptualisations of their symptoms (Butler & Strupp, 
1986). Highlighting this, in a sample of 51 non-clinical individuals, Addis and 
Carpenter (1999) found the more reasons offered for depression contrary to an 
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action-oriented treatment rationale, the less accepting patients were of that rationale 
(r = -.31, p < .05). Negative reactions to the rationale are not uncommon, with 58% 
of patients voicing disagreements or doubts after being probed for their opinion 
(Addis & Carpenter, 2000). Theoretically, patients are unlikely to remain in 
treatment or benefit from psychotherapy if the treatment rationale is inconsistent with 
their beliefs about what should occur during therapy (Connor-Greene, 1993). 
 
Treatment Attrition  
Studies of different psychiatric disorders have linked poor acceptance of the 
treatment rationale with attrition. Davis and Addis (2002) examined predictors of 
dropout from an outpatient behavioural medicine program for 118 patients presenting 
with stress, insomnia or pain. Patients were classified as early dropouts (n = 37), late 
dropouts (n = 22) or treatment completers (n = 59) according to number of sessions 
completed. Of predictor variables investigated (including physical and mental health 
functioning, self-efficacy expectations and treatment outcome expectations), 
agreement with the treatment rationale was the strongest predictor of treatment 
completion status, with early dropouts reporting significantly less acceptance of the 
rationale (M = 3.93, SD = .83) than completers (M = 4.55, SD = .52, p < .001). 
Consistent results were obtained by Hofmann and Suvak (2006) in the area of Social 
Phobia. These authors reported that dropouts (n = 34) from a CBT group program 
endorsed the treatment rationale significantly less positively than treatment 
completers (n = 99) despite not differing on demographic variables, Axis I or Axis II 
psychopathology.  
In a similar vein, Elkin et al. (1999) found lower attrition when patients 
receive treatment congruent with their beliefs regarding the aetiology and treatment 
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of their problem. Prior to treatment, 82 patients with major depression completed a 
questionnaire assessing belief in different causes of depression (e.g., being very self-
critical, biochemical problems) and the perceived helpfulness of different treatment 
approaches (e.g., learning more realistic attitudes about oneself and the world, 
medication) to ascertain treatment preference for psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy. 
Patients were randomly assigned to receive either psychotherapy (CBT or 
interpersonal therapy) or medication. Forty patients received their preferred 
treatment option (congruent group) and 42 received their non-preferred treatment 
(non-congruent group). Attrition rates were significantly lower in the congruent 
compared to non-congruent group (5% vs. 21%, p < .05). Similarly, Foulks, Persons 
and Merkel (1986) found disagreement between patients’ aetiological beliefs and a 
biopsychosocial rationale for depression was associated with poorer therapy 
attendance and premature termination among 60 psychiatric outpatients.  
These studies suggest patients are at increased risk of dropping out of 
treatment if the treatment rationale is poorly accepted, particularly if it is 
incompatible with patients’ pre-existing aetiological beliefs. Evidence also suggests 
patients’ acceptance of the treatment rationale is associated with outcome; however, 
surprisingly, no study has examined this in CBT for Panic-Ag. 
 
Treatment Outcome  
From a conceptual perspective, acceptance of the treatment rationale should 
promote stronger engagement with therapy, positive expectations of improvement 
and increased treatment compliance, which in turn should improve treatment 
outcomes. A pivotal study, in that it was the first to highlight the importance of 
patients’ acceptance of the treatment rationale in influencing outcome, and also set 
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the foundation for subsequent studies, was conducted by Fennell and Teasdale 
(1987). These authors attempted to understand factors contributing to individual 
differences in response to CBT for depression. In their study, 15 patients with 
depression were instructed to read a booklet concerning principles of cognitive 
therapy for depression following their first therapy session. Responses to the booklet 
(recorded at the beginning of Session 2) were rated by independent judges on the 
extent to which they accepted the treatment rationale. Consistent with the conceptual 
model, greater acceptance of the rationale was associated with greater compliance 
with treatment recommendations assigned in Session 2, and was highly predictive of 
treatment outcome, correlating significantly with independent observer ratings of 
depression at posttreatment (r = -.76, p < .01) and 6-month follow-up (r = -.65, p < 
.02). The same trend was observed at 1-year follow-up (r = -.52, p < .1) but this 
failed to reach significance. However, with a sample size of only 15, these high 
correlations may have reflected an early trend in the data which may not generalise 
to the larger population of depressed patients (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). As 
sampling error increases with decreasing sample size, replication with a larger 
sample is clearly required. 
Using a larger sample, Addis and Jacobson (1996) partially replicated the 
findings of Fennell and Teasdale (1987) in 98 depressed patients randomly allocated 
to receive cognitive therapy (n = 48) or behavioural activation (n = 50). Ratings of 
acceptance of the treatment rationale were combined with ratings of homework 
helpfulness to form a composite of “treatment helpfulness”. Controlling for 
pretreatment depression, the authors found Session 2 ratings of treatment helpfulness 
significantly predicted posttreatment outcome for patients receiving behavioural 
activation (r = .47, p < .01) but not cognitive therapy (r = .17, p > .05). As 
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acceptance ratings were combined with ratings of homework helpfulness, the true 
association between acceptance of the rationale and outcome remains unclear. 
Strengthening the results of the previous two studies, Addis and Jacobson 
(2000) obtained similar findings using a purer measure of acceptance of the 
treatment rationale in a larger sample. In a sample of 150 patients undergoing CBT 
for depression, acceptance of the rationale assessed across the first three sessions 
correlated significantly with treatment outcome (r = .35, p < .05), and early- and 
mid-homework compliance (r = .18, p < .05; r = .17, p < .05, respectively). 
Interestingly, mediational analyses demonstrated acceptance of the treatment 
rationale had an independent direct relationship with clinical outcome rather than 
simply through encouraging increased homework compliance, arguing in favour of 
non-specific effects influencing outcome.  
In summary, consistent findings from independent lines of research using 
different methodologies suggest that poor acceptance of the treatment rationale is 
associated with reduced therapeutic outcome in patients with depression. However, 
such a conclusion is weakened by methodological limitations inherent in studies and 
it remains unclear whether the same relationship exists for patients with Panic-Ag.  
 
Methodological Limitations  
An important methodological difficulty concerns the use of measures with 
unknown psychometric properties. Addis and Jacobson (1996, 2000) relied on 
single-item measures to assess acceptance of the treatment rationale. The reliability 
and validity of these scales were not reported, raising questions about their 
psychometric properties. Moreover, single-item scales are unreliable as they are 
associated with substantial random error, do not permit estimation of important 
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reliability information (e.g., internal consistency) and the magnitude of reliability is 
found to increase with the number of items (Loo, 2002; Nunnally, 1967). In addition, 
the validity of single-item scales is often poor, as it is difficult to depict complex 
constructs with a single item (Nunnally, 1967). As noted earlier, one study (Addis & 
Jacobson, 1996) combined rationale acceptance and homework helpfulness ratings, 
thereby potentially obscuring the true association between acceptance of the rationale 
and outcome.  
A further problem involves the temporal assessment of acceptance of the 
rationale. The studies reviewed above assessed acceptance of the rationale within the 
first three sessions and compared it with treatment outcome. However, CBT typically 
involves numerous treatment components introduced to patients gradually over the 
course of therapy. For example, CBT for Panic-Ag typically involves an introduction 
to the cognitive model and presentation of psychoeducation material during the first 
two sessions, with the rationale for cognitive therapy, behavioural experiments, in 
vivo exposure and interoceptive exposure unfolding over sessions three to six. 
Comparing treatment outcome with acceptance of the rationale before it has been 
fully described seems premature. Indeed, Addis and Jacobson (1996) observed 
differential relationships between acceptance of the rationale and outcome for 
patients allocated to behavioural activation or cognitive therapy. They speculated the 
relationship with behavioural activation was stronger as, unlike cognitive therapy, it 
utilised the same treatment approach consistently throughout treatment.  
This thesis therefore aims to address these methodological weaknesses by developing 
a psychometrically sound measure comprising items focussed purely on acceptance 
of the treatment rationale for CBT in Panic-Ag. In this way, the relationship between 
acceptance of the rationale and outcome can be assessed more accurately. This 
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measure will be administered to patients both before and after CBT to determine 
whether pretreatment and posttreatment beliefs about the rationale are associated 
with treatment improvement. 
 
 
Clinical Implications  
Based on the above, clinicians are advised to encourage discussion of the 
treatment rationale regularly throughout treatment to elicit patient reactions 
contributing to its non-acceptance to minimise early termination and improve 
outcomes (Addis & Carpenter, 2000; Davis & Addis, 2002; Elkin et al., 1999; Iselin 
& Addis, 2003; Van Audenhove & Vertommen, 2000). Indeed, exploring patients’ 
beliefs about the treatment rationale improves compliance, the latter being related to 
outcome (Kazantzis et al., 2000). Worthington (1986) found exploring client 
attitudes about therapy recommendations significantly predicted subsequent 
treatment compliance among 61 counselling clients, while merely stressing its 
importance did not. Similarly, in 26 depressed patients undergoing cognitive therapy, 
Bryant, Simons and Thase (1999) found significantly greater treatment compliance 
when therapists elicited patients’ perceptions regarding treatment.  
However, for patients who still fail to accept the rationale despite efforts to 
explore and address their reservations, matching treatment with their preferred 
alternative may be an option. Some studies in the field of depression found matching 
treatment preferences with treatment type contributed to improved patient outcome 
relative to receiving a randomised (Chilvers et al., 2001) or non-preferred treatment 
(Lin et al., 2005). However, other studies found no advantage for treatment matching 
relative to randomisation in patients with depression (e.g., Bedi et al., 2000; Elkin et 
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al., 1999). For patients with Panic-Ag, Bakker and colleagues (Bakker, Spinhoven, 
van Balkom, Vleugel, & van Dyck, 2000) compared patients treated with cognitive 
therapy through preference (n = 31) or randomisation (n = 35) and found no 
difference in outcome; however no studies have examined the impact of non-
preferred therapy on outcome in Panic-Ag. Devine and Fernald (1973) specifically 
examined this issue among 32 snake phobics and found outcomes were reduced 
when phobic individuals were treated with therapies they strongly disliked (p < .01).  
 
Summary 
 The treatment rationale serves a fundamental role in therapy through 
attempting to provide patients with an explanation of the cause of their problem and 
its solution. Patients vary in terms of their acceptance of the treatment rationale, 
which is often dependent upon its compatibility with pre-existing conceptualisations 
of their problem. Several studies have linked poor acceptance of the rationale with 
premature dropout and poorer outcome in CBT, suggesting clinicians should either 
discuss patients’ reservations about the rationale during therapy or offer preferred 
treatments. However, methodological problems surrounding the use of 
psychometrically unsound measures and timing of assessments cast doubt on the 
validity of this association, and it remains unclear whether the same relationship 
exists for patients with Panic-Ag. The present thesis aims to address the 
methodological problems inherent in the assessment of patients’ acceptance of the 
rationale such that its association with treatment improvement following CBT for 
Panic-Ag can then be examined.  
Acceptance of the treatment rationale does not guarantee patients will believe 
treatment will be effective for them. Patients may strongly agree with the rationale 
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behind CBT yet not believe it will improve their symptoms. This latter treatment 
belief, often referred to as expectancies of treatment outcome, has frequently been 
linked to patient improvement in numerous clinical populations including Panic-Ag. 
 
 
Expectancies of Treatment Outcome 
Definition 
Patients’ belief that therapy will be helpful and lead to improvement has been 
the focus of investigation for over 50 years (Arnkoff, Glass, & Shapiro, 2002). Also 
referred to as treatment outcome expectancy or expectation for therapeutic gain, 
patients’ beliefs about treatment outcome are prognostic beliefs that therapy will lead 
to change (Greenberg, Constantino, & Bruce, 2006). Therapy expectancies can be 
either positive (the belief that treatment will be helpful), negative (a lack of 
confidence that therapy will result in improvement) or ambivalent (conflicting 
feelings regarding the value of therapy) (Lipkin, 1954).  
Treatment outcome expectancies have been measured in various ways, 
including, “How much do you really feel that therapy will help you to reduce your 
symptoms?” (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000), “How confident are you that this treatment 
will eliminate your fear of ______?” (Holt & Heimberg, 1990), and “How do you 
think you will feel at the end of treatment compared to how you feel now?” (Hansson 
& Berglund, 1987). Such expectancies must be distinguished from other types of 
expectancies. Recently, Dozois and Westra (2005) developed the Anxiety Change 
Expectancy Scale (ACES) to assess agency expectancy, a related yet different 
concept examining individuals’ beliefs that they are capable of change (e.g., “I feel 
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pessimistic that my anxiety problems could ever change for the better”), rather than 
focussing on expectancies concerning improvement from treatment as in the first 
three items listed above. 
Treatment outcome expectancy should also be differentiated from similar 
concepts of treatment credibility and motivation. Kazdin (1979) defined treatment 
credibility as “how believable, convincing, and logical the treatment is” whereas 
treatment expectancy refers to “improvements that clients believe will be achieved 
on the basis of a particular treatment” (p. 82). Credibility involves logical and 
rational thought processes, while expectancy is related to emotional processes. What 
patients logically think is the case may differ from what is felt to be the case. For 
example, patients might believe their treatment is highly logical and credible, yet 
implicitly feel it will not be helpful for them (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). 
Highlighting this distinction, Borkovec and Matthews (1988) found treatment 
expectancy and credibility ratings demonstrated different relationships with 
treatment outcome in 30 non-phobic anxiety patients. Expectancy ratings correlated 
with 13 of 10 outcome measures assessed at three time intervals (i.e., a total of 30 
correlations), while ratings of credibility did not significantly correlate with any (i.e., 
0 out of 30 such correlations).  
Treatment motivation includes a desire to change, a commitment to attend 
appointments, and/or a willingness to participate in treatment and carry out 
homework assignments (Keijsers, Schaap, Hoogduin, Hoogsteyns, & de Kemp, 
1999). However, as highlighted by Arknoff et al. (2002), although these concepts 
could be highly related to treatment expectancy ratings, patients can be motivated to 
engage in treatment but hold low expectations that therapy will be helpful.  
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Historical Perspectives  
 Research on expectancies of treatment outcomes dates back to a seminal 
article by Rosenthal and Frank (1956) highlighting the potential relevance of placebo 
effects in psychotherapy. These authors stated that “patients entering psychotherapy 
have various degrees of belief in its efficacy, and this may be an important factor in 
the results of therapy, but this has not been studied, to our knowledge” (p. 296). 
Frank, who went on to become a primary and influential proponent of treatment 
expectancies, asserted that positive expectations of outcome are more important than 
techniques specific to different psychotherapies (Frank, 1982). Furthermore, Kazdin 
and Wilcoxon (1976) argued for the importance of controlling for treatment outcome 
expectancies when determining if specific effects are responsible for improved 
outcomes.  
The role of treatment outcome expectancies and the potential for researchers 
and clinicians alike to misattribute the cause of patient improvement to specific 
effects of therapy was highlighted in the classic work of Marcia, Rubin and Efran 
(1969). Forty-four snake and spider phobics received either systematic 
desensitisation, T-scope therapy (a bogus highly credible psychotherapy), or no 
treatment. Participants receiving T-scope therapy were told that images of feared 
stimuli would be presented tachistoscopically at subliminal levels, however they 
actually observed blank slides. Periodic shocks and false physiological feedback 
were also provided to enhance treatment credibility. Treatment expectancy for the T-
scope condition was manipulated such that participants in the high-expectancy 
condition received the treatment, while low-expectancy participants were told a 
crucial aspect of treatment was missing so that no improvement could be expected. 
The results revealed no differences between the systematic desensitisation and high-
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expectancy T-scope conditions on posttreatment measures. However, participants in 
these two conditions showed significantly more improvement than those receiving 
low-expectancy T-scope therapy or no treatment.  
Weinberger and Eig (1999) classified patient outcome expectations as one of 
five factors responsible for outcome equivalence among the major classes of 
psychotherapy (the other factors being the therapeutic relationship, confronting 
problems, experience of mastery and attributions of improvement); however it was 
the only one not emphasised by any major school of psychotherapy. Often regarded 
as non-specific factors common to different therapies, treatment outcome 
expectancies have been conceptualised as “nuisance variables” to be excluded in 
order to investigate differences in improvement between specific brands of 
psychotherapy (Dozois & Westra, 2005). Perhaps as a result of this view, patient 
outcome expectancies have not been vigorously researched to date and have been 
referred to as the most “neglected” and “ignored” factor in psychotherapy research 
(Weinberger & Eig, 1999).  
 Highlighting the under-recognised role of outcome expectancies is the 
chronological trend of research investigating its relationship with treatment 
improvement in psychotherapy over the last five decades. Arnkoff et al. (2002) 
reviewed the psychotherapy literature and noted seven empirical studies were 
published between 1956 and 1963 (i.e., an average of one paper per year), while only 
eight were published during the 25-year period between 1965 and 1989 (i.e., an 
average of one paper approximately every three years), suggesting research interest 
in patient expectancies had waned. However, nine reports were published between 
1990 and 2000 (i.e., an average of one paper every 1.2 years) and a growing 
collection of studies (Abouguendia, Joyce, Piper, & Ogrodniczuk, 2004; Davis & 
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Addis, 2002; Dozois & Westra, 2005; Goosens, Vlaeyen, Hidding, Kole-Snijders, & 
Evers, 2005; Greenberg et al., 2006; Joyce, Ogrodniczuk, Piper, & McCallum, 2003; 
Kenardy, McCafferty, & Rosa, 2003; Vogel, Hansen, Stiles, & Gotestam, 2006; 
Westra & Dozois, 2006; Westra, Dozois, & Marcus, 2007) have been published since 
Arnkoff et al.’s (2002) review indicating a renewed interest in the issue.  
 
Relationship Between Treatment Expectancies and Outcome 
Treatment outcome expectancies have frequently been associated with 
therapeutic improvement for a range of disorders, including borderline personality 
disorder (Antikainen, Koponen, Lehtonen, & Arstila, 1994), chronic pain (Goosens 
et al., 2005), complicated grief (Joyce et al., 2003), obesity (Bradley, Poser, & 
Johnson, 1980), social phobia (Chambless, Tran, & Glass, 1997; Safren, Heimberg, 
& Juster, 1997) and generalised anxiety disorder (Borkovec & Costello, 1993); 
however inconsistent findings are common (see Arnkoff et al., 2002; Noble, 
Douglas, & Newman, 2001, for reviews). Discrepant findings appear due to differing 
patient populations, symptom severity, treatment methods and outcome measures. 
For Panic-Ag, the literature appears to suggest treatment outcome 
expectancies are generally predictive of improvement, irrespective of whether earlier 
or modern treatments and diagnostic criteria are applied. (Note that prior to the 
introduction of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980) Panic Disorder was 
termed Agoraphobia with panic attacks.)  
Of five studies (Emmelkamp & Emmelkamp-Benner, 1975; Emmelkamp & 
Wessels, 1975; Mathews et al., 1976; Southworth & Kirsch, 1988; Stern & Marks, 
1973) employing the more traditional habituation-based exposure paradigm (either in 
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vivo or imaginal) as the sole therapeutic component, three found significant findings 
(Emmelkamp & Emmelkamp-Benner, 1975; Mathews et al., 1976; Southworth & 
Kirsch, 1988). Mathews et al. (1976) examined 36 agoraphobic patients and found 
pretreatment expectancy ratings (defined as percent confidence they would 
eventually confront each of 15 feared situations) predicted a composite measure of 
treatment outcome (including behavioural avoidance tests and patient- and clinician 
ratings of severity). Likewise, Emmelkamp and Emmelkamp-Benner (1975) found 
scores on a pretreatment 3-item expectancy scale (where patients rated how much 
they expected to gain from treatment) significantly correlated with posttreatment 
patient and independent-observer ratings of phobic anxiety and avoidance in 29 
agoraphobic patients. 
Southworth and Kirsch (1988) manipulated treatment expectancies and found 
it impacted positively on outcome. Twenty agoraphobic patients were assigned to 
either a high or low expectancy group and were given 10 in vivo exposure sessions 
over 2 to 3 weeks. Patients in the high expectancy condition were informed they 
were receiving a treatment with demonstrated efficacy in reducing fear and 
avoidance for agoraphobia. In contrast, patients in the low expectancy group were 
told the 10 exposure sessions were conducted to collect a reliable baseline anxiety 
measure after which they would receive treatment. Patients in the high expectancy 
group showed greater and more rapid behavioural improvement than patients in the 
low expectancy group, although no differences between groups were observed on 
self-report measures of anxiety. 
Two studies failed to obtain significant results, however they suffered from 
low sample sizes, reflecting inadequate power to detect relationships. For example, 
Emmelkamp and Wessels (1975) found a correlation of .38 with posttreatment 
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outcome (phobic anxiety and phobic avoidance) in a sample of 19 patients. Another 
report consisting of 16 patients also failed to find a significant relationship (Stern & 
Marks, 1973). 
The introduction of the cognitive model (Clark, 1986) saw a fundamental 
shift in the theoretical understanding and treatment of Panic-Ag, with modern 
approaches incorporating cognitive elements designed to disconfirm feared 
catastrophes (Rayburn & Otto, 2003). Despite the wealth of evidence supporting the 
cognitive model, of two studies investigating contemporary CBT programs for Panic-
Ag and treatment expectancies, both found positive associations. Clark et al. (1999) 
examined expectations of improvement as a predictor of treatment response to CBT 
for 43 patients with Panic-Ag. Controlling for pretreatment severity, expectancy 
ratings obtained at the end of the first session correlated significantly (r = -.50, p < 
.01) with posttreatment scores on a panic-anxiety composite (including patient self-
report and assessor ratings, lower score reflects better outcome). Interestingly, none 
of the other predictor variables examined (e.g., depression, general anxiety, episode 
duration, treatment suitability) significantly correlated with outcome. Kenardy et al. 
(2003) found pretreatment outcome expectancy ratings of Internet-delivered CBT for 
Panic-Ag predicted posttreatment fear of bodily sensations (r = -.59, p < .05) and 
catastrophic cognitions (r = -.64, p < .05) but was not significantly associated with 
three other self-report outcome measures among 36 university students at risk of 
developing the disorder.   
Hence, for more than 30 years, studies conducted by independent researchers 
found therapeutic outcome in Panic-Ag is predicted by positive expectations 
regarding the helpfulness of treatment. However, methodological problems exist 
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similar to those discussed in reference to treatment knowledge and acceptance of the 
treatment rationale, as described below.  
 
Methodological Limitations 
A serious methodological problem concerns the use of expectancy measures 
that combine items assessing treatment credibility with expectancy (Chambless et al., 
1997; Goosens et al., 2005; Safren et al., 1997). The impact of treatment credibility 
needs to be disentangled from expectancy because treatment expectancy ratings tend 
to correlate more frequently and strongly with outcome than treatment credibility 
(Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Borkovec & Matthews, 1988; Devilly & Borkovec, 
2000; Kenardy et al., 2003). As highlighted by Arnkoff et al. (2002), such combined 
measures no longer provide a “pure” assessment of treatment expectancy. Hence, 
scales including credibility items provide a diluted measure of outcome expectancy 
and its true relationship with outcome may be stronger than previously reported. 
Another methodological weakness prevalent in the Panic-Ag and wider 
psychotherapy literature is the reliance on expectancy scales with minimal 
(Abouguendia et al., 2004) or no reported psychometric data (Clark et al., 1999; 
Emmelkamp & Emmelkamp-Benner, 1975; Hansson & Berglund, 1987; Joyce et al., 
2003; Kenardy et al., 2003; Mathews et al., 1976; Stern & Marks, 1973). Several 
expectancy measures have been published, such as the Credibility/Expectancy 
Questionnaire (CEQ, Borkovec & Nau, 1972) and the Reaction to Treatment 
Questionnaire (RTQ, Holt & Heimberg, 1990). The 4-item CEQ contains three items 
assessing credibility of the treatment rationale and only one item assessing 
expectancy of success. The 13-item RTQ contains the same four items from the 
CEQ. These scales not only have the disadvantage of combining credibility and 
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expectancy ratings but their psychometric properties have not been established. 
However, a revised 6-item version of the CEQ (including an additional two 
expectancy items) demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency, test-retest 
reliability and some evidence of validity (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000) although it has 
not been used in studies investigating expectancy-outcome relationships in Panic-Ag. 
Other studies relied on single-item scales to assess outcome expectancy (Clark et al., 
1999; Hansson & Berglund, 1987; Vogel et al., 2006), which, as previously 
discussed, are unreliable. Given the significance ascribed to patient expectancies of 
improvement and the potential theoretical and clinical implications stemming from 
its association with treatment outcome, the development of a valid and reliable 
measure of treatment expectancy is highly desirable.  
 
Clinical Implications 
Bearing the above limitations in mind, it has been asserted that “believing 
that one will feel better is enough to make one feel better” (Kirsch, 1990, p. 104). 
Despite its clinical appeal, such a conclusion is premature as causality cannot be 
inferred from correlational research. As articulated by Chambless et al. (1997), poor 
treatment expectancies could either cause patients to improve less or they may 
simply reflect patients’ accurate prediction that treatment would not be effective for 
them. However, Hansson and Berglund (1987) conducted a study using path analysis 
which suggested a causal association. Alternatively, an unknown third variable could 
be influencing both expectancies of improvement and treatment outcome.  
If there is a causal relationship, the exact mechanisms through which 
treatment expectancies mediate change remains largely unknown. A number of 
researchers have suggested that positive expectancies promote greater engagement in 
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treatment and increased compliance with difficult CBT techniques such as exposure, 
thereby enhancing clinical outcomes (Arnkoff et al., 2002; Chambless et al., 1997). 
Such a hypothesis has not been tested and awaits further empirical investigation.  
A further issue requiring clarification is whether treatment expectancies 
assessed prior to treatment are related to outcome. Most studies assessed patients’ 
expectancies either during the first two treatment sessions (Borkovec & Costello, 
1993; Borkovec, Newman, Pincus, & Lytle, 2002; Chambless et al., 1997; Clark et 
al., 1999; Safren et al., 1997; Vogel et al., 2006) or prior to treatment but after the 
treatment rationale was presented (Emmelkamp & Emmelkamp-Benner, 1975; 
Emmelkamp & Wessels, 1975; Kenardy et al., 2003; Stern & Marks, 1973). 
However, patients are likely to have expectations regarding the helpfulness of 
treatment even before being introduced to it (Leventhal et al., 1992). It remains to be 
determined whether pretreatment expectancies are related to treatment improvement.  
If pretreatment expectancies of improvement predict outcome, patients with 
negative pretreatment expectancies should receive preparatory counselling to discuss 
and restructure such beliefs. A similar approach was used by Westra and Dozois 
(2006) who found providing three sessions of motivational interviewing to patients 
with anxiety disorders prior to undergoing CBT increased their expectancies for 
anxiety control, treatment compliance and the number of treatment responders 
relative to patients who did not receive pretreatment interventions. Conversely, if 
pretreatment outcome expectancies were unrelated to clinical improvement it 
suggests clinicians have a window of opportunity early in treatment (e.g., during 
Session 1) to instil confidence in the helpfulness of treatment in order to positively 
influence outcomes. 
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Summary 
Expectancies of treatment outcome refer to the extent patients believe 
treatment will lead to symptom improvement. This non-specific factor common to all 
treatments has frequently been associated with psychotherapy outcomes for a variety 
of disorders for over 50 years. Most studies examining associations between 
treatment expectancies and outcome for Panic-Ag showed significant relationships 
irrespective of whether treatment involved graded exposure only or more modern 
CBT procedures. However, methodological limitations regarding the measurement of 
treatment outcome expectancies (scales combining treatment credibility and 
expectancy ratings, poor psychometric data) weaken the veracity of such 
conclusions. Moreover, it remains to be determined whether patients’ pretreatment 
outcome expectancies are related to therapeutic improvement which, if significant, 
would signify the need to provide pretreatment counselling for patients with poor 
outcome expectations. This thesis aims to address these issues by developing a 
psychometrically sound measure consisting of items purely assessing treatment 
expectancies where it will be administered to patients prior to commencing CBT for 
Panic-Ag to assess its relationship with treatment improvement. 
 Thus far, poor treatment knowledge, acceptance of the rationale and 
expectancies of outcome have been associated with reduced clinical improvement, 
presumably in part through its impact on treatment compliance. A further issue 
known to interfere with compliance and treatment outcome concerns patients’ 
confidence or self-efficacy to carry out therapy instructions.  
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Treatment Self-Efficacy 
Compliance with CBT procedures is estimated at approximately 50% 
(Detweiler & Whisman, 1999). Interestingly, of reasons offered for difficulty 
completing treatment directives, patients doubting their ability to complete therapy 
tasks was most commonly mentioned, being expressed by 57% of patients who 
experienced problems with CBT task completion (Helbig & Fehm, 2004). Hence, 
patients’ confidence or self-efficacy to implement prescribed CBT techniques is 
likely to play an important role in influencing treatment compliance and, in turn, 
outcome. 
 
Self-Efficacy 
First formally introduced by Bandura (1977), self-efficacy is defined as “the 
conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour required to produce the 
outcome” (p. 193). This concept represents an individual’s belief in being able to 
effectively perform a particular behaviour. Self-efficacy beliefs are situation specific 
and intercorrelations between different domains tend to be low (O'Leary, 1992). 
Furthermore, self-efficacy is not static and may fluctuate significantly in relation to 
numerous factors. To illustrate, a student’s self-efficacy for completing mathematical 
equations can be quite different from his/her self-efficacy for driving, the latter of 
which can be influenced by factors such as the weather, driving terrain, or time of 
day.  
According to self-efficacy theory, individuals’ belief in their effectiveness 
can influence whether or not they try to cope with difficult situations, as well as how 
much effort they use and how long they persevere when encountering obstacles 
(Bandura, 2001). Strong self-efficacy promotes greater effort and is intertwined with 
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behaviour. Successes tend to raise self-efficacy and encourage further success, 
whereas failures, especially those occurring early on, tend to reduce self-efficacy, 
which in turn hinders success (Bandura, 1977). Personal efficacy beliefs are essential 
for implementing behavioural changes required for anxiety reduction (Bandura, 
1988). Patients are unlikely to be motivated to engage in or persist with treatment 
advice if they do not believe their actions will produce positive effects (Bandura, 
2004).  
 
Definitional Issues 
Within the literature, self-efficacy has been assessed in different domains 
(managing symptoms, completing daily activities, overcoming barriers); however 
this thesis will confine its investigation to self-efficacy for implementing treatment 
directives (herein referred to as treatment self-efficacy). This construct has also been 
termed adherence self-efficacy (Barclay et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2006; Nilsson 
Schönnesson, Diamond, Ross, Williams, & Bratt, 2006). Example items assessing 
treatment self-efficacy for diabetes self-management and hormone replacement 
therapy include, “How sure are you that you can manage your diabetes the way your 
health care team want you to, almost all the time?” (Iannotti et al., 2006) and “How 
confident are you in your ability to continue taking hormone therapy?” (Nagia, 
1999), respectively.  
Self-efficacy beliefs need to be distinguished from outcome expectancies 
(Bandura, 1977). Whereas outcome expectancies reflect the belief that specific 
behaviours, if implemented, will lead to predicted outcomes, self-efficacy beliefs 
denote individuals’ expectations that they possess skills required to successfully 
carry out those behaviours. Differentiating treatment self-efficacy from outcome 
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beliefs is important in CBT as patients may believe CBT will be helpful in reducing 
symptoms (high treatment outcome expectancies), yet simultaneously doubt their 
ability to carry out therapeutic techniques (low treatment self-efficacy). If self-
efficacy for Panic-Ag treatment recommendations is poor, patients may not attempt 
to carry out such procedures, thereby promoting intentional non-compliance, 
ultimately compromising therapy outcomes. 
It is also important to distinguish treatment self-efficacy from panic self-
efficacy which, unlike treatment self-efficacy, has been extensively investigated 
within the Panic-Ag literature. While treatment self-efficacy is exclusively concerned 
with confidence in implementing treatment, panic self-efficacy concerns individuals’ 
confidence in coping with panic symptoms (sensations, cognitions and feared 
situations) irrespective of treatment (Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 2004; 
Williams, 1990). Examples of panic self-efficacy items include, “How confident are 
you in controlling a panic attack when feeling short of breath?” (Gauthier, Bouchard, 
Côté, Laberge, & French, 1993) and “How confident are you that could drive 6 
kilometres on a crowded freeway when unaccompanied?” (Kinney & Williams, 
1988). If a patient’s treatment recommendation was to drive unaccompanied for 6 
kilometres on a crowded freeway, the latter item would also be assessing treatment 
self-efficacy. 
Numerous researchers have ascribed great importance to panic self-efficacy 
in theoretical models explaining the aetiology and maintenance of Panic-Ag (Barlow, 
1988; Casey, Oei, Newcombe et al., 2004; Rachman, Craske, Tallman, & Solyom, 
1986; Richards, Richardson, & Pier, 2002; Sanderson et al., 1989; Telch et al., 1996), 
and changes in panic self-efficacy have been shown to mediate the effectiveness of 
CBT for Panic-Ag (Hoffart, 1995a; Williams, Kinney, & Falbo, 1989; Zane & 
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Williams, 1993). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated that panic self-efficacy 
predicted treatment outcome to a similar (if not greater) degree as catastrophic 
cognitions (Borden, Clum, & Salmon, 1991; Bouchard et al., 2007; Casey, 
Newcombe et al., 2005; Casey, Oei et al., 2005; Reilly, Gill, Dattilio, & McCormick, 
2005). Thus, panic self-efficacy and catastrophic cognitions have both been 
emphasised as central to mediating the effectiveness of CBT and may each need to 
be targeted to maximise treatment outcome.  
It is also important to focus on treatment self-efficacy, as research from the 
medical literature identified this construct to be highly influential in contributing to 
clinical outcomes. However, few studies in the wider psychotherapy literature, and 
none in the Panic-Ag domain, have investigated treatment self-efficacy. Therefore, 
the present thesis will examine the role of treatment self-efficacy on outcome for 
Panic-Ag.  
 
Relationships Between Treatment Self-Efficacy, Compliance and 
Outcome 
Theoretically, treatment self-efficacy should hold a positive linear 
relationship with treatment outcome through promoting increased treatment 
compliance. Indeed, as will be reviewed below, the majority of studies from the 
medical and psychotherapy literature investigating relationships between treatment 
self-efficacy and clinical outcomes found significant positive associations across 
differing age groups, patient demographics, illness types and methodologies. The 
magnitude of effects varied as a function of illness type, outcome measures used 
(self-report vs. biological markers; stronger effects for self-report) and timing of 
assessments (baseline vs. concurrent).  
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Medical Illness 
Patients’ confidence to perform necessary self-care behaviours correlated 
significantly and positively with adherence to such behaviours in the field of asthma 
(Ngamvitroj & Kang, 2007; Zebracki & Drotar, 2004) and diabetes (Hurley & Shea, 
1992; Iannotti et al., 2006; Williams & Bond, 2002). For example, Williams and 
Bond (2002) found patients’ confidence to perform diabetic self-care behaviours 
(e.g., blood glucose testing, dietary restrictions) correlated between .39 and .61 (p < 
.01) with compliance behaviours in 94 patients. In regards to outcome, confidence 
adhering to treatment also correlated significantly with metabolic control in diabetic 
patients (Gerber et al., 2006; Grossman, Brink, & Hauser, 1987; Iannotti et al., 
2006), although correlations (r = -.21 – -.33) tended to be lower than those obtained 
for compliance. 
Among HIV-positive patients, confidence in being able to adhere to 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) has consistently been associated with treatment 
compliance in cross-sectional (Barclay et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2006, 2007; 
Pinheiro, de-Carvalho-Leite, Drachler, & Silveira, 2002) and longitudinal (Godin, 
Coté, Naccache, Lambert, & Trottier, 2005; Johnson et al., 2007; Nilsson 
Schönnesson et al., 2006; Spire et al., 2002) studies. In addition, confidence in 
adhering to ART correlated significantly with immunologic functioning and viral 
load biomarkers in two large samples (8 > 260) (Johnson et al., 2007).  
A strong relationship between treatment self-efficacy and self-reported 
outcome was observed for patients taking hormone replacement therapy (Nagia, 
1999). In this study of 50 women, confidence in continuing to take hormone therapy 
(assessed on a single-item scale) correlated .56 with quality of life and 31% of the 
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variance in quality of life was accounted for by hormone self-efficacy. However, 
problems associated with single-item measures may have inflated this relationship. 
One study failed to find significant results, however methodological problems 
may have contributed to this. Among 72 hypertensive patients, treatment self-
efficacy scores were higher for patients with controlled blood pressure than for those 
with uncontrolled blood pressure (Ogedegbe, Mancuso, Allegrante, & Charlson, 
2003), however the use of a 3-point Likert scale may have reduced variability in self-
efficacy scores preventing this difference from achieving statistical significance. In 
summary, however, treatment self-efficacy was associated with patients’ treatment 
compliance and health outcomes across many different illnesses. 
 
Psychological Disorders 
Although aspects of self-efficacy have been widely investigated in the 
psychotherapy literature, treatment self-efficacy itself appears only to have been 
investigated for insomnia (Bélanger, Morin, Bastien, & Ladouceur, 2005; Bouchard, 
Bastien, & Morin, 2003) and pain (Heapy et al., 2005). In a study of 36 patients, 
Bouchard et al. (2003) found self-efficacy in performing requirements of a CBT 
program for insomnia was significantly associated with adherence behaviour scores 
over a 7-week program (r = .17 – .67).  
Similar findings were found by Bélanger et al. (2005) who assessed self-
efficacy for adhering to recommendations to reduce sleeping tablets across 10 weeks 
of a benzodiazepine taper program for 47 patients. These authors reported that 
patients compliant with recommendations to reduce sleeping tablets reported 
significantly higher confidence in being able to do so than their less compliant 
counterparts at several time periods during the program. For example, at week 10, 
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self-efficacy expressed out of 100 for compliant patients was 95.1 in comparison to 
74.3 for non-compliant patients (p < .01). In addition, patients who were medication 
free at posttreatment (successful outcome) had significantly higher self-efficacy 
ratings than those who were not.  
Interestingly, baseline self-efficacy ratings are not as predictive of patient 
compliance or outcome as are concurrent measurements described in the two studies 
reviewed above. In the Bélanger et al. (2005) study, baseline self-efficacy did not 
differ between compliant and non-compliant patients or those with and without 
successful outcomes. Lack of significant associations with compliance and outcome 
were also reported by Heapy et al. (2005) in a sample of 78 patients undergoing CBT 
for chronic pain. Given self-efficacy is not an immutable character trait but 
responsive to personal experiences (e.g., therapy experiences), this lack of baseline 
association is not surprising and suggests optimism when treating patients with low 
self-efficacy. 
 
Summary 
Patients’ confidence or self-efficacy for implementing treatment 
recommendations is positively related to treatment compliance and outcome for a 
range of disorders. However, baseline self-efficacy ratings appear less predictive 
than concurrent ratings. To date, no study has examined this issue in the field of CBT 
for Panic-Ag. 
The present thesis will examine the relationship between treatment self-
efficacy and outcome in Panic-Ag. Should a significant relationship exist, the 
resultant clinical implications include regular monitoring of patients’ self-efficacy for 
implementing CBT recommendations coupled with exploring and addressing reasons 
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for low self-efficacy. As self-efficacy is domain specific, a multi-item measure 
specifically assessing confidence in implementing CBT techniques for Panic-Ag 
firstly needs to be developed.  
 
 
The Present Study 
The effectiveness of CBT is linked to patients’ treatment compliance. To 
comply, patients must understand or have knowledge of treatment, accept the 
treatment rationale, perceive therapy as helpful and believe they have sufficient self-
efficacy to execute treatment recommendations. A failure in any of these 
requirements can result in treatment non-compliance and interfere with therapeutic 
outcomes. Hence, patients’ knowledge and beliefs about treatment play an important 
role in influencing patient outcomes. With the exception of treatment outcome 
expectancies, treatment knowledge and beliefs and the impact of pretreatment 
expectancies on outcome have not been adequately examined in Panic-Ag.  
 
Aims and Hypotheses 
This thesis therefore aims to address a number of methodological limitations 
in examining associations between treatment knowledge, acceptance of the treatment 
rationale, pretreatment outcome expectancies and treatment self-efficacy on outcome 
following CBT for Panic-Ag. If significant relationships emerge, they highlight 
important clinical implications for treatment delivery, contributing to improved 
treatment outcomes, leading to reduced patient suffering and improved quality of 
life, thus lessening the burden of the disorder on the individual, the health care 
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system and society at large. The research undertaken in this thesis involved several 
stages. 
 
Stage 1: Development of Treatment Knowledge Measures 
Measures specifically assessing treatment knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag 
were developed. Due to uncertainty regarding best methods for assessing treatment 
knowledge, a multiple-choice and structured interview measure was constructed. 
Psychometric properties of the treatment knowledge measures were evaluated. 
Reliability and validity estimates were obtained from patient and clinician samples.  
 
It was expected that: 
1. Scores on the multiple-choice knowledge measure would correlate positively 
with knowledge interview scores.  
2. Treated patients would demonstrate greater treatment knowledge than untreated 
patients. 
3. Clinicians with experience in CBT would score higher on the multiple-choice 
knowledge measure than entry-level intern clinical psychologists. 
4. Treatment knowledge scores would significantly increase with the provision of 
treatment. 
5. Treatment knowledge scores would be positively correlated with intelligence and 
years of education and negatively correlated with age. 
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Stage 2: Development of Treatment Beliefs Measures 
Measures assessing patients’ treatment beliefs about CBT for Panic-Ag were 
developed; specifically, beliefs assessing acceptance of the treatment rationale, 
expectancies of treatment outcome and treatment self-efficacy. Psychometric 
properties of the treatment belief measures were assessed. Reliability and validity 
information was obtained from patient samples. 
 
It was expected that: 
1. Acceptance of the treatment rationale would be negatively associated with 
endorsement of aetiological beliefs inconsistent with a CBT rationale. 
2. Acceptance of the treatment rationale and treatment outcome expectancies would 
be negatively associated with stronger belief in non-CBT treatments. 
3. Acceptance of the treatment rationale would be positively correlated with 
treatment outcome expectancies. 
4. Treatment outcome expectancies would correlate positively with published 
measures assessing this construct.  
5. Treatment self-efficacy and outcome expectancies would be negatively correlated 
with stronger endorsement of factors perceived to interfere with treatment. 
6. Treatment self-efficacy would be negatively correlated with level of self-
deprecation. 
7. Treated patients would demonstrate greater acceptance of the treatment rationale 
and treatment self-efficacy than untreated patients. 
8. Patients’ acceptance of the treatment rationale and treatment self-efficacy would 
increase significantly with the provision of treatment. 
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Stage 3: Examination of Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge, 
Beliefs and Outcome  
In this final stage, relationships between treatment knowledge, beliefs and 
outcome following CBT for Panic-Ag were examined. Relative contributions of 
these variables to treatment outcome and whether such relationships were mediated 
by belief in catastrophic cognitions was determined.  
 
The following hypotheses were advanced: 
1. Improving treatment knowledge will be associated with reduced Panic-Ag 
severity. 
2. Greater posttreatment acceptance of the treatment rationale will be associated 
with reduced Panic-Ag severity. 
3. Stronger treatment self-efficacy at posttreatment will be associated with reduced 
Panic-Ag severity. 
4. Recovered participants will show greater treatment knowledge, pretreatment 
outcome expectancies, acceptance of the treatment rationale and treatment self-
efficacy than non-recovered participants. 
5. Relationships between treatment knowledge and outcome will be mediated by 
belief in catastrophic cognitions. 
6. Relationships between treatment beliefs and outcome will be mediated by belief 
in catastrophic cognitions. 
 
In addition, this thesis attempted to examine associations between pretreatment 
outcome expectancies, acceptance of the rationale and treatment self-efficacy on 
outcome. Finally, the impact of benzodiazepine use on treatment knowledge 
acquisition was explored. 
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Development of the Multiple-Choice Panic-Ag Treatment 
Knowledge Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ) 
This study describes the initial development of a measure assessing CBT 
knowledge for Panic-Ag. Knowledge measures for medical disorders have 
burgeoned in recent years (Dunn et al., 1984; Edworthy, Devins, & Watson, 1995; 
Hill, Bird, Hopkins, Lawton, & Wright, 1991; Jarvie, Espie, & Brodie, 1993a; John 
et al., 2009; Lubrano et al., 1998; Meadows et al., 1988; Pande et al., 2000; Rees et 
al., 2003; Wigal et al., 1993). However, to date there have been no valid and reliable 
instruments constructed for the assessment of CBT principles in general or tailored 
specifically to Panic-Ag. This thesis follows the guidelines on scale development set 
out by DeVellis (1991), additionally guided by research in the medical literature 
(Dunn et al., 1984; Edworthy et al., 1995; Lubrano et al., 1998; Pande et al., 2000; 
Rees et al., 2003) which suggest that several phases are involved in the construction 
of a treatment knowledge measure.  
 
Development of the Treatment Knowledge Measure 
 Although formats may vary, the process of developing a knowledge measure 
typically involves three phases: (i) development of an item pool, (ii) expert review of 
items and initial item refinement, and (iii) analysis of items and final reduction of 
item pool. These phases are described below. 
 Phase 1 – Development of item pool: The realm of knowledge to be assessed 
is identified from either experts in the field or published texts related to the disorder 
and its treatment. Major domains of knowledge are defined and items written, 
usually in multiple-choice or true/false format, assessing specific aspects of 
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knowledge relevant to content domains. These items constitute the initial draft of the 
knowledge questionnaire. 
 Phase 2 – Expert review of items and initial item refinement: The draft 
knowledge questionnaire is then reviewed by experts in the field to obtain feedback 
on relevance, comprehensibility and accuracy of items. The draft questionnaire is 
also piloted on lay persons to obtain comments characteristic of the target population. 
Items are added, omitted or reworded on the basis of feedback obtained and this 
refined set of items comprises the revised questionnaire. Guidelines regarding the 
number of expert reviewers required are lacking, however reports from the literature 
range from two or three (Edworthy et al., 1995; Rees et al., 2003) to 14 (Jarvie et al., 
1993a).  
 Phase 3 – Analysis of items and final reduction of item pool: Items from the 
revised questionnaire are analysed to determine their index of difficulty, index of 
discrimination and reliability. Index of difficulty refers to the proportion of 
respondents answering the item correctly (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994). The item’s 
difficulty index, or p value, is calculated using the formula: 
 
 A p value of .0 indicates no respondent answered the item correctly (difficult 
item), while a p value of 1.0 indicates all respondents answered the item correctly 
(easy item). Extreme p values minimise variability of scores and do not contribute to 
measurement of individual differences. Maximum variability within test scores is 
obtained when all p values cluster around .50 (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994). 
Number of correct responses for item i 
________________________________   
Total number of responses for item i 
p value for item i = 
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However, selection of appropriate item difficulties varies according to the purpose of 
the measure (Anastasi, 1988). If the measure is intended to determine pre-existing 
knowledge of material to be taught, item difficulty ratings are expected to be low. In 
such instances, difficult items should not be removed as they highlight what remains 
to be learnt. Similarly, if the purpose of the measure is to establish whether a 
respondent has adequately learnt the information, the difficulty indices should be 
high, around .80 or .90. In these circumstances, even very easy items (including 
those passed by 100% of respondents) are retained (Anastasi, 1988). 
 Item discrimination is defined as the degree to which an item is able to 
differentiate between respondents who do well and those who do poorly on the 
measure. The item discrimination index, or D, is calculated by constructing extreme 
groups (quartiles or thirds) and subtracting the percentage of respondents answering 
correctly in the lowest group from the percentage answering correctly in the highest 
group (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994). Theoretically, D values range from -100 
through 0 to +100. Negative D values indicate a higher proportion of respondents 
from the lower group answering the item correctly in comparison to respondents 
from the upper group. Positive D values indicate a higher proportion of respondents 
in the upper group answering the item correctly relative to respondents from the 
lower group. A zero D value indicates the proportion of respondents answering the 
item correctly from the upper group was equivalent to the proportion responding 
correctly from the lower group. A zero D value therefore signifies the item lacks 
discriminating power. A mean D value of +50 across an entire measure is associated 
with the highest level of item discrimination (Anastasi, 1988). 
 Reliability of items is commonly measured by Cronbach’s alpha, an index of 
internal consistency. Results from homogeneous groups are expected to reach 
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coefficient values between .8 and .9 (Cronbach, 1970). Less consistent items can be 
identified by producing an alpha score following the exclusion of individual items 
(alpha if item deleted). If the alpha score of a scale increases after removal of a 
particular item it indicates that inclusion of this item reduces the overall reliability of 
the scale and is therefore a poor item.  
Following a comprehensive analysis of items, those demonstrating 
unsatisfactory indices of difficulty, discrimination and reliability are excluded. 
Remaining items comprise the final version of the questionnaire. However, before 
developing a knowledge measure, selection of a suitable assessment format is an 
important requirement.  
 
Selection of Knowledge Questionnaire Format 
Three different formats have been identified in the literature: multiple-choice, 
true/false and open-ended short answer formats (Beeney et al., 1994; Dunn et al., 
1984; Edworthy et al., 1995; Hill et al., 1991; Jarvie et al., 1993a; Lubrano et al., 
1998; Meadows et al., 1988; Pande et al., 2000; Rees et al., 2003; Wigal et al., 1993). 
The true/false format, although simple for participants to complete, was rejected for 
this thesis on grounds that participants have a 50% chance of guessing correctly, 
which in turn can undermine interpretation of item difficulty indices (Dunn et al., 
1984). Some researchers (Beeney et al., 1994; Dunn et al., 1984) rejected open-ended 
short-answer formats because a high proportion of their participants were from non-
English speaking backgrounds (NESB). Short-answer formats have been criticised 
for discriminating against NESB individuals, penalising individuals who experience 
difficulty expressing themselves orally, and regarded as “an assessment of verbal 
ability,” reducing the validity of the knowledge measure (Dunn et al., 1984, p. 38). 
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However, it was unclear whether a test of recognition memory (multiple-choice 
format) versus recall (open-ended short answer format) would be a more 
ecologically valid assessment of knowledge in the field of CBT. It could be argued 
that a person who is able to recognise correct responses from a list of alternatives 
demonstrates knowledge of that issue. However, during real life situations, 
individuals are often required to draw upon information from memory in the absence 
of prompts or cues. Multiple-choice measures capitalise on recognition memory 
which may serve to remind some participants of knowledge that would otherwise be 
inaccessible without prompts. 
 Open-ended short answer questions may provide a more sensitive measure of 
patient knowledge than other formats as they have the capacity to assess a wider 
range of knowledge sophistication. Responses to open-ended questions can 
determine whether individuals possess partial knowledge of a topic, in contrast to 
multiple-choice items that are typically scored either wholly correct or incorrect. 
Indeed ceiling effects have been observed on a well validated multiple-choice test of 
diabetes knowledge (Dunn et al., 1984) possibly indicating a lack of sensitivity 
(Beeney et al., 1994; Coates & Boore, 1996). In contrast, responses to open-ended 
short answer questions can be scored on a continuum ranging from completely 
incorrect, partially correct, mostly correct through to completely correct.  
 While possibly providing a more sensitive assessment of knowledge, short-
answer formats are not without their disadvantages. In addition to potentially 
prejudicing less verbally skilled individuals, scoring open-ended responses can be 
time consuming, open to interpretation and unreliable across different raters in 
comparison to other formats where correct responses are identified objectively. 
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 Formal discussions regarding format choice were held with clinical 
psychologists from the Department of Medical Psychology, Westmead Hospital and 
the School of Psychology, University of Sydney. Acknowledging the pros and cons 
of each approach, feedback from clinical psychologists and academics recommended 
using both a multiple-choice questionnaire and an open-ended short-answer 
interview. In this way, the multiple-choice questionnaire allowed objective 
assessment of treatment knowledge free from subjective scoring interpretations or 
therapist bias, while assessing knowledge via interview enabled participants’ 
responses to be queried and/or probed, minimising problems associated with reduced 
verbal fluency and incorrect use of terms. Incorporating two measures of patient 
knowledge also enabled assessment of convergent validity. Hence, for purposes of 
this thesis, a decision was made to incorporate both multiple-choice questionnaire 
and open-ended interview formats. 
 The remainder of this chapter focuses on the development of the multiple-
choice treatment knowledge questionnaire. The development of the open-ended short 
answer structured knowledge interview and the psychometric properties of both 
knowledge measures are described in chapter 3. 
 
Method 
 Construction of the multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire proceeded 
through the three previously described phases of questionnaire development: (i) 
development of the item pool, (ii) expert review of items and initial item refinement, 
and (iii) analysis of items and final reduction of the item pool.   
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Phase 1: Development of the Item Pool 
 Items were generated from material covered in contemporary CBT programs 
for Panic-Ag with empirical efficacy (Andrews et al., 2003; Craske & Barlow, 2001; 
Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk, & Clark, 1989) and scientific literature relevant to the 
disorder (Clark, 1986, 1996; Rapee, 1997; Rayburn & Otto, 2003; Salkovskis, Clark, 
& Gelder, 1996; Schmidt et al., 2000; Uren, Szabo, & Lovibond, 2004). Four inter-
relating domains were repeatedly discussed in the literature:  
1. Psychoeducation: consisting of the stress-diathesis model, fight/flight response, 
role of hyperventilation and medically accurate explanations of panic symptoms  
2. Cognitive Therapy: consisting of the cognitive model of panic, identification of 
causal thoughts and methods for challenging the probability and cost of feared 
panic outcomes 
3. Avoidance: consisting of the nature and function of avoidance and safety seeking 
behaviours 
4. Exposure Therapy: consisting of behavioural experiments, graded in vivo 
exposure and interoceptive exposure 
 These four domains encompassed over 150 individual facets of knowledge 
relevant to treatment of Panic-Ag. As research has not investigated which specific 
aspects of treatment knowledge are essential to clinical improvement, a 
comprehensive measure of treatment knowledge was sought. However, lengthy 
measures have been known to promote undesirable factors such as fatigue, boredom 
and intimidation that may serve to reduce the validity (Dunn et al., 1984). To achieve 
a compromise between comprehensiveness of knowledge and questionnaire length, 
items were constructed with a stem question comprising five response alternatives. A 
“Don’t know” response was also included to minimise guessing, reduce performance 
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anxiety and improve compliance. While three or four response alternatives is often 
traditional for multiple-choice questionnaires (Dunn et al., 1984; Edworthy et al., 
1995; Lubrano et al., 1998; Pande et al., 2000; Wigal et al., 1993), many items in the 
present questionnaire contained an “All of the above” and/or “None of the above” 
option within the response alternatives to maximise the scope of knowledge able to 
be assessed within one question whilst keeping questionnaire length to a minimum 
(see Figure 2.1). Similar formats have been applied by other researchers (Hill et al., 
1991; Wigal et al., 1993).  
 A preliminary set of 39 multiple-choice questions was constructed (see 
Appendix A) consisting of 15 psychoeducation items (items 1-15), 11 cognitive 
therapy items (items 16-22, 24-27), six avoidance items (items 28-33) and seven 
exposure therapy items (items 23, 34-39). Example questions from each content 
domain are presented in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. Examples of multiple-choice questions for each knowledge domain. 
Psychoeducation Items 
In individuals without a history of such problems, panic attacks are likely to 
cause  
a. Heart disease or heart attacks 
b. Stroke 
c. Insanity (e.g., Schizophrenia) 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
 
Which of the following reactions does OT occur during the fight or flight 
response? 
a. The face may go pale as blood is diverted away from parts of the body that do 
not immediately require nutrition. 
b. Heart rate and blood pressure increases so that oxygen and nutrients can be 
transported quickly to where they are needed. 
c. Breathing speeds up to increase the amount of oxygen available to the muscles. 
d. Muscles relax to help you stay calm and perform at your best. 
e. Sweating increases to cool the body to prevent it from overheating during 
strenuous physical activity. 
f. Don’t know 
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Figure 2.1 (Continued). Examples of multiple-choice questions for each knowledge 
domain. 
Cognitive Therapy Items 
According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements are 
correct?  
If you are having difficulty identifying why you are feeling panicky… 
a. It means there are simply no thoughts there and a medical explanation is 
required to explain the cause of your panic attacks and anxiety.  
b. It is likely that the panic sensations or situation have become associated with 
danger (probably because of past experiences), so that you now automatically 
respond with fear without consciously having thoughts about the sensations. 
c. You can repeatedly ask yourself what would be so bad if the worst thing 
happened until you get to the core of the problem (Downward Arrow 
Technique). 
d. You can observe your own behaviour when you are anxious to look for clues 
that would help to explain the underlying thought. 
e. b, c and d 
f. Don’t know 
 
 
According to the CBT approach, “Overestimating the probability” refers to:  
a. Thinking about something that has happened and making it out to be much 
worse than it is in reality. 
b. Thinking that something is more likely to happen than it is in reality.  
c. Exaggerating the importance or significance of an event. 
d. All of the above 
e. b and c 
f. Don’t know 
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Figure 2.1 (Continued). Examples of multiple-choice questions for each knowledge 
domain. 
Avoidance Items 
According to the CBT approach, which of the following is a safety seeking 
behaviour?  
a. Slowing your breathing to prevent a panic attack from developing 
b. Carrying (but not actually taking) anti-anxiety medication with you when you 
enter an anxiety provoking situation 
c. Carrying a paper bag 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
 
According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
safety seeking behaviours is false?  
Using a safety seeking behaviour when you are in an anxiety provoking situation… 
a. Is a sensible approach to overcoming anxiety as it can help prevent the terrible 
thing from happening (e.g., heart attack, fainting, embarrassing self in public). 
b. Is a form of avoidance. 
c. Stops you from testing out your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic. 
d. Keeps your fears alive. 
e. Is a problem because you will still believe that something bad would have 
happened if you had not used the safety seeking behaviour. 
f. Don’t know 
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Figure 2.1 (Continued). Examples of multiple-choice questions for each knowledge 
domain. 
Exposure Therapy Items 
According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements involving 
facing your fears is false? 
a. Behavioural experiments that involve facing your fears can cause intense 
anxiety and even panic attacks. 
b. Facing your fears is not recommended for the treatment of Panic Disorder or 
Agoraphobia as anxiety levels can become so severe as to cause serious 
physical harm (e.g., heart attack, stroke, fainting) or mental harm (e.g., 
insanity).  
c. The more often you confront your fear, the less your anxiety will rise and the 
faster your anxiety will fall.  
d. Confronting a feared situation is an excellent method for testing out whether 
your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic attacks are correct. 
e. By facing your fears you learn that the thing you feared did not happen (or was 
not that bad). This increases your confidence about facing your fear in the 
future. 
f. Don’t know 
 
 
According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
deliberately bringing on the feared panic sensations (interoceptive exposure) is 
correct? 
The aim of deliberately bringing on panic sensations is to… 
a. Change your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic sensations. 
b. Learn that panic sensations are unpleasant but harmless. 
c. Help you become less anxious when you experience such sensations (e.g., 
dizziness, heart palpitations) as part of your every day life. 
d. Break the association between your fear response and the feared sensation. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
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Phase 2: Expert Review of Items and Initial Item Refinement  
 The 39-item draft multiple-choice questionnaire was reviewed by experts in 
the field for relevance, comprehensibility and accuracy of information. Following 
this, items were refined on the basis of feedback. 
 
Participants and Procedure 
 The 39-item draft multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire was distributed to 
27 clinical academics and clinical psychologists experienced in the provision of CBT 
specific to Panic-Ag and in general. These expert reviewers were recruited from 
three sources: 
1. Clinical academics from the School of Psychology, University of Sydney (n = 3) 
2. Clinical Psychologists working in tertiary referral anxiety clinics in Western 
Sydney (n = 5)  
3. Clinical Psychologists working within the Department of Medical Psychology, 
Westmead Hospital (n = 19)  
 Brief demographic information comprising years of clinical experience and 
self-rated level of expertise with CBT for Panic-Ag from 1 (very low) to 5 (very 
high) was collected. Reviewers were requested to make three ratings regarding:  
i. relevance of each question to cognitive behavioural treatment of Panic-Ag from 0 
(not at all relevant) to 2 (very relevant) 
ii. comprehensibility or wording of each question and respective answers from 0 
(difficult for patients to understand) to 2 (easy for patients to understand) and to 
make changes to wording of items as they saw fit 
iii. agreement with answer provided (Yes or No) 
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 Reviewers were also asked to indicate whether any components of CBT were 
omitted or over-represented and extra space for each question was provided for 
additional comments (see Appendix A).  
 Thirteen of the 27 reviewers returned the questionnaire (48%). Three 
reviewers (100%) from the University of Sydney and five reviewers (100%) from 
tertiary referral anxiety clinics returned the questionnaire. Only five questionnaires 
(26%) were received from clinical psychologist reviewers in the Department of 
Medical Psychology, Westmead Hospital. This low return rate may in part be due to 
these reviewers working primarily with other disorders (depression, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, eating disorders, child and adolescent issues) which may have 
lowered their Panic-Ag expertise ratings, leading to reluctance in providing 
feedback. Khawaja and Oei (1992) reported a similar and lower return rate (37.5%) 
among psychologist reviewers. The 13 reviewers returning questionnaires had an 
average of 9.8 years clinical experience (SD = 7.1 years). Self-rated level of expertise 
with CBT for Panic-Ag was high (M = 4.3, SD = 0.9).  
 
Analysis of Feedback From Expert Reviewers 
Table 2.1 displays means and standard deviations for relevance and 
comprehensibility ratings and percentage agreement for each of the 39 items of the 
draft knowledge questionnaire. Overall, the draft measure appeared to assess 
knowledge relevant to CBT for Panic-Ag with relevance ratings ranging between 
1.45 and 2.00 (M = 1.92, SD = 0.13). Comprehensibility ratings ranged between 0.92 
and 2.00 (M = 1.76, SD = 0.23) indicating reviewers felt most items were relatively 
easy for patients to understand. Overall inter-rater agreement with answers was high 
at 100% with the exception of four items (78% – 92% agreement).  
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Table 2.1 Ratings of Relevance, Comprehensibility and Agreement Across Expert 
Reviewers (8 = 13) for the 39-Item Draft Multiple-Choice Knowledge Questionnaire 
 Relevance  Comprehensibility  Agreement 
Item no. M (SD)  M (SD)  (% Agree) 
1  1.83 (0.39)  1.92 (0.29)  100.0  
2  1.85 (0.56)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
3  1.85 (0.56)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
4  1.46 (0.66)  .92 (0.64)  100.0  
5  2.00 (0.00)  1.69 (0.48)  100.0  
6  2.00 (0.00)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
7  2.00 (0.00)  1.62 (0.51)  100.0  
8  1.62 (0.51)  1.75 (0.45)  77.8  
9  1.62 (0.51)  1.85 (0.38)  100.0  
10  2.00 (0.00)  1.92 (0.28)  100.0  
11  2.00 (0.00)  1.85 (0.38)  100.0  
12  1.92 (0.28)  1.92 (0.28)  92.3  
13  2.00 (0.00)  1.85 (0.56)  100.0  
14  1.92 (0.28)  1.77 (0.44)  100.0  
15  1.92 (0.28)  1.69 (0.48)  100.0  
16  1.77 (0.44)  1.69 (0.63)  100.0  
17  2.00 (0.00)  1.54 (0.52)  100.0  
18  2.00 (0.00)  1.85 (0.38)  100.0  
19  2.00 (0.00)  1.75 (0.45)  90.9  
20  2.00 (0.00)  1.50 (0.52)  100.0  
21  1.85 (0.38)  1.23 (0.73)  100.0  
22  1.92 (0.28)  1.69 (0.48)  100.0  
23  1.85 (0.38)  1.62 (0.51)  100.0  
24  2.00 (0.00)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
25  2.00 (0.00)  1.75 (0.45)  100.0  
26  1.83 (0.39)  1.50 (0.52)  100.0  
27  1.85 (0.38)  1.62 (0.51)  91.7  
28  2.00 (0.00)  1.85 (0.38)  100.0  
29  2.00 (0.00)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
30  2.00 (0.00)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
31  1.92 (0.29)  2.00 (0.00)  90.9  
32  1.92 (0.28)  1.54 (0.78)  100.0  
33  2.00 (0.00)  1.85 (0.38)  100.0  
34  2.00 (0.00)  1.77 (0.44)  100.0  
35  2.00 (0.00)  2.00 (0.00)  100.0  
36  2.00 (0.00)  1.64 (0.67)  100.0  
37  2.00 (0.00)  1.83 (0.39)  100.0  
38  2.00 (0.00)  1.75 (0.45)  100.0  
39  2.00 (0.00)  1.92 (0.28)  100.0  
Total 1.92 (0.13)  1.76 (0.23)  98.9  
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Initial Item Refinement  
 Length of questionnaire was a recurring topic raised by reviewers. While 
shorter measures may be less taxing for participants to complete, a reduction in 
number of items generally reduces reliability (DeVellis, 1991). As a trade-off, 
attempts were made to reduce the number of items by approximately 25% (from 39 
to 29 items), thereby substantially shortening the questionnaire yet conserving 
reliability. 
 Although all items were considered relevant, items with mean relevance 
ratings below 1.80 were excluded (items 4, 8, 9, 17). Items 1-3 related to the stress-
diathesis model of panic. These items were omitted because, although considered 
part of the psychoeducation component of Panic-Ag, knowledge contained in these 
items did not assist in challenging catastrophic misinterpretations of panic symptoms, 
the core feature of treatment for Panic-Ag (Clark et al., 1997; Craske & Barlow, 
2006). Items 10 and 11 both discussed symptoms of hyperventilation and were 
combined into one item. Similarly, items 17 and 18 related to the cognitive model of 
panic and items 29 and 30 to specific examples of avoidance. These four items were 
respectively combined into two single items, resulting in a refined set of 29 items.  
 While reviewers indicated all areas of CBT for Panic-Ag were adequately 
covered, specific details were added as requested (e.g., the notion that “the 
fight/flight response is a mechanism that does not need to be controlled or stopped 
and it will go away on it is own” was added to a question concerning the fight/flight 
response). Of the 29 items, those with comprehensibility ratings less than 2.0 were 
rephrased where possible. Items with agreement ratings less than 100% were 
reworded until consensus with reviewers’ comments was achieved. 
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 The refined 29-item multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire was piloted on 
a small group of individuals consisting of three patients with a history of Panic-Ag, 
three lay persons and four intern clinical psychologists to assess time taken to 
complete the measure and identify aspects requiring further refinement. The 
questionnaire took approximately 20-25 minutes to complete and further adjustments 
to wording of items were made in light of their advice. The revised questionnaire, 
referred to as the Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment 
Knowledge Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ, see Appendix B), consisted of eight 
psychoeducation items (items 1, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 25, 26), nine cognitive therapy 
items (items 2, 4, 7, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23), five avoidance items (items 5, 11, 15, 24, 
27) and seven exposure therapy items (items 8, 9, 13, 18, 20, 28, 29).  
The readability of the MC-PTKQ was assessed using the Flesch Reading 
Ease Index (Flesch, 1948). Readability scores are calculated according to average 
number of (a) syllables per word and (b) words per sentence. Reading ease scores 
range from 0 to 100 where higher scores reflect greater reading ease. Documents 
rated above 70 are regarded as fairly easy to read while scores of 50 and below are 
considered difficult. As the MC-PTKQ assessed knowledge of CBT principles, items 
typically contained multi-syllabic technical terms (e.g., hyperventilation, behavioural 
experiments, overestimating the probability) inflating the average number of 
syllables per word thereby reducing the total readability score. Accordingly, the 
obtained reading ease score ranged between 30 and 50 (rated as difficult). However, 
when based on average sentence length in words, the text was considered easy to 
read (reading ease score: 80 – 90).  
 Scores for the 29-item MC-PTKQ ranged from 0 to 40. Eighteen items were 
scored one point for a correct response. The remaining 11 items assessed multiple 
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aspects of knowledge (often containing an “All of the above” and/or “None of the 
above” response option). For such items, two points were awarded if all correct 
responses were selected and one point was awarded if only one of the correct 
responses was selected. Incorrect responses, unanswered questions or “Don’t know” 
responses were scored zero. 
 
Phase 3: Analysis of Items and Final Reduction of the Item Pool 
 The next phase involved determining indices of item difficulty, 
discrimination and reliability enabling identification and elimination of poorly 
performing items to maximise validity and reliability of the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was administered to a sample of CBT waitlisted patients with Panic-Ag 
for the purpose of identifying and deleting easy items. Items easy for most patients 
prior to receiving treatment contribute to a ceiling effect and thus reduce the 
measure’s ability to detect changes after treatment. A difficulty index, or p value, 
exceeding .75 is deemed a poor discriminator (Hill et al., 1991; Lubrano et al., 1998; 
Pande et al., 2000). However, it was considered appropriate to retain difficult items 
as the provision of treatment allows scores on such items to increase. Furthermore, it 
was unclear whether items with low p values reflected patients’ confusion with 
wording (indicating validity problems), or whether knowledge contained within such 
items was associated with successful treatment outcomes. However, items lacking 
ability to discriminate between high and low scoring participants should be removed. 
A discrimination index, or D value, of less than 20 is deemed unacceptably low 
(Dunn et al., 1984). Similarly, items with low reliability coefficients should be 
discarded. 
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Participants  
Participants were recruited from the Sydney West Area Health Service 
(SWAHS) Anxiety Treatment and Research Unit, Cumberland Hospital between 
December 2005 and September 2007. The SWAHS Anxiety Treatment and Research 
Unit is a tertiary referral anxiety clinic in Western Sydney typically serving patients 
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The clinic offers cognitive behavioural 
therapy for patients with a primary anxiety disorder.  
The sample was drawn from a population of 83 consecutive first-time 
attendees seeking treatment for Panic-Ag. Inclusion criteria consisted of diagnosis of 
Panic Disorder and/or Agoraphobia as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) as assessed through the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for 
DSM-IV, Adult Version (ADIS-IV, Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994), fluency in 
written and spoken English, and aged between 18 and 70 years. Active psychosis, 
substance abuse and developmental delay were exclusion criteria.  
A flow-chart of participant recruitment is presented in Figure 2.2. From this 
population, 79 (95.2%) met the study’s inclusion criteria (four patients were 
excluded: > 70 years = 1, non-fluent in English = 2, active psychosis = 1), and of 
these 79, 65 were able to attend the pretreatment research assessment representing a 
response rate of 82.3% of eligible participants. These 65 participants, referred to as 
Sample A, comprised 18 males (27.7%) and 47 females (72.3%), with a mean age of 
37.9 years (SD = 12.6, range = 18 – 63). There was no significant age difference 
between males (M = 42.67, SD = 11.57) and females (M = 36.04, SD = 12.67), t(63) 
= 1.93, p > .05. Remaining demographic characteristics for Sample A participants are 
displayed in Table 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2. Recruitment of Sample A and Sample B participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Active psychosis 
2 = Non-fluent in written or 
spoken English 
1 = Exceeded age range 
Panic-Ag patients waiting for treatment from the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment & 
Research Unit recruited between December 2005 and September 2007 
+ = 83 
Panic-Ag patients eligible to complete the pretreatment research appointment 
+ = 79 
2 = Deceased 
1 = Withdrew from study 
3 = Unable to be contacted 
Sample B – Post Treatment 
Participants completing 6-month follow-up assessment 
+ = 41 
1 = Failed to attend 3 scheduled 
appointments 
Treated participants eligible for 6-month follow-up assessment 
+ = 48 
3 = Did not commence 
treatment 14 = Dropped out within 3 
sessions 
Sample A – Pre Treatment 
Participants completing pretreatment research assessment 
+ = 65 
4 = Unable to attend treatment 
due to moving out of area or 
work commitments 
Moved to Sample C 
10 = Unable to be assessed 
before treatment commenced.  
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Of the 14 eligible participants unable to attend the pretreatment research 
appointment, four declined treatment due to work commitments or moving out of the 
area. These four were excluded from the study altogether. The remaining 10 
participants could not attend the research assessment due to work (n = 5), study (n = 
1), personal commitments (n = 2) or illness (n = 2). These 10 had a mean age of 38.9 
years (SD = 10.9); there was nine females (90%) and one male (10%). They did not 
differ significantly from Sample A participants in age, t(73) = -.24, p > .05, or 
gender, χ2(1, 8 = 75) = 1.43, p > .05. These 10 participants were excluded from this 
aspect of the study, however they completed treatment, were assessed at 6-month 
follow-up and their data was used in subsequent aspects of the study described in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
Following the pretreatment research assessment, participants were offered 
treatment for Panic-Ag. Of the 65 Sample A participants offered treatment, three 
(4.6%) did not commence and 14 (21.5%) dropped out within three sessions giving a 
final sample of 48 treatment completers. This sample represents a response rate of 
60.7% of the total sample of eligible participants, and 73.8% of those offered 
treatment. 
In respect to follow-up data, 41 (85.4%) of the 48 Sample A treatment 
completers were able to attend 6-month follow-up assessments. This subset of 
Sample A participants is referred to as Sample B. Of the seven treated participants 
unable to attend follow-up assessments, two died (one diabetic patient suffered a 
myocardial infarction, another died from suspected drug overdose), three could not 
be contacted, one withdrew from the study and one failed to attend three scheduled 
appointments. These seven participants did not differ significantly from Sample B on 
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pretreatment demographic or diagnostic characteristics. Sample B represents 51.9% 
of the total eligible population, and 63.1% of those initially offered treatment. 
 
Table 2.2 Pretreatment Demographic Characteristics for Samples A and B 
 Sample A 
+ = 65 
Sample B 
+ = 41 
Marital status 
   Never married 
   Married/de facto 
   Divorced/Separated 
 
25 (38.5%) 
31 (47.7%) 
  9 (13.8%) 
 
 
11 (26.8%) 
25 (61.0%) 
  5 (12.2%) 
Education in years (M ± SD) 12.7 ± 2.8 
range = 7 – 19 
 
13.0 ± 2.8 
range = 9 – 19 
Employed 23 (35.4%) 
 
19 (46.3%) 
Country of origin 
   Australia 
   Other 
   Length of time in Australia in yearsa 
 
49 (75.4%) 
16 (24.6%) 
31.2 ± 15.6 
range = 1.5 – 57 
 
 
30 (73.2%) 
11 (26.8%) 
34.2 ± 12.1 
range = 10 – 57 
Duration of anxiety disorder in 
years (M ± SD) 
8.9 ± 11.2 
range = 0.25 – 50 
 
6.8 ± 7.7 
range = 0.25 – 30 
Previous treatments 
   Medication 
   CBT 
   Counselling    
   Self-help books 
 
47 (72.3%) 
18 (27.7%) 
31 (47.7%) 
31 (47.7%) 
 
 
29 (70.7%) 
11 (26.8%) 
16 (39.0%) 
21 (51.2%) 
Medication 
   No medication 
   ADs only 
   BZs only 
   ADs & BZs 
   Other 
 
25 (38.5%) 
12 (18.5%) 
12 (18.5%) 
15 (23.1%) 
1 (1.5%) 
 
 
17 (41.5%) 
 7 (17.1%) 
 8 (19.5%) 
 8 (19.5%) 
1 (2.4%) 
Primary diagnosis  
   Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia 
   Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia 
   Agoraphobia without Panic Disorder 
 
 
4 (6.2%) 
58 (89.2%) 
3 (4.6%) 
 
3 (7.3%) 
36 (87.8%) 
2 (4.9%) 
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Table 2.2 (continued) Pretreatment Demographic Characteristics for Samples A 
and B 
 Sample A 
+ = 65 
Sample B 
+ = 41 
Comorbidity 
Other anxiety disorder  
   Social phobia 
   GAD 
   OCD 
   Specific phobia 
   PTSD 
   Any comorbid anxiety disorder 
 
Depressive disorder  
   Major depression 
   Dysthymia 
   Any depressive disorder 
No. comorbid diagnoses (M ± SD) 
 
 
 
22 (33.8%) 
34 (52.3%) 
5 (7.7%) 
14 (21.5%) 
6 (9.2%) 
49 (75.4%) 
 
 
30 (46.2%) 
15 (23.1%) 
36 (55.4%) 
2.1 ± 1.5 
Range = 0 – 7 
 
 
14 (34.1%) 
21 (51.2%) 
3 (7.3%) 
  7 (17.1%) 
3 (7.3%) 
29 (70.7%) 
 
 
19 (46.3%) 
  6 (14.6%) 
21 (51.2%) 
2.0 ± 1.5 
range = 0 – 5 
 
8ote. ADs = Antidepressants; BZs = Benzodiazepines; GAD = Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder; OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PTSD = Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder. 
aBased on participants born outside Australia. 
 
Sample B participants consisted of 11 males (26.8%) and 30 females 
(73.2%), with a total sample mean age of 37.8 years (SD = 11.6, range = 20 – 63). 
Again, no significant age differences existed between males (M = 40.00, SD = 9.06) 
and females (M = 37.03, SD = 12.06), t(39) = 0.72, p > .05. Remaining demographic 
characteristics of Sample B are displayed in Table 2.2. Comparisons between Sample 
B and the combined group of treatment non-starters and dropouts (n = 17) revealed 
Sample B participants were significantly more likely to be married, 61.0% vs. 23.5%, 
χ2(1, 8 = 58) = 6.74, p < .01, employed, 46.3% vs. 17.6%, χ2(1, 8 = 58) = 4.20, p < 
.05, and less likely to have received previous counselling, 39.0% vs. 76.5%, χ2(1, 8 = 
58) = 6.74, p < .01. These differences suggest Sample B participants were a higher 
functioning sample relative to treatment dropouts and non-starters. However, no 
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significant differences existed on other demographic variables (age, sex, education, 
country of origin, duration of anxiety disorder, medication, other previous 
treatments), intelligence (assessed by Matrix Reasoning and the Wechsler Test of 
Adult Reading), comorbidity or self-report measures (described below) assessing 
frequency and severity of anxiety and depressive symptoms (p > .05).  
 
Measures 
Personal Details Questionnaire. A 12-item demographic questionnaire was 
administered to collect information on age, gender, ethnicity, length of time in 
Australia, marital status, education, employment, duration of anxiety disorder, 
previous anxiety treatments and psychotropic medication.  
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV, Adult Version (ADIS-IV, 
Brown et al., 1994). The ADIS-IV is a structured clinician-administered psychiatric 
interview assessing current and lifetime episodes of anxiety, mood, somatoform and 
substance use disorders based on DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Severity of symptoms is rated on dimensional scales from 0 to 8. 
Each diagnosis is assigned a clinical severity rating from 0 (none) to 8 (very severe) 
based on functional interference and distress associated with the disorder. Clinical 
severity ratings of four or more are of diagnostic significance, ratings of 1 to 3 are 
regarded as subclinical and a rating of 0 is assigned when no features of the disorder 
are present.  
The ADIS-IV has demonstrated good to excellent reliability for the majority 
of anxiety and depressive disorders, with the exception of Dysthymia (к = .22 – .31). 
Test-retest reliability of anxiety disorders ranged from .57 to .86 and reliability of 
Major Depression was also good (к = .59 – .67). Inter-rater reliability of key 
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symptoms across anxiety and depressive disorders was generally sound (r = .36 – 
.86, mean r = .69) (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). Evidence of 
convergent and discriminant validity has also been established with self-report 
measures of Panic-Ag, Social Phobia, GAD, OCD and depression loading onto the 
respective latent diagnostic factors (e.g., the checking subscale of an OCD 
questionnaire loaded .94 on the OCD latent factor) without cross-loading on latent 
factors of non-corresponding diagnoses (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). 
8umber of Panic Attacks Assessed on the ADIS-IV (nPA-ADIS). Interviewers 
assessed the number of DSM-IV defined panic attacks experienced in the previous 
month using the Panic Disorder module of the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994).  
Panic Attack Sensation Severity Assessed on the ADIS-IV (PASS-ADIS). 
Participants were interviewed regarding the severity of 14 physical and mental 
sensations experienced during an unexpected panic attack using the Panic Disorder 
module of the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994). Items were rated on a 9-point visual 
analogue scale ranging from 0 (none) to 8 (very severe). Scores on this measure 
range from 0 to 112 with higher scores reflecting more severe symptoms. While the 
psychometric properties of this subscale have not been published, internal 
consistency estimates (Cronbach’s alpha) based on participants in the present study 
were sound, both at pretreatment and posttreatment (α = .81 – .92). 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire – Frequency (ACQ-Frequency, 
Chambless et al., 1984). The ACQ is a 14-item self-report questionnaire assessing 
frequency of thoughts concerning catastrophic consequences of anxiety (e.g., “I am 
going to pass out”, “I am going crazy”) when feeling anxious. Items are rated on a 5-
point scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Total scores range from 14 to 70. It has 
sound reliability (internal consistency: α = .80, test-retest reliability: r = .79 – .86) 
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and showed evidence of convergent (r = .21 – .67, p < .01) and discriminant validity 
(r = -.08 – -.14, p > .05) when correlated with theoretically related and unrelated 
measures, respectively. The ACQ is sensitive to treatment effects and clearly 
discriminates between normal and agoraphobic samples (Chambless et al., 1984). For 
the purpose of this thesis, the ACQ is subsequently referred to as ACQ-Frequency to 
differentiate it from the ACQ-Belief scale described below. 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire – Belief (ACQ-Belief). Belief in 
catastrophic cognitions was assessed using a modified version of the ACQ. Ratings 
of ACQ items were modified to assess belief in catastrophic cognitions across a 5-
point Likert scale from 0 (do not believe at all), 1 (slightly believe), 2 (somewhat 
believe), 3 (mostly believe) to 4 (completely believe). Scores range from 0 to 56, with 
higher scores reflecting stronger beliefs. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale based on 
participants in the present study was sound (α = .87) and test-retest reliability (1-2 
week re-test interval) was very high (r = .95 – .96). Similar modifications to the 
ACQ have been used by Salkovskis et al. (2007) to assess belief in catastrophic 
cognitions. 
Mobility Inventory for Agoraphobia (MI, Chambless, Caputo, Jasin, Gracely, 
& Williams, 1985). The MI is a 26-item self-report questionnaire assessing 
frequency of avoidance of common agoraphobic situations (e.g., supermarkets, 
enclosed spaces, trains). Items are rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (never avoid) to 5 
(always avoid). Each item is rated twice according to when experienced (a) alone and 
(b) accompanied by a trusted companion. Scores for the alone subscale range from 
26 to 130, while the accompanied subscale ranges from 25 to 125 (the “staying at 
home alone” item is not applicable for this subscale). Both subscales are highly 
internally consistent (α > .91) and correlate significantly with each other (r = .67) as 
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well as independent measures of agoraphobia (r = .44 – .66, p < .001) and trait 
anxiety (r = .25 – .38, p < .01). The measure is highly sensitive to treatment effects 
and can successfully distinguish agoraphobic patients from socially phobic and 
normal control samples.  
Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ, Chambless et al., 1984). The BSQ is a 
17-item self-report questionnaire assessing fear of panic sensations. Items are rated 
on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all frightening) to 5 (extremely frightening) with 
total scores ranging from 17 to 85. The BSQ has demonstrated high internal 
consistency (alpha = .87 – .88), moderate pretreatment stability (test-retest reliability 
= .66 – .67, retest interval = 6-31 days), and evidence of convergent (r = .17 – .67, p 
< .05) and discriminant validity (r = -.19 – .11, p > .05). BSQ scores decreased 
significantly with treatment and were able to successfully distinguish between 
agoraphobic patients and normal controls.  
Panic Belief Inventory (PBI, Greenberg, 1989; Wenzel et al., 2006). The PBI 
is a self-report questionnaire consisting of 35 statements assessing strength of beliefs 
regarding unrealistic ideas about panic and its consequences. Factor analysis 
identified four subscales: anticipatory anxiety (e.g., “I must be able to reach my 
‘support system’ at all times or a catastrophe could happen”), physical catastrophes 
(e.g., “A panic attack can give me a heart attack”), emotional catastrophes (e.g., “A 
panic attack can drive me insane”), and self-deprecation (e.g., “Having panic attacks 
means I’m weak, defective, or inferior”). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale 
from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree). Analysis of the psychometric properties 
of the PBI revealed good internal consistency of the subscales (α = .82 – .91) and of 
the measure as a whole (α = .95). Significant moderate correlations were observed 
between the PBI and measures of anxiety demonstrating evidence of convergent 
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validity. Evidence of discriminant validity was achieved with a lack of association 
between the PBI and measures of depressive cognitions and suicidal ideation. The 
PBI has also been shown to be sensitive to treatment gains with scores across the 
four subscales decreasing significantly from pretreatment to posttreatment.  
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II, Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire assessing severity of depressive 
symptoms. Items are reflective of DSM-IV criteria for major depressive episode. 
Each symptom is rated on a 4-point severity scale from 0 to 3 such that total scores 
range from 0 to 63. The BDI-II has demonstrated high levels of internal consistency 
(α > .90) and test-retest reliability (r = .93). It correlated well (r > .50) with self-
report and clinician ratings of depression in clinical and non-clinical samples and 
was more strongly associated with measures of depression than anxiety (see Steer & 
Beck, 2000, for a review), attesting to its sound convergent and discriminant validity. 
Work and Social Adjustment Scale (WSAS, Mundt, Marks, Shear, & Greist, 
2002). The WSAS is a brief 5-item self-report measure assessing functional 
impairment resulting from a specified disorder across five domains of functioning 
(work, home management, social leisure activities, private leisure activities, 
maintaining close relationships). Items are rated on a 9-point visual analogue scale 
from 0 (not at all impaired) to 8 (very severely impaired). Total scores range from 0 
to 40. The WSAS demonstrated good reliability with internal consistency estimates 
(Cronbach’s alpha) ranging between .79 to .94, pretreatment test-retest reliability of 
.73 and inter-rater reliability (patient vs. clinician ratings) of .81 to .86. WSAS scores 
correlated significantly with measures of symptom severity in patients with 
depression (r = .63 – .77, p < .001) and OCD (r = .45 – .69, p < .001). Furthermore, 
patients reporting higher clinical improvement ratings scored significantly lower on 
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the WSAS than those indicating little or no improvement. These results provide 
strong evidence of the measure’s convergent validity.  
Matrix Reasoning subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third 
Edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997). Matrix Reasoning is an untimed non-verbal 
measure of intelligence consisting of 26 items of increasing difficulty. Each item 
comprises a matrix of coloured geometric shapes in which one part of the pattern is 
omitted. Participants must identify the missing part that best completes the pattern 
from five choices. Raw scores range from 0 to 26. The psychometric properties of 
Matrix Reasoning are very sound (The Psychological Corporation, 1997). Reliability 
of the measure was high with split-half internal consistency coefficients ranging from 
.87 to .94 (M = .90) across different age groups and test-retest reliability (mean retest 
interval = 35 days) ranging from r = .75 – .81. Age-scaled scores correlated highly 
with full-scale IQ (r = .75), performance IQ (r = .79) and a similar independent non-
verbal intelligence test (Raven’s Standardised Progressive Matrices, r = .81), 
demonstrating strong construct validity.  
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR, The Psychological Corporation, 
2001). The WTAR is a verbal intelligence test originally designed to estimate 
premorbid IQ. It requires the reading and pronunciation of 50 irregularly spelled 
words of increasing difficulty (e.g., know, ogre, hyperbole) without requiring word 
comprehension. The words do not follow standard grapheme-to-phoneme translation 
and generally require prior knowledge of the words for correct pronunciation. Raw 
scores range from 0 to 50, however scores are adjusted according to age, sex, and 
level of education. The WTAR demonstrated excellent internal consistency (r = .87 – 
.97) and temporal stability (test-retest reliability, r = .92 – .94, mean retest interval = 
35 days). It correlated highly with other measures of reading recognition (r = .73 – 
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.90) and verbal and full-scale IQ (r = .75, .73, respectively), providing evidence of 
good construct validity.  
Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment Knowledge 
Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ). Constructed by the author for this thesis, the MC-PTKQ 
contains 29 items assessing knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag. Scores on the MC-
PTKQ range from 0 to 40. All information required by participants to correctly 
answer the questionnaire was provided by the therapists in the treatment program as 
detailed below. 
 
Procedure 
 This phase of the study examined item refinement and formed part of the 
broader research question assessing relationships between treatment knowledge, 
beliefs and outcome. Ethics approval for all aspects of the study was provided from 
the Sydney West Area Health Service (SWAHS) Human Research Ethics Committee 
[HREC2005/5/4.12(2083)].  
As part of the routine clinical procedures used in the clinic, participants 
completed an initial clinical diagnostic assessment using the ADIS-IV and a battery 
of self-report psychosocial measures consisting of the ACQ-Frequency, MI, PBI, 
BSQ, WSAS and BDI-II. These self-report measures were completed by participants 
in their own home after administration of the ADIS-IV. The ADIS-IV was 
administered by one of three clinical psychologists with between 8 and 15 years 
clinical experience. In addition, 16 clinical masters or doctoral students completing 
an internship at the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment and Research Unit between 
November 2005 and November 2007 also conducted ADIS-IV assessments 
following training in the administration of the instrument. Symptoms and ratings of 
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interns were discussed in weekly supervision meetings in order to ensure diagnoses 
were accurate and justified.  
Prior to treatment, participants were invited to attend a research assessment 
where the purpose of the study was explained and informed consent was obtained. 
Participants were subsequently administered a battery of measures comprising the 
WTAR, Matrix Reasoning, MC-PTKQ (described above) in addition to an open-
ended short-answer structured interview assessing knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag, 
and questionnaires assessing beliefs about Panic-Ag and its treatment for research 
purposes (descriptions of these latter measures are provided in chapters 3 and 4, 
respectively).  
Treated participants (Sample B) attending the 6-month follow-up (for brevity, 
referred to as posttreatment) research assessment were readministered the ADIS-IV, 
followed by the same pretreatment measures assessing treatment knowledge and 
beliefs. Pre- and posttreatment research assessments each lasted approximately 2 
hours after which participants were thanked for their time and effort. A 6-month 
posttreatment assessment was selected to provide a more representative measure of 
treatment outcome for two reasons. Firstly, “honeymoon effects” observed 
immediately post treatment (e.g., rapid reduction of panic attack frequency) may not 
be sustained over time. Secondly, agoraphobic avoidance continues to decrease 
following treatment with ongoing application of CBT skills. 
In both the pre- and posttreatment assessment procedures, previous feedback 
from expert reviewers suggested participants might feel threatened about answering 
questions related to treatment knowledge. Furthermore, it was highlighted that some 
participants lacking familiarity with multiple-choice measures may respond to 
questions impulsively without reading through all answer options. To minimise such 
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performance anxiety and impulsivity, the following instructions were provided and 
read aloud to participants immediately prior to completion of the knowledge 
measure.   
Below are some questions exploring what people know about Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy (CBT) for Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia. Some 
of the questions are quite difficult and you are not expected to know all 
of the answers. It does not matter if you do not know any of the answers 
or if you know them all. This is not a test or exam, we are just interested 
in what you currently know about CBT for Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia. The information obtained will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and used only for research. 
Important Instructions 
 Read each question carefully before answering 
 Make sure you read all the options before making your 
selection 
 Circle the letter of the answer that you think is most correct 
 Circle only one answer per question 
 If you think you do not know the answer to a question, circle 
‘Don’t know’ rather than simply guess 
 Do not spend too long on any question 
  
Following explanation and clarification of instructions, participants were asked 
to complete the questionnaire alone in a quiet office unaided by textbooks or material 
relevant to treatment of Panic-Ag.  
 
Treatment 
Treatment was based on the cognitive model of Panic-Ag (Clark, 1986) and 
focussed on correcting catastrophic misinterpretations of bodily sensations through a 
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range of cognitive and behavioural techniques. Therapy was conducted in a group-
based format and involved eight sessions over 8 consecutive weeks. Each session ran 
for 2½ hours with the exception of Session 5, which consisted of a 4-hour in vivo 
exposure session. A total of eight groups were run comprising between six and 10 
patients per group. Treatment was administered by one of three registered clinical 
psychologists experienced in CBT for anxiety disorders, in combination with two 
intern clinical psychologists in their second or third year of a masters or doctoral 
degree in clinical psychology (16 interns in total). Interns were supervised weekly to 
ensure therapist competence. Of the eight treatment groups, six were run by the 
author, and the other two clinical psychologists each conducted one group. Treatment 
was manualised and all clinicians utilised the same manual. 
The treatment manual was based on procedures outlined in a number of 
published texts on Panic-Ag (Andrews et al., 2003; Barlow, 2001; Clark, 1986, 1996, 
1999; Hackmann, 2004; Hawton et al., 1989; Salkovskis et al., 1996).  Session 1 
introduced patients to the role of catastrophic cognitions in maintaining anxiety and 
panic attacks and provided psychoeducation surrounding the nature of anxiety and 
the role of the fight/flight response. Session 2 examined the impact of 
hyperventilation on the production of panic sensations and accurate medical 
information was provided to challenge patients’ catastrophic misinterpretations. 
Session 3 focussed on identifying and challenging catastrophic cognitions through 
examining the realistic probability and cost of feared outcomes and behavioural 
experiments. Session 4 discussed graded exposure to feared situations and 
sensations. In-session interoceptive exposure was conducted (e.g., hyperventilation, 
breathing through a straw, spinning). Session 5 involved a 4 hr exposure session 
where patients tested their catastrophic cognitions in vivo (e.g., in shopping centres, 
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trains, lifts), initially accompanied or prompted by the therapist and then 
independently. Safety seeking behaviours were gradually withdrawn to reinforce the 
lack of feared consequences. Sessions 6 and 7 involved revision of concepts, further 
behavioural experiments, cognitive challenging and planning of exposure goals. 
Relapse prevention strategies were discussed in Session 8. Patients were given 
weekly homework assignments corresponding to session content which was 
reviewed at the beginning of the following session. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
 SPSS for Windows Version 15.0 (SPSS Inc., 2006) was used to conduct 
statistical analyses. Initial indices of item difficulty, discrimination and reliability 
were based on Sample A participants. Item difficulty indices, or p values, were 
calculated by dividing the number of participants responding correctly to the item by 
the total number of participants. Item discrimination indices were obtained by firstly 
constructing extreme groups consisting of participants scoring in the upper and lower 
33.3% of the questionnaire. The use of thirds over quartiles provided a more 
stringent evaluation of item discrimination. Scores on the knowledge measure ranged 
from 0 to 39 (out of a possible 40). The lower group consisted of 22 participants 
scoring 0-14, while the upper group comprised 22 participants scoring 23-39. A 
choice-distribution table was generated for each item to determine percentage of 
participants answering the item correctly in the upper and lower groups. The 
discrimination index, or D value, was calculated by subtracting the percentage of 
participants in the lower group responding correctly to the item from the percentage 
scoring correctly in the upper group. Reliability of individual items was determined 
using Cronbach’s alpha and calculating the alpha coefficient when the item was 
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excluded from the total scale (alpha if item deleted). An increase in alpha of .01 was 
selected as a conservative cut-off to identify unreliable items. 
 
Results  
Table 2.3 displays indices of item difficulty and discrimination and reliability 
coefficients for the 29 items of the MC-PTKQ. Item difficulty indices ranged 
between .08 to .72, with an average of .38. As participants consisted of patients due 
to commence treatment, all item difficulty indices fell within the appropriate range of 
.00 – .75 (Anastasi, 1988).  
Eleven items (items 2, 8, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27) had p values 
below .30 indicating they were difficult (Meadows et al., 1988). To determine 
whether these items became easier with provision of treatment, pre- and 
posttreatment item difficulty indices were calculated and compared among Sample B 
participants. As can be seen from Table 2.4, scores increased significantly for all 
items following treatment with the exception of item 17, indicating items became 
easier. Item 17 assessed participants’ ability to understand the concept of 
overestimating the probability of potential events and to differentiate it from 
overestimating the cost of such events (see Appendix B). This suggests that 
participants confused these concepts and treatment was unhelpful in clarifying their 
meaning. Posttreatment difficulty indices exceeded .30 for most items, with the 
exceptions of items 17 and 18. However, these difficult items were retained so the 
contribution of such knowledge to treatment outcome could be examined. 
 Item discrimination indices, or D values, for Sample A ranged between 9 and 
86, with an average D value of 50.41 (see Table 2.3) indicating most items were able 
to discriminate well between high and low scoring participants. Only three items 
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Table 2.3 Index of Difficulty (p), Index of Discrimination (D), and Alpha Coefficients 
for the 29-Item Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment Knowledge 
Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ) for Sample A (8 = 65) 
  Item discrimination index  
 
Item 
difficulty 
index 
 Percentage 
passing  
 
Alpha if item 
deleted 
Item no. p 
 Upper 
group  
Lower 
group  D 
  
α 
1  .52  82 27 55  .909 
2  .28  59 0 59  .908 
3  .51  82 14 68  .907 
4  .35  59 9 50  .905 
5  .35  59 14 45  .907 
6  .45  82 18 64  .908 
7  .32  41 27 14  .912 
8  .11  14 5 9  .912 
9  .40  73 9 64  .906 
10  .72  91 55 36  .909 
11  .25  50 5 45  .909 
12  .22  36 9 27  .912 
13  .54  86 14 72  .907 
14  .43  86 14 72  .907 
15  .45  77 5 72  .906 
16  .46  86 0 86  .903 
17  .25  27 9 18  .912 
18  .08  23 0 23  .910 
19  .46  86 14 72  .904 
20  .62  95 27 68  .907 
21  .15  32 0 32  .911 
22  .49  73 32 41  .910 
23  .19  45 5 40  .909 
24  .46  82 14 68  .908 
25  .26  59 0 59  .905 
26  .25  50 5 45  .909 
27  .26  45 9 36  .906 
28  .48  86 14 72  .908 
29  .62  82 32 50  .909 
Total .38  63.72 13.31 50.41  .911 
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Table 2.4 Pre- and Posttreatment Item Difficulty Indices (p) for MC-PTKQ Items 
With Pretreatment Indices of p < .30 for Sample B (8 = 41) 
 Pretreatment Posttreatment 
Item o. p p 
2  .37  .85*** 
8  .12  .51*** 
11  .24  .66*** 
12  .24  .51** 
17  .27  .27 
18  .10  .29* 
21  .22  .49*** 
23  .22  .49*** 
25  .29  .61*** 
26  .27  .78*** 
27  .27  .51*** 
8ote. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
 
(items 7, 8, 17) had unacceptably low D values (< 20), however these three items 
also had p values below .35, indicating a floor effect made it difficult to discriminate 
between participants at pretreatment. As scores on item 8 increased following 
treatment it was retained. Posttreatment D values (based on Sample B) for items 7 
(upper group = 39, lower group = 8) and 17 (upper group = 46, lower group = 15) 
were each 31, indicating that these items were able to discriminate between high and 
low scoring participants following treatment. Hence, items 7 and 17 were also 
retained. Internal consistency of the 29-item knowledge questionnaire was high (α = 
.911). The alpha coefficient did not substantially increase following deletion of any 
item (alpha if item deleted = .903 – .912), indicating all 29 items were internally 
consistent (see Table 2.3). 
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Discussion 
 This study aimed to develop a multiple-choice measure assessing patients’ 
knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag, (Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia 
Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire, MC-PTKQ). Thirty-nine items were generated 
and reviewed for relevance, comprehensibility and accuracy. Reviewers’ feedback 
resulted in reducing the questionnaire by 10 items to a set of 29 items. Results of 
item difficulty, discrimination and reliability analyses on these 29 items indicated 
that all items were sound, hence all items were retained.  
The difficulty, discrimination and reliability ratings obtained in this study 
must be interpreted with caution. Firstly, over one quarter of participants reported 
having previously received CBT. However, prior exposure to CBT varies 
considerably according to factors such as nature of presenting problem (Panic-Ag, 
depression, general anxiety), therapy intensity (3 sessions vs. 12 sessions) as well as 
therapist orientation and experience. These variables could not be ascertained 
retrospectively yet may have influenced item difficulty, discrimination and reliability 
ratings to some extent.  
Secondly, as Sample B comprised only half the number of eligible 
participants, the posttreatment item difficulty indices obtained in this study may not 
generalise to the larger population of Panic-Ag patients. Sample B participants were 
more likely to be married, employed and less likely to have previously received 
counselling than treatment dropouts and non-starters thereby comprising a higher 
functioning sample. Consequently, a more representative sample of Panic-Ag 
patients may score substantially lower on the MC-PTKQ after treatment than Sample 
B.  
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 Nevertheless, this study provides the first attempt to develop a measure 
assessing knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag using a multiple-choice format. However, 
multiple-choice measures are not without their shortcomings. The next chapter 
attempts to address such disadvantages through the development of a parallel 
knowledge interview where the psychometric properties of both knowledge measures 
will also be examined.  
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Development of the Interview of Panic-Ag Treatment 
Knowledge (Int-PTK) 
This chapter describes the development of a structured knowledge interview 
designed specifically to confirm findings from the MC-PTKQ using a more sensitive 
format as discussed earlier. As noted, interview methods permit a more sensitive 
assessment of knowledge than multiple-choice and other written measures. In 
addition, they not only maximise the potential to distinguish between partial and full 
knowledge of concepts but also reduce the impact of correct guesses on total 
knowledge scores. For these reasons, an open-ended short-answer structured 
interview was developed as a supplementary assessment of CBT knowledge for 
Panic-Ag. 
Construction of the multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire (MC-PTKQ) 
described in chapter 2 laid the foundations for the development of the Interview of 
Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment Knowledge (Int-PTK). That is, of the three 
phases involved in the development of a knowledge measure, phases one 
(development of the item pool) and two (expert review of items and initial item 
refinement) had already been conducted. Interview questions were therefore identical 
in content to the 29 multiple-choice questionnaire items but restructured into 24 
questions to accommodate the open-ended short-answer format.  
 The Int-PTK (see Appendix C) comprised 24 questions across domains of 
psychoeducation (questions 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 2c), cognitive therapy (questions 3a, 3b, 
3c, 4, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d), role of avoidance (questions 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d) and exposure 
therapy (questions 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 8a, 8b, 8c). Examples of interview questions for 
each domain appear in Figure 3.1. The interview was tightly scripted. The 
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interviewer, an experienced clinical psychologist, read each question aloud to 
participants irrespective of their experience with CBT for Panic-Ag. 
 
Figure 3.1. Example questions from the Int-PTK for each knowledge domain. 
Psychoeducation  
 What is the Fight or Flight Response and what is its purpose? 
 Name 5 symptoms that can be caused by hyperventilating. 
Cognitive Therapy 
 According to the CBT approach, why are panic attacks/panic sensations so 
frightening? 
 According to the CBT approach, if you are overestimating the probability, how 
could you go about decreasing your probability estimates? 
Role of Avoidance  
 According to the CBT approach, how does avoidance maintain fear and anxiety? 
 According to the CBT approach, what is the problem with using safety seeking 
behaviours? 
Exposure Therapy 
 According to the CBT approach, if your behavioural experiment was too hard, 
describe 3 ways to make it easier for yourself. 
 According to the CBT approach, what is the purpose of deliberately bringing on 
panic sensations (e.g., dizziness, heart palpitations, lightheadedness, shortness of 
breath)?  
 
Administration 
 To ensure a thorough assessment of knowledge had been obtained, 
participants were advised they would be probed exhaustively for each question until 
they indicated they had no more to report. As the interview required participants to 
discuss a range of (often unfamiliar) CBT concepts in front of the interviewer, the 
potential to feel anxious, intimidated and/or threatened was also acknowledged. As 
such, the following instructions were provided prior to commencing the interview.  
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This section involves a brief interview about what you currently know 
about cognitive behaviour therapy for panic disorder and agoraphobia. 
When assessing people’s knowledge, their first response will often 
capture, say, only 70% of what they know about the topic. If I want to get 
the remaining 30% I have to probe further by asking “Is there anything 
else you would like to add?” until they say “no”. I will use this same 
procedure with you for every question, regardless of your response.  
Sometimes people feel threatened when being asked these types of 
questions. As you have not started treatment you are not expected to 
know the answers to these questions. However, whatever you say is 
useful and interesting for the purpose of this research and your responses 
are completely confidential. 
In addition, less confident participants have been noted to prefer to say 
nothing or “I don’t know” rather than risk responding incorrectly and appearing 
foolish. In such cases, prompts were used to encourage responding (e.g., “Just have a 
go”). Care was taken to query vague or unclear responses to ensure participants were 
not being disadvantaged by reduced verbal abilities (e.g., “Tell me more about that,” 
“Give me an example of what you mean”). Similarly, ambiguous terms or phrases 
used by participants were queried to determine their exact understanding of concepts. 
For example, the term negative thoughts, when queried, implied both catastrophic 
misinterpretations of physical sensations and negative (non-panic) memories of the 
past by different patients. Administration of the Int-PTK lasted approximately 15 to 
25 min, with less knowledgeable participants typically taking less time. Interviews 
were audiotaped and transcribed to assist scoring. 
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Scoring  
Correct responses to questions consisted of either core CBT concepts (e.g., 
purpose of the fight or flight response, role of catastrophic cognitions in the 
maintenance of panic) or identification of a specific number of points (e.g., three 
symptoms of the fight or flight response and their function, five symptoms that can 
be caused by hyperventilating). Ten treated and 10 untreated participant interview 
transcripts were analysed and responses classified across a 5-point continuum as 
operationalised in Figure 3.2  below.  
 
Figure 3.2. Operationalisation of scoring for Int-PTK items. 
Score Knowledge 
rating 
ecessary criteria 
4 Excellent  All necessary information provided 
 Excellent understanding of core components 
 Required number of points 
3 Very Good  Majority of information provided 
 Sound understanding of core components 
 One point overlapping or similar to another 
2 Good  Moderate understanding of core components 
 Missing one concept or 1-2 points 
1 Minimal  Minimal information provided 
 Vague reference to core concept or elaboration that 
indicates misunderstanding 
 Missing 3 or more points 
0 Poor  Wholly incorrect information provided 
 Poor understanding of core concept or “Don’t know” 
response 
 Missing all points 
 
Scores across the 24 items therefore ranged from 0 to 96. Examples of 0 to 4 
point responses are displayed in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3. Examples of 0 to 4-point responses. 
What is the fight or flight response and what is its purpose? 
4 
 
The fight or flight response is a term used when people are put into a threatening 
situation, whether that be a real threat or a perceived threat, and it’s when your 
body activates the fight or flight response, which is basically whether you’re 
going to fight the danger that’s ahead of your or flee it, run away from it. Even 
just a distressing thought can trigger it off. Its purpose is to protect you from 
danger, so it’s a natural response. 
3 Fight or flight response is if you’re put into a dangerous situation as you see it, 
you fight aggressively to survive or you flee the situation for the same reason, to 
survive…I guess it’s a trigger for you to survive. 
2  
 
It’s when you think you’re in a dangerous situation, it brings on fear and 
palpitations, sweating and lightheadedness, that kind of thing and it’s…to alert 
you to danger…To kind of get you out of danger when you’re in a dangerous 
situation. 
1  
 
Either run away or you fight it…To overcome the panic and know that nothing’s 
going to happen, you just have to fight it and not give in...your body’s 
responding to the panic and your body’s either going to run away and keep 
going until it ends. 
0  Something about fighting the symptoms, trying to just fight them and get 
through it, and then the flight is sort of when you’ve gotten over it. 
According to the CBT approach, why are panic attacks/panic sensations so 
frightening? 
4 It’s because of what you think about them. If you think that the physical 
symptoms are because of a heart attack or a stroke or something, that’s quite 
frightening…just from your thoughts about them. 
3 Well they’re usually frightening from the point of view, it’s more your thoughts. 
So your thoughts are usually quite negative more than anything else. 
2  They’re frightening because you don’t understand what’s going on…you say “Is 
this going to be forever, what’s wrong with me?” 
1  You feel like you don’t have control of the feelings and the situation and they 
feel like they’re just gonna keep on getting worse. 
0  Because of the symptoms….Because the symptoms are not pleasant so you 
don’t want them. 
 
To assess inter-rater reliability of the scoring system, an independent rater 
was initially trained in the scoring system through reviewing five pretreatment and 
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five posttreatment Int-PTK transcripts. Following review of these 10 transcripts, the 
reviewer independently scored an additional five transcripts blind to participants’ 
treatment status (i.e., pretreatment vs. posttreatment) and symptom severity. Ratings 
to individual items were compared and discrepancies discussed until consensus was 
achieved. Finally, blind ratings were made to an additional random sample of 20 Int-
PTK transcripts. Intraclass correlations (ICC) across the 20 transcripts ranged 
between .65 and .96, p < .001, (mean ICC = .84) indicating satisfactory inter-rater 
reliability. 
   
Analysis of Items and Final Reduction of Item Pool 
The next phase in the development of the Int-PTK involved analysing items 
to remove those that were too easy, poor discriminators or unreliable. Although all 
items in the multiple-choice version were deemed appropriate, differences in the 
administration and phrasing of questions in the knowledge interview may have 
affected difficulty, discrimination and reliability indices.  
Participants, measures and assessment procedures used to determine such 
indices were identical to those for the multiple-choice version described in chapter 2. 
The Int-PTK was administered prior to the MC-PTKQ to prevent information from 
the latter measure influencing participants’ responses. Item difficulty, discrimination 
and reliability indices were based on Sample A participants. Scores for interview 
items were collapsed into two categories to calculate item difficulty and 
discrimination indices. Responses scored 0 and 1 were coded as incorrect, while 
scores of 2, 3 and 4 were coded as correct. As can be seen from Table 3.1, item 
difficulty indices (p values) ranged from .05 to .69 indicating all items fell within the 
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appropriate range (.00 – .75). The mean difficulty rating was .31 indicating that on 
average, interview items were quite difficult for patients to answer at pretreatment.  
 
Table 3.1 Index of Difficulty (p), Index of Discrimination (D), and Alpha Coefficients 
for the 24-Item Interview of Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment Knowledge (Int-
PTK) for Sample A (8 = 65) 
  Item discrimination index  
 
Item difficulty 
index 
 Percentage 
passing  
 
Alpha if item 
deleted 
Item no. p 
 Upper 
group  
Lower 
group  D 
  
α 
1a .42  73 14 59  .912 
1b .25  55 0 55  .912 
2a .49  86 18 68  .911 
2b .37  68 9 59  .912 
2c .69  91 41 50  .912 
3a .55  77 36 41  .916 
3b .25  59 0 59  .910 
3c .55  77 36 41  .907 
4 .06  18 0 18  .913 
5a  .62  77 41 36  .913 
5b  .32  64 0 64  .909 
5c  .14  32 0 32  .912 
5d  .05  14 0 14  .913 
6a  .17  41 0 41  .909 
6b  .43  77 14 63  .912 
6c  .59  100 14 86  .909 
6d  .12  32 0 32  .910 
7a  .20  55 0 55  .909 
7b  .20  46 0 46  .911 
7c  .15  36 0 36  .911 
7d  .34  68 5 63  .909 
8a  .23  50 0 50  .911 
8b  .20  50 0 50  .911 
8c  .09  23 0 23  .914 
Total .31  57.0 9.5 47.5  .914 
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Thirteen of the 24 items (54%) had p values below .30, suggesting 
participants found the interview more difficult than the multiple-choice version (c.f. 
38% of items with p values < .30). Examination of difficulty indices for pre- and 
posttreatment data confirmed the provision of treatment improved performance; p 
values increased significantly with treatment for all such items and exceeded .30 (see 
Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2 Comparison of Pre- and Posttreatment Item Difficulty Indices (p) for Int-
PTK Items With Pretreatment Difficulty Indices p < .30 for Sample B (8 = 41) 
  Pretreatment Posttreatment 
Question p p 
1b .29  .63* 
3b .29  .76* 
4 .10  .49* 
5c .17  .51* 
5d .07  .42* 
6a .24  .73* 
6d .12  .73* 
7a .24  .83* 
7b .20  .93* 
7c .20  .90* 
8a .24  .90* 
8b .24  .93* 
8c .12  .49* 
8ote. *p < .001.  
 
Sample A participants scoring in the upper and lower thirds of the Int-PTK 
were used to construct extreme groups for the evaluation of item discrimination. 
Scores ranged from 0 to 58 (out of a possible 96).  The lower third (n = 22) scored 0-
16 and the upper third (n = 22) scored 28-58. Item discrimination indices, or D 
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values, ranged between 14 and 86, with a mean of 47.5 (see Table 3.1) indicating 
most items were able to adequately discriminate between high and low scoring 
participants. Only two items (items 4 and 5d) had D values below 20, however these 
items also had very low pretreatment p values (.06 and .05, respectively), indicating a 
floor effect made item discrimination difficult. Posttreatment discrimination values 
were calculated on items 4 and 5d using Sample B data.  D values of 54 and 85 were 
obtained for items 4 (upper group = 77, lower group = 23) and 5d (upper group = 85, 
lower group = 0), respectively, indicating both items discriminated well between 
high and low scoring participants after treatment. Internal consistency of the Int-PTK 
was high (α = .914). The alpha coefficient did not substantially increase following 
deletion of any item (alpha if item deleted = .907 – .916), indicating all 24 items 
were internally consistent. On the basis of these indices, all items were retained. 
 
Summary 
This section described the development of a structured interview assessing 
knowledge of CBT for Panic-Ag (the Interview of Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia 
Treatment Knowledge, Int-PTK). The Int-PTK was constructed to obtain a more 
sensitive assessment of knowledge than the MC-PTKQ. Items for the Int-PTK 
borrowed heavily from the development of the MC-PTKQ described in chapter 2. As 
found for the MC-PTKQ, item difficulty, discrimination and reliability ratings were 
sound hence all items were retained.  
Several limitations of the Int-PTK must be acknowledged. Firstly, as 
described in chapter 2, over one quarter of participants reported prior treatment with 
CBT which may have influenced indices of difficulty, discrimination and reliability. 
Secondly, treated participants’ were interviewed immediately following 
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administration of the ADIS-IV. Hence the interviewer was not blind to participants’ 
diagnostic status (or the research question) which may have biased the interview in 
some way. However, interviews were scored from decoded transcripts, thus raters 
were blind to participants’ treatment status (pretreatment vs. posttreatment) and 
symptom severity. Moreover, intraclass correlations revealed the inter-rater 
reliability of the scoring was sound.  
 
 
Evaluation of the Psychometric Properties of the Knowledge 
Measures 
This section describes the reliability and validity of the MC-PTKQ and Int-
PTK. Reliability data was collected using a pretreatment and posttreatment sample. 
Convergent and discriminant validity was assessed by comparing total knowledge 
scores with variables theoretically related and unrelated to patient knowledge, 
respectively. The known-group method (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1994) was used to 
test the ability of the MC-PTKQ to discriminate between independent samples of 
pretreatment and posttreatment patients as well as between clinical psychologists and 
intern clinical psychologists to further support the construct validity of the measures. 
Finally, the measures’ sensitivity to change was assessed as a final marker of 
validity. 
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Method 
Participants 
 A summary of patient and clinician samples used to evaluate the 
psychometric properties of the knowledge measures is displayed in Table 3.3.  
 
Patient Samples 
 All patient participants were recruited from the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment 
and Research Unit, Cumberland Hospital. Three patient samples were used, hereafter 
referred to as Samples A, B and C. Samples A and B were identical to those 
described in chapter 2. Sample C was recruited from two groups of treated Panic-Ag 
patients assessed 6 to 12 months posttreatment (again, for brevity referred to as 
posttreatment): (a) an independent group of 40 consecutive patients who completed 
treatment prior to December 2005 and, as described in chapter 2, (b) 10 patients 
receiving treatment from the clinic between December 2005 and September 2007 
who were unavailable for the pretreatment research assessment. Inclusion criteria 
consisted of primary pretreatment DSM-IV diagnosis of Panic Disorder and/or 
Agoraphobia, fluency in written and spoken English and aged 18 to 70 years. 
Exclusion criteria involved current substance abuse, active psychosis and 
developmental delay.  
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A flow-chart of Sample C recruitment is depicted in Figure 3.4. One patient 
was excluded due to English non-fluency. Of the remaining 49 patients, four (8.2%) 
declined participation, five (10.2%) were unable to be contacted, another five 
(10.2%) failed to attend three scheduled assessment appointments, leaving 35 
patients available for follow-up assessment which constituted Sample C. Sample C 
represents a response rate of 71.4% of the total sample of eligible posttreatment 
participants. 
 
Figure 3.4. Recruitment of Sample C participants.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 = Non-fluent in written or 
spoken English 
5 = Unable to be contacted/ 
moved out of the area 
Patients eligible to participate in the study 
+ = 49 
4 = Declined to participate in 
the study 
5 = Failed to attend 3 
scheduled appointments 
Patients treated for Panic-Ag at the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment & Research 
Unit recruited prior to December 2005 (n = 40) and between December 2005 to 
June 2008 (n = 10) 
+ = 50 
Sample C 
Participants completing 6-month follow-up assessment 
+ = 35 
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Demographic characteristics of Samples A, B and C are displayed in Table 
3.4. For ease of comparison, data from Table 2.2 is repeated here.  
 
Table 3.4 Pretreatment Demographic Characteristics for Samples A, B and C 
 Sample A 
+ = 65 
Sample B 
+ = 41 
Sample C 
+ = 35 
Age (years) (M ± SD) 37.9 ± 12.6 
range = 18-63 
37.8 ± 11.6 
range = 20-63 
37.7 ± 11.4 
range = 21-68 
Sex 
   Males 
   Females 
 
18 (27.7%) 
47 (72.3%) 
 
11 (26.8%) 
30 (73.2%) 
 
  7 (20.0%) 
28 (80.0%) 
Country of origin 
   Australia 
   Other 
   Length of time in 
    Australia (years)a 
 
49 (75.4%) 
16 (24.6%) 
31.2 ± 15.6 
range = 1.5 – 57 
 
30 (73.2%) 
11 (26.8%) 
34.2 ± 12.1 
range = 10 – 57 
 
28 (80.0%) 
  7 (20.0%) 
18.1 ± 10.3 
range = 6 – 32 
Marital status 
   Never married 
   Married/de facto 
   Divorced/Separated 
 
25 (38.5%) 
31 (47.7%) 
  9 (13.8%) 
 
11 (26.8%) 
25 (61.0%) 
  5 (12.2%) 
 
  9 (25.7%) 
23 (65.7%) 
3 (8.6%) 
Education (years)  
(M ± SD) 
12.7 ± 2.8 
range = 7 – 19 
13.0 ± 2.8 
range = 9 – 19 
13.5 ± 2.6 
range = 10 – 19 
Employed 23 (35.4%) 19 (46.3%) 22 (62.9%) 
Duration of anxiety 
disorder (years) 
(M ± SD) 
8.9 ± 11.2 
range = .25 – 50 
6.8 ± 7.7 
range = .25 – 30 
6.3 ± 6.9 
range = .5 – 30 
Previous treatments
b
 
   Medication 
   CBT 
   Counselling    
   Self-help books 
 
47 (72.3%) 
18 (27.7%) 
31 (47.7%) 
31 (47.7%) 
 
29 (70.7%) 
11 (26.8%) 
16 (39.0%) 
21 (51.2%) 
 
19 (54.3%) 
35 (100%) 
17 (48.6%) 
16 (45.7%) 
Medication status 
   No medication 
   ADs only 
   BZs only 
   ADs & BZs 
   Other 
Number of medications 
 (M ± SD) 
 
25 (38.5%) 
12 (18.5%) 
12 (18.5%) 
15 (23.1%) 
1 (1.5%) 
1.0 ± 0.9 
Range = 0 – 3 
 
17 (41.5%) 
7 (17.1%) 
8 (19.5%) 
8 (19.5%) 
1 (2.4%) 
1.0 ± 0.9 
Range = 0 – 3 
 
18 (51.4%) 
11 (31.4%) 
1 (2.9%) 
  5 (14.3%) 
       0 (0%) 
0.6 ± 0.8 
Range = 0 – 2 
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Table 3.4 (continued) Pretreatment Demographic Characteristics Across Samples 
A, B and C 
 Sample A 
+ = 65 
Sample B 
+ = 41 
Sample C 
+ = 35 
Primary diagnosis 
   PD 
   PD-Ag 
   Ag 
 
4 (6.2%) 
58 (89.2%) 
3 (4.6%) 
 
3 (7.3%) 
36 (87.8%) 
2 (4.9%) 
 
 4 (11.4%) 
27 (77.1%) 
 4 (11.4%) 
Comorbidity
 
Other anxiety disorder  
   Social phobia 
   GAD 
   OCD 
   Specific phobia 
   PTSD 
   Any comorbid anxiety 
    disorder 
Comorbid depressive 
disorder  
   Major depression 
   Dysthymia 
   Any depressive disorder 
No. comorbid diagnoses  
(M ± SD) 
 
 
22 (33.8%) 
34 (52.3%) 
5 (7.7%) 
14 (21.5%) 
6 (9.2%) 
49 (75.4%) 
 
 
 
30 (46.2%) 
15 (23.1%) 
36 (55.4%) 
2.1 ± 1.5 
range = 0 – 7 
 
 
14 (34.1%) 
21 (51.2%) 
3 (7.3%) 
  7 (17.1%) 
3 (7.3%) 
29 (70.7%) 
 
 
 
19 (46.3%) 
  6 (14.6%) 
21 (51.2%) 
2.0 ± 1.5 
range = 0 – 5 
 
 
  7 (20.0%) 
14 (40.0%) 
2 (5.7%) 
  7 (20.0%) 
3 (8.6%) 
20 (57.1%) 
 
 
 
10 (28.6%) 
  5 (14.3%) 
14 (40.0%) 
1.5 ± 1.6 
range = 0 – 6 
8ote. ADs = Antidepressants; BZs = Benzodiazepines; GAD = Generalised Anxiety 
Disorder; OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PTSD = Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder; PD = Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia; PD-Ag = Panic Disorder with 
Agoraphobia; Ag = Agoraphobia without Panic Disorder. 
aBased on participants born outside Australia.  
bData for Sample C collected at 6-12 months posttreatment and represents treatments 
received either before or after treatment from the Anxiety Treatment and Research 
Unit. 
 
Sample C differed significantly from Sample A on several pretreatment 
variables: Sample C participants were more likely to be employed (62.9% vs. 
35.4%), χ2(1, 8 = 100) = 6.94, p < .01, used fewer total psychotropic medications 
(0.6 vs. 1.0), t(98) = 2.24, p < .05, were less likely to be using benzodiazepines 
(17.1% vs. 41.5%), χ2(1, 8 = 100) = 6.12, p < .05, obtained higher age-scaled scores 
on matrix reasoning (M = 12.17, SD = 2.23  vs. M = 10.97, SD = 2.92), t(98) = -2.12, 
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p < .05, and reported less agoraphobic avoidance when accompanied (M = 54.01, SD 
= 21.51 vs. M = 63.87, SD = 21.02), t(98) = 2.22, p < .05. Sample C differed 
significantly from Sample B only on benzodiazepine use (17.1% vs. 39.0%), χ2(1, 8 
= 76) = 4.40, p < .05. No other differences between Samples C and B or Samples C 
and A were found for other pretreatment demographic variables, comorbid 
diagnoses, intelligence or pretreatment self-report measures of psychopathology (p > 
.05). 
 
Clinician Samples 
 Three clinician samples were recruited to validate the MC-PTKQ: (1) 
Clinical Psychologists, (2) Intern Clinical Psychologists in their second or third year 
of a post-graduate degree in clinical psychology, and (3) Entry level Intern Clinical 
Psychologists at the beginning of their first year of a Doctorate of Clinical 
Psychology degree.  A small number of the clinical psychologists participated in the 
earlier phase described in chapter 2. 
 Eighteen Clinical Psychologists were recruited from three sources:  
1. Clinical academics from the School of Psychology at the University of Sydney 
(n = 4) 
2. Clinical psychologists experienced in CBT for anxiety disorders employed 
within the Department of Medical Psychology, Westmead Hospital (n = 4) 
3. Clinical psychologists specialising in psychotherapy for other disorders (e.g., 
depression, eating disorders, illness adjustment, personality disorders, 
psychosis) employed within the Department of Medical Psychology, Westmead 
Hospital (n = 10) 
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In total, 16 (88.9%) of the 18 clinical psychologists returned the MC-PTKQ. They 
comprised three academics (75%), four clinicians specialising in anxiety disorders 
(100%) and nine (90%) clinicians specialising in other disorders.  
Twenty-eight intern clinical psychologists in their second or third year of a 
post-graduate degree in clinical psychology who had also completed a 6-month field 
placement at the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment and Research Unit were recruited. All 
28 (100%) interns completed and returned the MC-PTKQ. 
A total of 35 entry-level intern clinical psychologists recruited from students 
enrolled in the Doctorate of Clinical Psychology program at the University of 
Sydney at the commencement of their first year were invited to participate in the 
study. Of these 35 interns, 20 (57%) returned useable questionnaires. This lower 
return rate likely reflects participants’ discomfort in completing a treatment 
knowledge questionnaire of which they have little experience. 
Brief demographic information was collected from clinician samples (see 
Table 3.5) regarding years of clinical experience, primary areas of expertise, 
treatment modalities and self-rated expertise in CBT for Panic-Ag ranging from 1 
(very low) to 5 (very high). As expected, clinical psychologists had significantly 
greater years of clinical experience than second/third year interns, t(42) = 6.24, p < 
.001, who in turn had more clinical experience than entry-level interns, t(46) = 4.50, 
p < .001. Similarly, clinical psychologists reported higher Panic-Ag expertise ratings 
than second/third year interns, t(42) = 4.07, p < .001, who in turn reported higher 
ratings than entry-level interns, t(46) = 8.60, p < .001.  
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Table 3.5 Demographic Characteristics for Clinician Samples 
 Clinical 
psychologists  
+ = 16 
Second/third 
year interns 
+ = 28 
Entry-level 
interns 
+ = 20 
Years experience 
(M ± SD) 
 
10.6 ± 0.8 
 
1.5 ± 0.5 
 
0.6 ± 0.8 
Areas of expertise 
  Anxiety Disorders 
  Mood Disorders 
  Eating Disorders  
  Other 
 
8 (50.0%) 
6 (37.5%) 
3 (18.8%) 
8 (50.0%) 
 
 28 (100.0%) 
 5 (55.6%) 
0 (0.0%) 
  3 (10.7%) 
 
  3 (15.0%) 
1 (5.0%) 
 0 (0.0%) 
   4 (20.0%) 
Treatment modality 
  CBT 
  Schema  
  IPT 
  DBT 
  Other 
 
  16 (100.0%) 
  4 (25.0%) 
  2 (12.5%) 
  2 (12.5%) 
1 (6.3%) 
 
  28 (100.0%) 
  3 (10.7%) 
1 (3.6%) 
0 (0.0%) 
1 (3.6%) 
 
  9 (45.0%) 
1 (5.0%) 
1 (5.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
0 (0.0%) 
Panic-Ag expertise    
(1 - 5) (M ± SD) 
 
3.8 ± 0.6 
 
3.0 ± 0.6 
 
1.4 ± 0.6 
8ote. CBT = Cognitive Behaviour Therapy; IPT = Interpersonal Therapy; DBT = 
Dialectical Therapy. 
 
Measures 
 In addition to the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK, the measures used to examine the 
construct validity of the knowledge measures were the Personal Details 
Questionnaire, Matrix Reasoning and the WTAR described in chapter 2. 
 
Procedure  
The procedure for Sample A and B participants was previously reported in 
chapter 2. Sample C participants were contacted by telephone 6 to 12 months 
posttreatment to organise follow-up assessments at the clinic as part of routine 
clinical procedures. During this telephone call they were also invited to participate in 
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the research study and informed of its purpose and requirements. A battery of routine 
psychosocial measures was mailed to participants for them to complete at home and 
return at the follow-up assessment. Follow-up clinical and research assessments were 
conducted at the clinic and combined in the same appointment. Sample C 
participants were initially re-assessed with the ADIS-IV and subsequently completed 
the same battery of measures as Sample A participants in the following order: 
WTAR, Matrix Reasoning, Int-PTK, MC-PTKQ and questionnaires assessing beliefs 
about Panic-Ag and its treatment (described in chapter 4). The Int-PTK was 
administered prior to the MC-PTKQ to ensure participants’ recall on the knowledge 
interview was not influenced by recognition of correct information contained within 
the multiple choice questionnaire answers. Pretreatment data for the MC-PTKQ, Int-
PTK and belief questionnaires were not available for Sample C as these participants 
were only assessed at posttreatment. 
In order to establish test-retest reliability, 30 consecutive Sample A 
participants and 20 consecutive Sample C participants completed the MC-PTKQ and 
the belief scales again at home (in the absence of study aids) 1 to 2 weeks after the 
initial administration and returned it in a reply-paid envelope. A total of 24 of the 30 
Sample A participants (80.0%) and 15 of the 20 Sample C participants (75.0%) 
returned useable data (return rate = 78.0%).  
 
Statistical Analyses 
Internal consistency was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Pearson 
correlations were used to examine test-retest reliability, convergent and discriminant 
validity. Differences in treatment knowledge within patient and clinician samples 
were assessed using independent samples t-tests. Repeated measures t-tests were 
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used to assess the knowledge measures’ sensitivity to change and to investigate 
treatment efficacy. Treatment effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were calculated to determine 
magnitude of change. Effect sizes are defined as small: d = 0.2, medium: d = 0.5, and 
large: d = 0.8. 
 
Results 
Reliability  
Table 3.6 displays the internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the 
MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK. Using data from Sample A, the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK 
were both highly reliable instruments with internal consistency estimates above .90, 
indicating items assessed a unitary concept. The MC-PTKQ also appeared to be 
stable over a test-retest interval of 7 to 14 days. Replication with Sample C data 
yielded virtually identical results; internal consistency was slightly lower for the MC-
PTKQ although remaining within the desired range. 
 
Table 3.6 Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients for the 
Treatment Knowledge Measures for Samples A and C 
 Sample A  Sample C  
Internal consistency   
MC-PTKQ (n) .91 (65) .85 (35) 
Int-PTK (n)   .91 (65) .91 (34)a 
Test-retest reliability
   
MC-PTKQ (n) .93 (24) .93 (15) 
8ote. MC-PTKQ = Multiple-Choice Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire; 
Int-PTK = Interview of Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge. 
aInt-PTK data was missing for one participant. 
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Construct Validity 
Convergent Validity 
To assess the extent the two knowledge instruments measured the same 
construct, total scores on the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK were compared. High 
correlations between the measures were found for Sample A at pretreatment (r = .69, 
p < .001), Sample B at posttreatment (r = .72, p < .001) and replicated at 
posttreatment in Sample C (r = .72 p < .001). The lack of shared measurement 
method between the two knowledge measures (written vs. oral) further strengthens 
their convergent validity. 
Pearson correlations were computed for age, education and intelligence as 
these demographic variables are theoretically and empirically related to patient 
knowledge. These associations were examined in Sample B using pretreatment and 
posttreatment data. As displayed in Table 3.7, age was modestly but not significantly 
associated with treatment knowledge at pretreatment. However, significant negative 
age effects emerged with the provision of treatment whereby younger participants 
were better at learning and retaining information presented during treatment than 
their older counterparts.  
Years of education was significantly positively related to increased knowledge, 
indicating educated participants demonstrated higher knowledge at pretreatment and 
posttreatment on both the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK, although the association with the 
MC-PTKQ failed to reach significance (r = .27, p = .09) due to insufficient power 
(only 60% power to detect small-to-medium effects). Intelligence, whether assessed 
by the WTAR or Matrix Reasoning, was also significantly positively associated with 
knowledge scores at pretreatment and posttreatment for both knowledge measures.  
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Finally, among clinician samples, self-rated expertise in CBT for Panic-Ag 
was expected to be positively associated with knowledge scores. Collapsing across 
the three clinician samples, MC-PTKQ scores correlated .63 (p < .001) with expertise 
ratings, thereby supporting this prediction. 
 
Known-Group Validity 
Assuming the provision of treatment improves knowledge, scores for both 
knowledge measures were predicted to be significantly higher for participants at 
posttreatment than pretreatment. This prediction was confirmed. The mean MC-
PTKQ score for Sample A was 18.34 (SD = 9.27) compared with 31.34 (SD = 5.74) 
for Sample C, t(98) = -7.54, p < .001. For the Int-PTK, Sample A scored 23.85 (SD = 
15.43) in comparison to 65.41 (SD = 16.10) for Sample C, t(97) = -12.54, p < .001.  
Further evidence of construct validity would be shown if Sample A 
participants reporting previous CBT treatment (n = 18) demonstrated higher 
knowledge scores than those without prior CBT exposure (n = 47). This prediction 
was supported for the MC-PTKQ (Previous CBT: M = 23.06, SD = 8.73, No- 
previous CBT: M = 16.53, SD = 8.91), t(63) = 2.66, p < .05, and the Int-PTK 
(Previous CBT: M = 37.17, SD = 14.63, No-previous CBT: M = 18.74, SD = 12.49), 
t(63) = 5.07, p < .001. 
It was also expected that clinicians with experience in CBT would score 
higher on the MC-PTKQ than entry-level intern clinical psychologists lacking such 
experience. Examination of total MC-PTKQ scores among the clinician samples 
confirmed this expectation. Clinical psychologists (M = 37.31, SD = 2.63) and 
second/third year interns (M = 38.11, SD = 1.57) scored significantly higher on the 
MC-PTKQ than entry-level interns (M = 30.95, SD = 4.97), t(34) = 4.62, p < .001; 
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t(46) = 7.16, p < .001, respectively. Clinical psychologists did not differ significantly 
from second/third year interns, t(42) = -1.26, p > .05. This latter finding is not 
surprising as second/third year interns gain extensive experience in treating anxiety 
disorders while on placement at the Clinic. These findings further support the 
validity of the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK. 
 
Sensitivity to Change  
In order to examine whether improvement in treatment knowledge is related 
to treatment outcome, the knowledge measures must be sensitive to change. To 
assess sensitivity to treatment effects, repeated measures t-tests were applied using 
Sample B data. Although treatment integrity was unable to be verified, pre- to 
posttreatment changes across all self-report measures of psychopathology were 
significant in the desired direction with large effect sizes indicating treatment was 
efficacious (see Table 3.8).  
As predicted, knowledge scores increased following treatment. At 
pretreatment, the mean MC-PTKQ score was 19.27 (SD = 10.14) which increased 
significantly to 30.07 (SD = 6.37) at posttreatment, t(40) = -8.14, p < .001. Similarly, 
scores on the Int-PTK increased significantly from 26.24 (SD = 16.44) at 
pretreatment to 62.98 (SD = 16.44) at posttreatment, t(40) = -16.03, p < .001). These 
results indicate both knowledge measures are sensitive to treatment effects. No 
significant floor or ceiling effects were present on either the MC-PTKQ or Int-PTK. 
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Table 3.8 Pre- and Posttreatment Means, Standard Deviations and Effect Sizes for 
Self-Report Measures of Psychopathology for Sample B (8 = 41) 
 Pretreatment  Posttreatment   
Treatment variable   M   SD    M   SD      t(40) da 
nPA-ADISa  10.22 10.69  1.15 1.65 7.83* 1.52 
PASS-ADIS 62.56 20.15  30.45 22.62 8.78* 1.50 
ACQ–Frequency  35.02 9.92  26.12 9.03 6.69* 0.94 
ACQ-Belief  19.51 12.35  8.22 8.06 7.23* 1.08 
MI-Accompanied  64.07 21.48  43.06 17.88 7.22* 1.06 
MI-Alone  80.85 26.70  54.16 26.92 6.64* 1.00 
BSQ 51.95 12.63  35.24 13.99 7.82* 1.25 
PBI 123.22 32.93  73.55 31.90 9.95* 1.53 
BDI-II 25.68 13.06  15.56 10.47 5.76* 0.86 
WSAS 24.50 9.69  13.50 8.38 8.65* 1.21 
8ote. nPA-ADIS = Number of panic attacks in the last month assessed on the ADIS-IV; 
PASS-ADIS = Panic attack sensation severity assessed on the ADIS-IV; ACQ-
Frequency = Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire-Frequency Score; ACQ-Belief = 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire-Belief Score; MI-Accompanied = Mobility 
Inventory for Agoraphobia-Accompanied subscale; MI-Alone = Mobility Inventory for 
Agoraphobia-Alone subscale; BSQ = Body Sensations Questionnaire; PBI = Panic 
Beliefs Inventory; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; WSAS = Work and Social 
Adjustment Scale. 
aCohen’s effect size = Mpre – Mpost/SDpooled, where SDpooled = √[(SD
2
pre + SD
2
post)/2]. 
*p < .001. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 This chapter described the psychometric properties of the Int-PTK and MC-
PTKQ. The psychometric properties of the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK were found to be 
acceptable. Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of both measures was high 
across two separate patient samples. The MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK were highly inter-
correlated and further evidence of construct validity was obtained using patient and 
clinician samples. Both measures were sensitive to change.  
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Although sound, the psychometric properties of the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK 
need to be considered in light of several methodological limitations. First, many of 
the psychometric analyses were based on the same participants (Sample A) used to 
develop the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK which may have inflated the observed reliability 
and validity coefficients. However, similar reliability estimates obtained from an 
independent patient sample (Sample C) and validity analyses incorporating Sample C 
and clinician samples corroborated the knowledge measures’ psychometric 
properties.  
Second, as previously discussed in relation to the MC-PTKQ, analyses 
employing Sample B participants are based on only half the total eligible sample, 
hence the psychometric properties may not be as robust for the general Panic-Ag 
population. As Sample B consisted of higher functioning patients, a broader sample 
of Panic-Ag patients may find the Int-PTK and MC-PTKQ more difficult and show 
less improvement following treatment. However, arguing against this interpretation 
is the lack of significant differences between Sample B and treatment dropouts/non-
starters on other important indices including age, education, intelligence, level of 
comorbidity, social functioning and severity of Panic-Ag and depressive symptoms. 
Third, readability analysis of the MC-PTKQ indicated it was fairly difficult to 
read and as such may not have accurately assessed knowledge for less educated 
individuals or those with reduced verbal skills. Development of treatment knowledge 
measures containing items with fewer words per sentence and fewer syllables per 
word would be useful for future investigations involving treatment knowledge. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the knowledge measures developed in this 
study address many of the methodological weaknesses inherent in research 
investigating patient treatment knowledge. Firstly, many studies used measures with 
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poor or unknown psychometric properties (Durose et al., 2004; Heisler et al., 2002; 
Miller et al., 2003; Weiss et al., 2003), whereas the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK were 
subjected to rigorous psychometric testing, demonstrating high reliability, sensitivity 
to change and good evidence of convergent, divergent and known-group validity.  
Second, several studies (Ho et al., 2003; Wigal et al., 1993) combined 
multiple aspects of knowledge (treatment, symptoms, prevalence) in the same 
measure ignoring conceptual distinctions which obfuscate relationships between 
treatment knowledge and outcome. The development of the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK 
ensured items assessed only knowledge specific to treatment and thus represent pure 
measures of treatment knowledge. Third, the MC-PTKQ provided an objective 
measure of patients’ treatment knowledge free from therapist bias in contrast to 
therapist ratings of patient knowledge used by Abramowitz et al. (2002). Less 
objective measures can inflate associations between knowledge and outcome, hence 
the MC-PTKQ allows a more accurate examination of this relationship.  
Finally, the shortcomings of multiple-choice measures were addressed with 
the Int-PTK. Whereas multiple-choice measures can overestimate patients’ true 
knowledge by providing cues and reminders, the Int-PTK may offer a more 
ecologically valid assessment of patients’ treatment knowledge by focussing on 
recall rather than recognition of information and as such may be more relevant to real 
life situations reliant on information recall. The Int-PTK also allowed a more 
sensitive assessment of patient knowledge whereby partial knowledge of concepts 
could be differentiated from complete knowledge, making the measure less prone to 
ceiling effects sometimes observed in multiple-choice measures (Beeney et al., 
1994). 
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In summary, the MC-PTKQ and Int-PTK offer two reliable and valid 
methods of assessing patients’ treatment knowledge enabling examination of its 
relationship with treatment outcome. Before examining this relationship, the next 
chapter describes the development of the treatment beliefs scales. 
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Development of the Treatment Belief Scales  
This chapter describes the development of three belief scales assessing 
acceptance of the treatment rationale, expectancies of treatment outcome, and 
treatment self-efficacy for Panic-Ag. Construction of scales assessing treatment 
expectancy and rationale acceptance was necessary to address the limitations of 
existing measures which included single-item scales (Addis & Jacobson, 1996, 2000; 
Borkovec & Nau, 1974), combination ratings (Addis & Jacobson, 1996; Borkovec & 
Nau, 1974) and measures with unknown psychometric properties (Kennardy et al., 
2003; Stern & Marks, 1973). For treatment self-efficacy, existing self-efficacy scales 
used for other disorders were inappropriate because self-efficacy is situation specific. 
Hence, a self-efficacy scale tailored to assessing patients’ confidence in applying 
therapy skills for Panic-Ag was needed.  
 
Scale Construction  
Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag (ATR-PA) 
In constructing a measure of acceptance of the treatment rationale for Panic-
Ag, items assessing rationale knowledge were derived from the MC-PTKQ described 
in chapter 2 and rated according to belief strength. The MC-PTKQ comprised 68 
treatment facets which were phrased as statements to form the initial version of the 
Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag Scale (ATR-PA-68). 
Acceptance of each statement was assessed on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (do not 
believe at all), 1 (slightly believe), 2 (somewhat believe), 3 (mostly believe) and 4 
(completely believe). The ATR-PA-68 covered 17 psychoeducation items (9 reverse 
scored), 23 cognitive therapy items (8 reverse scored), 11 role of avoidance items (5 
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reverse scored) and 17 exposure therapy items (4 reverse scored) (see Appendix D). 
Items across categories were randomly distributed within the measure.  
 
Expectancy of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag (ETO-PA) 
Construction of expectancy of treatment outcome items was guided by 
literature surrounding patients’ beliefs about treatment (Arnkoff et al., 2002; Frank, 
1982; Kazdin, 1979; Leventhal et al., 1992) and existing measures containing items 
assessing therapy expectancies including the Nijmegen Motivation List 2 (Keijsers et 
al., 1999) and the Treatment Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (Devilly & 
Borkovec, 2000). The Expectancy of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag Scale (ETO-
PA) comprised nine items (four reverse scored) pertaining to expectancies of CBT 
for improving anxiety and panic (see Appendix E). All items were expressed as 
statements worded in the first person and rated on the above 5-point Likert scale 
from 0 (do not believe at all) to 4 (completely believe).  
  
Treatment Self-Efficacy for Panic-Ag (TSE-PA) 
Treatment self-efficacy items for Panic-Ag were generated from the self-
efficacy subscale of the psychometrically sound Knowledge, Attitudes and Self-
Efficacy Asthma Questionnaire (Wigal et al., 1993) modified for Panic-Ag, and 
literature on self-efficacy in relation to illness management (Bandura, 1977; Kobau 
& DiIorio, 2003; Scherer & Bruce, 2001; Waldrop, Lightsey, Ethington, Woemmel, 
& Coke, 2001). Due to symptom idiosyncrasies, specific CBT techniques (e.g., 
interoceptive exposure, cost experiments) can be irrelevant for particular Panic-Ag 
patients. Therefore, a self-efficacy scale for CBT in general was preferred as opposed 
to a scale assessing self-efficacy for specific individual CBT techniques. The 
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Treatment Self-Efficacy for Panic-Ag Scale (TSE-PA) consisted of nine items (two 
reverse scored) phrased as statements in the first person (see Appendix E). Belief in 
each item was rated on the aforementioned 5-point Likert scale (0 = do not believe at 
all to 4 = completely believe). 
 
Initial Item Refinement 
Items across the ATR-PA-68, ETO-PA and TSE-PA scales were analysed to 
identify unreliable items using data from Sample A. Poor items were detected by 
examining alpha coefficients. Items exceeding alpha by .01 or more when deleted 
were considered unreliable. No item on the ATR-PA-68 scale significantly exceeded 
alpha by .01 when deleted (Cronbach’s alpha = .912, alpha if item deleted = .908 - 
.914). However, with 68 items, attempts were made to reduce scale length to a more 
manageable 15 item version without loss of reliability. Accordingly, only those with 
corrected item-total correlations above .50 were retained. This cut-off yielded 14 
items (referred to as ATR-PA, see Appendix E) consisting of two psychoeducation 
items (one reverse scored), three cognitive therapy items (one reverse scored), one 
role of avoidance item and eight items focussed on exposure (in vivo and 
interoceptive exposure and behavioural experiments). Total scores ranged from 0 to 
56, with higher scores reflecting greater acceptance. Example items from the 14-item 
ATR-PA scale are displayed in Figure 4.1.  
For the ETO-PA and TSE-PA, no item when deleted significantly exceeded 
alpha by more than .01 (ETO-PA: Cronbach’s alpha = .847, alpha if item deleted = 
.817 – .848; TSE-PA: Cronbach’s alpha = .747, alpha if item deleted = .694 – .754), 
hence all items for both scales were retained. Example ETO-PA and TSE-PA items 
are displayed in Figure 4.1. Total scores for ETO-PA and TSE-PA each ranged from 
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0 to 36 with higher scores reflecting more positive expectancies and greater self-
efficacy, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1. Example items from the Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale, 
Treatment Outcome Expectancies and Treatment Self-Efficacy Scales. 
Scale Example Items 
ATR-PA            
(14 items) 
    
 
 
 A panic attack is just the fight or flight response coming on 
when there is no real danger. 
 Testing out the way I interpret my panic symptoms is a 
sensible approach for overcoming my panic. 
 Facing my fears helps me to learn that panic symptoms are 
harmless even if they are unpleasant. 
 
ETO-PA (9 items)  *I do not believe CBT will be helpful for me 
 CBT will help me overcome my panic  
 *CBT is too simplistic to be helpful for treating my panic 
 
TSE-PA (9 items)  I feel I can implement the techniques as recommended by 
my therapist 
 I feel I have learned strategies to effectively manage my 
anxiety and panic 
 During the early stages of a panic attack I can apply the 
skills I have learned to reduce the attack 
 
8ote. ATR-PA = Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag; ETO-PA = 
Expectancies of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag; TSE-PA = Treatment Self-
Efficacy for Panic-Ag. 
*Reverse scored. 
 
Readability of the treatment belief scales was assessed with the Flesch 
Reading Ease Index (Flesch, 1948). Based on average syllables per word, the ATR-
PA was regarded as “difficult” to read (Reading Ease score (RE) = 30 – 50) while the 
ETO-PA and TSE-PA were rated as “fairly difficult” (RE = 50 – 60). However, 
when defined by average number of words per sentence, the ETO-PA was rated as 
“easy” (RE = 80 – 90), TSE-PA as “fairly easy” (RE = 70 – 80) and ATR-PA as 
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“standard” (RE = 60 – 70). On average, these ratings imply the treatment belief 
scales had the equivalent readability of a digest-style magazine or easier. 
 
Summary 
This phase of the study involved developing scales assessing acceptance of 
the treatment rationale, expectancies of treatment outcome and treatment self-
efficacy for Panic-Ag (ATR-PA, ETO-PA, TSE-PA, respectively). Items for the 
ATR-PA assessed acceptance of treatment knowledge derived from the MC-PTKQ 
and initially comprised 68 items. Items for the ETO-PA and TSE-PA were 
constructed from scientific literature and published questionnaires adapted for Panic-
Ag and each contained nine items. Sixty-five pretreatment Panic-Ag participants 
completed each scale to identify unreliable items. Examination of alpha coefficients 
within each scale indicated all items were internally consistent, hence all items were 
retained. However, the ATR-PA scale was reduced to 14 items on the basis of 
corrected item-total correlations above .50 to decrease scale length.  
In order to examine the convergent validity of the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and 
TSE-PA scales, they must be compared with measures assessing theoretically related 
constructs. To this end, three additional belief scales were constructed as described in 
the next section.  
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Development of the Aetiology, Alternative Non-CBT 
Treatments and Treatment Barriers Belief Scales 
The purpose of this component of the study was to develop a set of measures 
to establish the convergent validity of the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA scales. 
Three theoretically related constructs were identified. Firstly, Addis and Carpenter 
(1999) found that decreased acceptance of an action-oriented treatment rationale for 
depression was associated with endorsement of more reasons offered for depression 
inconsistent with that rationale. It was therefore hypothesised that the more reasons 
offered for the cause of Panic-Ag incompatible with a treatment rationale focussed 
on correcting catastrophic cognitions, the less accepting participants will be of that 
rationale. Hence, a scale assessing aetiology beliefs for Panic-Ag was developed.  
Secondly, stronger belief in non-CBT based treatments would indicate 
decreased acceptance of the treatment rationale for Panic-Ag, hence a scale assessing 
belief in alternative non-CBT treatments was constructed. Conceptually, belief in 
non-CBT treatments should also be associated with reduced treatment outcome 
expectancies of CBT for Panic-Ag. Finally, factors believed to interfere in one’s 
ability to respond to treatment should be associated with reduced expectancies of 
treatment outcome and poorer treatment self-efficacy. Therefore a treatment barriers 
scale was developed. 
 
Scale Construction  
In order to develop a representative and comprehensive set of items for the 
aetiology, alternative non-CBT treatment and treatment barriers belief scales, a two-
phase procedure was used. In phase one, a checklist of beliefs was constructed with 
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items derived from the author’s eight years clinical experience conducting diagnostic 
assessments and treatment of patients with Panic-Ag, and literature on patient 
treatment and illness representations (Addis, Truax, & Jacobson, 1995; Atkinson, 
Worthington, Dana, & Good, 1991; Foulks et al., 1986; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Leventhal et al., 1992; Moss-Morris et al., 2002; Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris, & 
Horne, 1996). However, as individuals present to treatment with pre-existing beliefs 
about their illness and treatment (Donovan et al., 1989), views of Panic-Ag patients 
were also incorporated. Hence phase two involved semi-structured interviews with 
Panic-Ag patients designed to elicit a representative range of beliefs not captured by 
the above beliefs checklist or previous studies. Interview methods are useful for 
identifying patient attitudes and beliefs to generate items for questionnaire 
development (Cooper-Patrick et al., 1997; Horne, Weinman, & Hankins, 1999). 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants comprised 25 consecutive Panic-Ag patients on the waiting list for 
treatment and 15 consecutive Panic-Ag patients who completed treatment within 6 
months of assessment at the SWAHS Anxiety Treatment and Research Unit, 
Cumberland Hospital, between November 2004 and August 2005. (This study was 
conducted prior to the evaluation of the treatment knowledge and belief scales.) Of 
these 40 participants, 19 (47.5%) participated in other aspects of the study and 
comprised 54.3% of Sample C. The remaining 21 (52.5%) participants represented 
an independent sample of Panic-Ag patients who had no further involvement in any 
aspect of the study. Of the 40 participants, 26 (65.0%) were female and 14 (35.0%) 
were male. Participants were aged between 21 and 67 years (M = 40.2 years, SD = 
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13.0 years). Additional demographic characteristics of these participants are 
presented in Table 4.1 
 
Table 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Panic-Ag Participants Completing the 
Beliefs Checklist and Beliefs Interview (8 = 40) 
Marital status 
   Never married 
   Married/de facto 
   Divorced/separated 
 
 13 (32.5%) 
 23 (57.5%) 
  4 (10.0%) 
Education in years (M ± SD) 12.8 ± 2.8 
Range = 6 – 20 
Employed 30 (75.0%) 
Country of origin 
   Australia 
   Other 
 
29 (72.5%) 
11 (27.5%) 
Duration of anxiety disorder in years (M ± SD) 9.5 ± 8.9 
Range = 0.25 – 30 
Previous treatments 
   Medication 
   Counselling    
   Self-help books 
 
33 (82.5%) 
20 (50.0%) 
15 (37.5%) 
 
Measures 
 The Beliefs Checklist was developed for this study and comprised 12 
aetiological beliefs, 15 alternative non-CBT treatment beliefs and eight beliefs about 
treatment barriers. Each item was worded in the first person using a stem and leaf 
format (see Figure 4.2). Space was allocated for patients to add additional beliefs not 
listed in the checklist. Example items from each belief domain are presented in 
Figure 4.2 .  
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Figure 4.2. Example items from each belief domain of the Beliefs Checklist. 
Belief domain Example belief item 
Aetiology 
 
I believe my problem is caused by: 
 Something physically wrong with me 
 Inheriting anxious genes from my parents (genetics) 
 A curse or supernatural force  
Alternative non-CBT 
treatments 
 
In order to treat myself for my problem I believe I need 
to: 
 Rely on tranquilizers (e.g., Xanax, Valium, Ativan)       
 Treat the underlying medical problem 
 Avoid people, places or situations that trigger my 
anxiety 
Treatment barriers 
 
I believe the following factors will interfere in my 
ability to respond to treatment: 
 The intensity of my symptoms 
 The length of time I have had the problem 
 My previous unsuccessful attempts with treatment 
  
 The Beliefs Interview, also developed for this study, consisted of three open-
ended questions assessing the same belief domains assessed by the Beliefs Checklist. 
Participants were asked: 
1. What do you believe has caused your problem? 
2. What do you believe needs to happen for you to overcome your problem? 
3. Do you believe there is anything about you or your situation that will interfere in 
the success of treatment?  
 
Procedure 
 Ethics approval for this phase of the study was provided from the Western 
Sydney Area Health Service (WSAHS) Human Research Ethics Committee 
[HREC2004/8/4.10(1924)]. Participants were invited to attend a research 
appointment where the purpose of the study was explained and informed consent was 
obtained. During this research appointment, patients firstly completed the Beliefs 
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Checklist alone in a quiet office. The following instructions were provided and read 
aloud:  
The following are some beliefs about anxiety and panic that some 
people have. Please place a tick in the box if YOU have EVER had the 
belief (even if you only believed it for a moment). Try to be as honest 
as possible when answering. There are no right or wrong answers. We 
are interested in YOUR beliefs. 
 
Participants were subsequently interviewed about their beliefs via the Beliefs 
Interview where they were probed until an exhaustive list of beliefs was obtained. 
The Beliefs Checklist and the Beliefs Interview each took approximately 10 minutes 
to complete. At the conclusion of the interview, participants were thanked for their 
time and effort. 
 
Results 
Beliefs Checklist Data 
 Participant endorsement of beliefs about aetiology, alternative treatments, and 
treatment barriers are displayed in Table 4.2. All items were endorsed by at least one 
participant indicating the range of beliefs were relevant to Panic-Ag patients. 
Furthermore, no item was endorsed by 100% of the sample, indicating good 
variability of responses. Endorsement of aetiology beliefs ranged from 8% 
(“Exposure to environmental contaminants”) to 73% (“Chemical imbalance in my 
brain”). Of the 12 aetiology belief items, seven were endorsed by at least 50% of the 
sample and five by less than 50%.  
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Table 4.2 Endorsement of Beliefs About Aetiology, Alternative 8on-CBT Treatments 
and Treatment Barriers in 40 Patients with a History of Panic-Ag 
Belief Items + (%) 
Aetiology beliefs  
I believe my panic/anxiety is caused by…  
1. A chemical imbalance in my brain  29 (73%) 
2. Something physically wrong with me 24 (60%) 
3. Inheriting anxious genes from my parents (genetics) 23 (58%) 
4. A hormonal imbalance 22 (55%) 
5. Early traumatic experiences from my childhood or adolescence 22 (55%) 
6. A medical condition that the doctors haven’t found yet  20 (50%) 
7. A traumatic experience (e.g., assault, rape, death of a family 
member/friend, relationship break-up) 
20 (50%) 
8. Using drugs and/or alcohol  9 (23%) 
9. Punishment from God for my past sins  8 (20%) 
10. Taking too much caffeine  7 (18%) 
11. A curse or supernatural force  4 (10%) 
12. Exposure to environmental contaminants   3   (8%) 
  
Alternative non-CBT treatment beliefs  
In order to treat myself for my problem I believe I need to…  
1. Think positively 36 (90%) 
2. Talk about my personal problems with a counsellor 34 (85%) 
3. Talk about my problem with someone who has had similar 
experiences with anxiety  
31 (78%) 
4. Slow my breathing down or practice breathing exercises 31 (78%) 
5. Stay away from stressful things 26 (65%) 
6. Avoid people, places or situations that trigger my anxiety 25 (63%) 
7. Distract myself 24 (60%) 
8. Treat the underlying medical problem 23 (58%) 
9. Practice yoga, meditation or exercise 22 (55%) 
10. Rely on antidepressant medication (e.g., Zoloft, Prozac, 
Aropax, Cipramil, Avanza, Efexor-XR, Aurorix, Prothiaden) 
19 (48%) 
11. Address underlying issues from my childhood/adolescence 18 (45%) 
12. Rely on tranquilizers (e.g., Valium, Xanax, Serapax, Ativan, 
Lexotan) 
12 (30%) 
13. Undergo spiritual cleansing 11 (28%) 
14. Rely on alcohol    3   (8%) 
15. Have my sins forgiven by a religious/spiritual leader   3   (8%) 
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Table 4.2 (continued) Endorsement of Beliefs About Aetiology, Alternative 8on-
CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers in 40 Patients with a History of Panic-Ag 
Belief items + (%) 
Treatment barrier beliefs  
I believe the following factors will interfere in my ability to 
respond to treatment: 
 
1. My anxiety level 24 (60%) 
2. The length of time I have had the problem 19 (48%) 
3. The intensity of my symptoms 18 (45%) 
4. My previous unsuccessful attempts with treatment 14 (35%) 
5. My physical health   9 (23%) 
6. My age   6 (15%) 
7. I am not intelligent enough   3   (8%) 
8. Presence of my (diagnosed) medical problem   1   (3%) 
 
Endorsement of alternative non-CBT treatment beliefs ranged from 8% (e.g., 
“Have my sins forgiven by a religious/spiritual leader”) to 90% (“Think positively”). 
Of the 15 alternative non-CBT treatment beliefs, nine were endorsed by at least 50% 
of the sample and six by less than 50%. Endorsement of beliefs about treatment 
barriers ranged from 3% (“Presence of my diagnosed medical problem”) to 60% 
(“My anxiety level”). Of the eight treatment barriers, only one was endorsed by at 
least 50% of the sample, while the remaining seven were endorsed by less than 50%. 
One item (“Presence of my diagnosed medical problem”) was endorsed by only one 
participant and was subsequently omitted from the scale. 
 
Belief Interview Data  
 Qualitative data from the Belief Interview corroborated items from the 
Beliefs Checklist. However interview responses prompted several minor 
modifications and additional items. With regard to aetiology beliefs, the item “Using 
drugs or alcohol” from the Beliefs Checklist was split into three separate items 
Chapter 4 – Development of the Aetiology, Alternative Treatments & Treatment Barriers Scales  
155 
(“Using prescription drugs”, “Using illicit drugs”, “Using alcohol”) highlighting the 
differences between substances. Similarly, an item relating to traumatic experiences 
(assault, rape, death of a family member/friend, relationship break-up) was separated 
into two items, one reflecting more violent traumas (assault, rape, war), the other 
relating to stress from personal/family problems (death of a family member, 
relationship break-up, financial problems). A further item relating to physical stress 
to the body (illness, virus, fatigue, childbirth) was also added.  
 Interview responses added three items to the alternative non-CBT treatment 
beliefs scale (“Have further medical tests conducted”, “Probe into my past to 
discover the cause of my fear”, and “Avoid foods or substances that trigger my 
anxiety”). However one item, “Think positively”, was removed due to ambiguity in 
meaning with some participants interpreting thinking realistically as equivalent to 
thinking positively. In addition, five items were added to the treatment barriers scale 
(“My depression”, “Presence of my other emotional/psychological problem(s)”, 
“Chemical imbalance in my brain”, “The hereditary nature of my problem 
(genetics)” and “The previous effects of drugs/alcohol/toxins on my system”) and 
several items were reworded to improve their comprehensibility (e.g., “My previous 
unsuccessful attempts with treatment” changed to “My previous failure to respond to 
treatment”). 
  
Refined Belief Scales 
 On the basis of participant feedback from the Beliefs Checklist and Beliefs 
Interview, the Aetiology scale comprised 16 items, the Alternative Non-CBT 
Treatments scale comprised 17 items and the Treatment Barriers scale consisted of 
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12 items (see Appendix F). Items across the three scales were rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 0 (do not believe at all) to 4 (completely believe). 
 
Reliability 
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) and test-retest reliability (retest-
interval = 1-2 weeks; Pearson correlations) were assessed using Samples A and C. 
Reliability of the Aetiology, Alternative Non-CBT Treatments and Treatment 
Barriers belief scales was sound as displayed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability of the Aetiology, 
Alternative 8on-CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers Belief Scales for Samples 
A and C 
 Belief Scales 
 Aetiology Alternative 
non-CBT 
treatments 
Treatment 
barriers 
Internal consistency (n)    
Sample A (64) .86 .86 .91 
Sample C (35) 
 
.84 .87 .89 
Test-retest reliability (n)    
Sample A (24) .85 .87 .92 
Sample C (15) .86 .92 .78 
 
Summary 
To evaluate the convergent validity of the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA 
scales, three additional belief scales were developed consisting of a 16-item
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Aetiology scale, a 17-item Alternative Non-CBT Treatments scale and a 12-item 
Treatment Barriers scale. Scale items were constructed from clinical experience, 
scientific literature and feedback from 40 Panic-Ag patients. Each belief scale was 
found to be very reliable in a pretreatment and posttreatment sample. 
 
 
Evaluation of the Psychometric Properties of the Treatment 
Belief Scales 
This section describes the psychometric properties of the treatment belief 
scales assessing acceptance of the treatment rationale (ATR-PA), expectancies of 
treatment outcome (ETO-PA) and treatment self-efficacy (TSE-PA) for Panic-Ag. 
Reliability of these scales was assessed in a pretreatment sample and replicated in a 
posttreatment sample. The treatment belief scales were compared with other belief 
scales listed below to establish convergent validity. The ability of the ATR-PA and 
TSE-PA scales to differentiate between pretreatment and posttreatment participants 
and be sensitive to change was also examined.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 The psychometric properties of the treatment belief scales were established 
using Samples A, B and C.  
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Measures 
 In addition to the ATR-PA, ETO-PA, TSE-PA and the Aetiology, Alternative 
Non-CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers belief scales described above, the 
following measures were administered. 
Personal Details Questionnaire. Described in chapter 2, this questionnaire 
was administered to collect demographic information on age and gender for the 
purpose of establishing discriminant validity.  
Expectancy Factor of the Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ, 
Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). The CEQ is a 6-item self-report questionnaire designed 
to measure treatment outcome expectancy and rationale credibility. It consists of two 
factors each comprising three items: Factor 1 (credibility) examines how credible the 
patient thinks therapy is, and Factor 2 (expectancy) concerns the patient’s emotional 
expectations about the effectiveness of therapy. The psychometric properties of the 
expectancy factor demonstrated sound internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .79 – 
.90) and high 1-week test-retest reliability (r = .82, p < .001). As the CEQ is 
administered prior to the conclusion of therapy, data for this measure is not available 
for Sample B at posttreatment or for Sample C. 
 Doubt Factor of the 8ijmegen Motivation List 2 (NML2, Keijsers et al., 
1999). The NML2 is a 24-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess patients’ 
motivation for commencing psychotherapy. Factor analysis revealed the measure 
consisted of three factors: preparedness, distress and doubt. The preparedness 
subscale assesses a “patient’s preparedness to actively invest in treatment and to 
make sacrifices” (p. 171). The distress subscale captures the level of distress 
experienced by the patient as a result of their problems. The doubt factor consists of 
six items assessing “doubt about the investment in treatment, the treatment itself and 
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the possibility of gaining from it” (p. 171). An example item from the doubt factor is, 
“I do not believe that this is the right treatment for me”. Responses are rated on a 6-
point scale from 1 (not at all applicable) to 6 (very applicable). The doubt factor had 
sound test-retest reliability over a 1-week interval (r = .73, p < .001) and a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .69 (following the removal of one item). As this measure 
assesses attitudes prior to commencing therapy it was only administered at 
pretreatment, hence data is unavailable for Sample B (posttreatment) and Sample C. 
 Self-deprecation Subscale of the Panic Belief Inventory (PBI, Greenberg, 
1989; Wenzel et al., 2006). The self-deprecation subscale of the PBI (described in 
chapter 2) comprises six statements (e.g., “Having panic attacks means I’m weak, 
defective, or inferior”). The psychometric properties of the self-deprecation subscale 
revealed good internal consistency (α = .82) and significant moderate correlations 
were observed between this subscale and other self-report measures of cognitions at 
pretreatment (r = .61, p < .001) and posttreatment (r = .52 - .77, p < .05), 
demonstrating evidence of convergent validity. Evidence of discriminant validity 
was achieved with a lack of association between this subscale and a measure of 
suicidal ideation. The self-deprecation subscale is also sensitive to treatment gains 
with scores decreasing significantly from pretreatment to posttreatment (p < .001).   
 
Procedure  
Assessment procedures for participants from Samples A, B and C were 
identical to those described in chapter 2 and chapter 3. In brief, prior to treatment all 
participants were assessed with the ADIS-IV and completed a battery of self-report 
questionnaires containing the Panic Beliefs Inventory. Sample A participants then 
attended a pretreatment research appointment where their treatment knowledge and 
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beliefs were assessed. The order of measures was as follows: Int-PTK, Personal 
Details Questionnaire, CEQ, NML2 and MC-PTKQ. The Aetiology, Alternative 
Non-CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers belief scales were then administered 
followed by the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA with items from the latter three 
scales intermixed. These six belief scales took approximately 30 minutes in total to 
complete. Prior to administration of the belief scales the following instructions were 
provided and read aloud:  
Below is a list of beliefs that some people have about Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia. Sometimes people’s beliefs match what they have previously 
been told, and sometimes they differ. We are interested in what you truly or 
secretly believe (not what you think you should believe). Please read each item 
and circle the number using the scale below to rate the extent YOU believe the 
item to be true for you. Do not spend too long on any item. There are no right 
or wrong answers. We are interested in what you really believe. 
 
Sample B and C participants were contacted 6 to 12-months posttreatment to 
organise a routine clinical follow-up assessment and invite them to participate in the 
study. Prior to this assessment, participants were mailed a battery of self-report 
questionnaires including the PBI. During the follow-up assessment, they were 
reassessed with the ADIS-IV, after which the abovementioned knowledge and belief 
measures were administered, with the exception of the CEQ and NML2.  
 
Statistical Analyses 
Internal consistency of the belief scales was evaluated using Cronbach’s 
alpha. Test-retest reliability, concurrent, convergent and discriminant validity was 
assessed with bivariate Pearson correlations. Independent samples t-tests were 
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performed to examine differences in beliefs between pretreatment and posttreatment 
participants. Repeated measures t-tests were used to investigate pre- to posttreatment 
belief change within Sample B.  
Scores on the Aetiology, Alternative Non-CBT Treatments and Treatment 
Barriers beliefs scale items were recoded dichotomously such that items were either 
endorsed or not. Responses indicating any level of endorsement (scores of 1-4) were 
classified as item endorsement. Total scores for these scales were calculated by 
summing the number of items endorsed. Therefore, total scores ranged from 0 to 16 
for Aetiology, 0 to 17 for Alternative Non-CBT Treatments and 0 to 12 for 
Treatment Barriers.  
 
Results 
Reliability  
As displayed in Table 4.4, internal consistencies of the treatment belief scales 
were satisfactory for Sample A. The TSE-PA scale yielded slightly lower ratings, yet 
still above the minimum acceptable level for internal consistency of .5 to .7 
(Bowling, 2002). Replication with Sample C participants demonstrated internal 
consistency estimates in the desired range. Test-retest reliability of the ATR-PA, 
ETO-PA and TSE-PA was sound (see Table 4.4). Moreover, ATR-PA and TSE-PA 
beliefs appeared to become more stable after treatment (Sample C: r > .9). 
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Table 4.4 Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability Scores for the Treatment 
Beliefs Measures for Samples A and C  
 Sample A  
Pretreatment 
Sample C  
Posttreatment 
Internal Consistency   
ATR-PA (n) .88 (64) .92 (35) 
ETO-PA (n) .85 (64) - 
TSE-PA (n) .75 (64) .88 (35) 
Test-retest Reliability
   
ATR-PA (n) .72 (24) .97 (15) 
ETO-PA (n) .81 (24) - 
TSE-PA (n) .77 (24) .91 (15) 
8ote. ATR-PA = Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag; ETO-PA = 
Expectancies of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag; TSE-PA = Treatment Self-
Efficacy for Panic-Ag. 
 
Construct Validity 
Convergent Validity 
The ATR-PA scale assesses acceptance of a treatment rationale based on 
correcting catastrophic misinterpretations of physical symptoms. Theoretically, 
participants endorsing more reasons for panic incompatible with this rationale should 
demonstrate reduced acceptance of the rationale. This prediction was supported 
through significant negative correlations between the Aetiology and ATR-PA scales 
(Sample A: r = -.32, p < .05; Sample B-posttreatment: r = -.50, p < .01; Sample C: r 
= -.44, p < .01). Conceptually, greater acceptance of the treatment rationale should be 
associated with endorsement of fewer non-CBT based treatments. Significant 
negative correlations between the ATR-PA and Alternative Non-CBT Treatments 
scales supported this prediction (Sample A: r = -.30, p < .05; Sample B-
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posttreatment: r = -.55, p < .01; Sample C: r = -.60, p < .001), thus providing further 
evidence of convergent validity for the ATR-PA scale.  
The ETO-PA was only completed at pretreatment by Sample A. Concurrent 
validity of the ETO-PA scale was demonstrated through significant correlations with 
other measures assessing treatment expectancy, namely the expectancy factor of the 
CEQ (r = .55, p < .001) and the NML2 doubt factor (r = -.30, p < .05). The 
difference in magnitude of the two correlations also supported the construct validity 
of the ETO-PA because, unlike the expectancy factor of the CEQ, the NML2 doubt 
factor does not purely assess outcome expectancies and hence yielded a lower 
correlation.  
Evidence of convergent validity for the ETO-PA would also be shown if 
participants endorsing more non-CBT treatments and treatment barriers expressed 
lower treatment outcome expectancies. These predictions were confirmed. 
Significant negative correlations between ETO-PA were observed with the 
Alternative Non-CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers scales (r = -.32, p < .001, r 
= -.56, p < .001, respectively). In addition, greater acceptance of the treatment 
rationale should be associated with higher expectancies of treatment outcome. 
Further strengthening its construct validity, significant positive correlations were 
observed between ATR-PA and ETO-PA (r = .42, p < .001).  
Regarding the TSE-PA scale, participants endorsing more treatment barriers 
should theoretically report reduced treatment self-efficacy. Significant negative 
correlations between the TSE-PA and the Treatment Barriers scale supported this 
prediction (Sample A: r = -.36, p < .01; Sample B-posttreatment: r = -.72, p < .001; 
Sample C: r = -.51, p < .01). Furthermore, highly self-deprecating participants were 
expected to report lower treatment self-efficacy. This relationship was borne out in 
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significant negative correlations between TSE-PA and the self-deprecation subscale 
of the PBI (Sample A: r = -.42, p < .01; Sample B-posttreatment: r = -.50, p <.01; 
Sample C: r = -.57, p <.01). These results strengthen the convergent validity of the 
TSE-PA scale. 
 
Known-Group Validity 
Theoretically, treatment should increase patients’ acceptance of the treatment 
rationale and treatment self-efficacy. Posttreatment participants were therefore 
predicted to score significantly higher on the ATR-PA and TSE-PA than 
pretreatment participants. Comparison of data from Sample A and Sample C 
revealed posttreatment participants scored significantly higher than pretreatment 
participants on the ATR-PA (Sample A: M = 32.80, SD = 10.36, Sample C: M  = 
48.29, SD = 9.98), t(97) = -7.20, p < .001, and TSE-PA (Sample A: M = 18.83, SD = 
5.85, Sample C: M = 31.03, SD = 6.18), t(97) = -9.23, p < .001, thus providing 
supportive evidence of known-group validity. 
 
Sensitivity to Change 
 Using Sample B data, the ATR-PA and TSE-PA were shown to be sensitive 
to treatment effects with scores increasing significantly from pretreatment to 
posttreatment: ATR-PA (pretreatment M = 33.05, SD = 10.36, posttreatment M = 
45.66, SD = 9.60), t(40) = -7.22, p < .001; TSE-PA (pretreatment M = 20.02, SD = 
6.34, posttreatment M = 28.29), SD = 6.14, t(40) = -6.79, p < .001. 
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Discussion 
This chapter aimed to develop reliable and valid measures assessing 
acceptance of the treatment rationale, expectancies of treatment outcome and 
treatment self-efficacy for Panic-Ag (referred to as ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA, 
respectively). The ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA demonstrated adequate levels of 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability in two independent samples of Panic-
Ag patients. The convergent and discriminant validity of each measure was 
supported. The ATR-PA and TSE-PA effectively discriminated between 
pretreatment and posttreatment participants and were sensitive to change, further 
supporting the construct validity of the scales.  
The ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA represent an advancement over similar 
measures used in previous research for the purpose of assessing relationships with 
treatment outcome. Firstly, as previously described, some studies used single-item 
measures of acceptance of the treatment rationale (Addis & Jacobson, 1996, 2000) 
and treatment outcome expectancies (Clark et al., 1999; Hansson & Berglund, 1987; 
Vogel et al., 2006). Single-item scales are unreliable and prone to measurement 
error; the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA in contrast are all multi-item measures.  
Second, other studies have combined related but distinct variables into one 
measure (Addis & Jacobson, 1996; Chambless et al., 1997; Goosens et al., 2005; 
Safren et al., 1997) when investigating associations between treatment outcome and 
acceptance of the rationale and treatment expectancies, thereby obscuring true 
relationships. Acknowledging this methodological problem, the ATR-PA was 
constructed purely from items assessing the treatment rationale, while ETO-PA items 
solely focussed on outcome expectancy without assessing treatment credibility.  
Chapter 4 – Psychometric Properties of the Treatment Belief Scales 
166 
Third, as self-efficacy is domain specific, existing self-efficacy measures 
developed for treatment of other disorders (e.g., asthma, diabetes, HIV, insomnia) 
were unsuited to the Panic-Ag domain. As treatment self-efficacy for Panic-Ag has 
not been investigated, the TSE-PA scale represents the first attempt to develop a 
valid and reliable measure of self-efficacy for implementing CBT in Panic-Ag.  
Finally, numerous studies have used measures unsubjected to rigorous 
psychometric testing (Addis & Jacobson, 1996, 2000; Emmelkamp & Emmelkamp-
Benner, 1975; Joyce et al., 2003; Kenardy et al., 2003; Stern & Marks, 1973). In 
contrast, the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA scales possess sound internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability and favourable evidence supporting construct 
validity in two independent samples of Panic-Ag patients. On the basis of these 
measurement improvements, relationships between acceptance of the treatment 
rationale, treatment expectancy, treatment self-efficacy and treatment outcome can 
be more accurately ascertained. 
 Despite their advantages, the development of the treatment belief scales are 
not without limitations. The most notable limitation involved sample overlap 
between scale development and validation. The sample used to develop and refine 
ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA items (Sample A) was the same one used to 
evaluate the scales’ construct validity, which may have affected the way these scales 
correlated with other measures. However, similar reliability and validity coefficients 
were obtained with an independent sample (Sample C). In a similar vein, 
approximately half the participants used to develop the Aetiology, Alternative Non-
CBT Treatments and Treatment Barriers scales went on to form Sample C which 
may have inflated correlations between these measures and the ATR-PA and TSE-
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PA. However, correlations of similar magnitude were observed in Sample B, 
strengthening the validity of the scales. 
 As previously stated, Sample B comprised only 50% of eligible participants, 
hence the psychometric properties (e.g., sensitivity to change) of the treatment belief 
measures obtained from Sample B may not generalise to the wider population of 
Panic-Ag patients. As reported in chapter 2, Sample B participants tended to be 
higher functioning, hence a more representative sample of Panic-Ag patients may 
exhibit less pre- to posttreatment change on the ATR-PA and TSE-PA. Finally, all 
measures used to assess the validity of the scales were self-report paper and pencil 
measures, thus shared measurement methods may have contributed to the significant 
correlations obtained in this study, potentially over-inflating the true level of 
association.  
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Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and 
Outcome 
This chapter examines the final aspect of the study investigating relationships 
between treatment knowledge, beliefs and treatment outcome. It assesses relative 
contributions of treatment knowledge and beliefs to outcome and also explores 
whether belief in catastrophic cognitions mediate observed relationships. On the 
basis of literature reviewed in chapter 1, hypotheses regarding associations between 
treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome were as follows: 
1. Improving treatment knowledge will be associated with reduced Panic-Ag 
severity. 
2. Greater posttreatment acceptance of the treatment rationale will be associated 
with reduced Panic-Ag severity. 
3. Stronger treatment self-efficacy at posttreatment will be associated with reduced 
Panic-Ag severity. 
4. Recovered participants will show greater treatment knowledge, pretreatment 
outcome expectancies, acceptance of the treatment rationale and treatment self-
efficacy than non-recovered participants. 
5. Relationships between treatment knowledge and outcome will be mediated by 
belief in catastrophic cognitions. 
6. Relationships between treatment beliefs and outcome will be mediated by belief 
in catastrophic cognitions. 
Additionally, exploratory analyses investigated associations between 
pretreatment beliefs (acceptance of the rationale, expectancies of outcome and 
treatment self-efficacy) and outcome. Finally, the influence of benzodiazepine use on 
acquisition of treatment knowledge was explored. 
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Method 
Participants 
Sample B (8 = 41) and Sample C (8 = 35) participants participated in this 
phase of the study.  
 
Measures 
Outcome measures were selected to assess four fundamental aspects of Panic-
Ag symptoms: panic attack frequency, panic attack sensation severity, frequency of 
catastrophic cognitions and frequency of agoraphobic avoidance. These measures, 
detailed fully in chapter 2, are briefly described again here.  
8umber of Panic Attacks Assessed on the ADIS-IV (nPA-ADIS). The number 
of DSM-IV defined panic attacks experienced in the previous month was assessed 
using the Panic Disorder module of the ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994).  
Panic Attack Sensation Severity Assessed on the ADIS-IV (PASS-ADIS). The 
PASS-ADIS assesses the severity of 14 physical and mental sensations experienced 
during an unexpected panic attack. Items were rated on a 9-point visual analogue 
scale ranging from 0 (none) to 8 (very severe). Scores ranged from 0 to 112 with 
higher scores reflecting greater symptom severity.  
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire – Frequency (ACQ-Frequency, 
Chambless et al., 1984). Frequency of catastrophic cognitions was measured using 
the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire (Chambless et al., 1984). In brief, 
participants rated how often they experienced 14 catastrophic cognitions when 
anxious from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Scores on the ACQ-Frequency scale ranged 
from 14 to 70.  
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Mobility Inventory for Agoraphobia – Alone Subscale (MI-Alone, Chambless 
et al., 1985). The alone subscale of the Mobility Inventory of Agoraphobia 
(Chambless et al., 1985) was used to assess frequency of agoraphobic avoidance. The 
alone subscale was used in preference to the accompanied subscale, as degree of 
avoidance without the presence of a trusted companion was considered a more 
accurate measure of functional improvement. Participants rated how often they 
avoided 26 situations on a 5-point scale from 1 (never avoid) to 5 (always avoid). 
Scores on the MI-Alone ranged from 26 to 130 with higher scores indicating greater 
severity. 
Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire – Belief (ACQ-Belief). Belief in 
catastrophic cognitions was assessed using a modified version of the ACQ. Belief in 
the 14 ACQ items was assessed on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (do not believe at 
all) to 4 (completely believe). Scores ranged from 0 to 56, with higher scores 
reflecting stronger beliefs.  
Measures assessing treatment knowledge and beliefs were previously 
described in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Treatment knowledge was assessed with the 
Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire 
(MC-PTKQ) and the Interview of Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia Treatment 
Knowledge (Int-PTK). Acceptance of the treatment rationale, expectancies of 
treatment outcome and treatment self-efficacy for Panic-Ag, were assessed with the 
ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA, respectively.  
 
Procedure 
Assessment procedures for Samples B and C were identical to those 
described in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In summary, prior to treatment, all participants 
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initially completed an ADIS-IV assessment and a battery of self-report 
questionnaires assessing psychosocial functioning. Sample B participants then 
attended a pretreatment research appointment assessing treatment knowledge and 
beliefs after which they completed an 8-week group-based CBT program for Panic-
Ag. At 6-months posttreatment, participants were mailed the same battery of self-
report measures of psychosocial functioning which they completed and returned at a 
posttreatment assessment conducted at the clinic. During this posttreatment 
assessment the ADIS-IV was readministered, followed by measures assessing 
treatment knowledge and beliefs. Sample C participants completed an identical 
assessment procedure except they did not attend the pretreatment research 
appointment, hence pretreatment knowledge and belief data is unavailable for this 
sample. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
To examine treatment efficacy, repeated measures t-tests were applied to 
assess changes in the four Panic-Ag symptom domains (panic attack frequency, 
panic attack sensation severity, frequency of catastrophic cognitions, frequency of 
agoraphobic avoidance), treatment knowledge and beliefs (acceptance of the 
treatment rationale, treatment self-efficacy and belief in catastrophic cognitions) and 
effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were used to compare degree of change. Effect sizes are 
defined as follows: small: d = 0.2, medium: d = 0.5, large: d = 0.8. Analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVAs) that included pretreatment knowledge as a covariate were 
performed to investigate differences in posttreatment knowledge (MC-PTKQ, Int-
PTK) between participants using and not using benzodiazepines.  
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Partial correlations were performed to investigate relationships between 
treatment knowledge, beliefs and Panic-Ag outcome, controlling for pretreatment 
Panic-Ag severity. Zero-order Pearson correlations were used to examine inter-
relationships between treatment knowledge and beliefs at pre- and posttreatment.  
Univariate hierarchical multiple regression analyses investigating relative 
contributions (∆ R2) of treatment knowledge and beliefs to the four indices of Panic-
Ag outcome were conducted. Posttreatment Panic-Ag severity scores (nPA-ADIS, 
PASS-ADIS, ACQ-Frequency, MI-Alone) were the dependent variables. To control 
for initial severity, pretreatment Panic-Ag scores were entered as the independent 
variable in step 1. For analyses involving treatment knowledge or belief in 
catastrophic cognitions, pretreatment MC-PTKQ/Int-PTK and ACQ-Belief scores 
were also entered at step 1 to control for pretreatment knowledge and catastrophic 
beliefs, respectively. Posttreatment knowledge (MC-PTKQ, Int-PTK), acceptance of 
the rationale (ATR-PA), treatment self-efficacy (TSE-PA) and pretreatment 
expectancies of treatment outcome (ETO-PA) were entered separately as 
independent variables in step 2.  
Additional univariate hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted to 
determine whether relationships between treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome 
were mediated by belief in catastrophic cognitions. As before, analyses involving 
Panic-Ag outcome, treatment knowledge or belief in catastrophic cognitions 
controlled for respective pretreatment scores in step 1.  
Univariate analyses were selected over multivariate analyses for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was of interest to determine which specific aspects of Panic-Ag outcome 
were related to knowledge and beliefs. Secondly, as there were four outcome 
variables and analyses controlled for pretreatment Panic-Ag severity, multivariate 
Chapter 5 – Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and Outcome 
 
174 
analyses therefore required control of four pretreatment severity variables (as 
opposed to only one for univariate analyses). The inclusion of an additional three 
predictors reduced power to unacceptable levels.  
Finally, a series of univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) investigated 
differences in treatment knowledge and beliefs between recovered and non-recovered 
participants, controlling for pretreatment severity. Analyses involving treatment 
knowledge and belief in catastrophic cognitions also controlled for pretreatment MC-
PTKQ/Int-PTK and ACQ-Belief scores, respectively. To control for pretreatment 
symptom severity, a Panic-Ag severity composite was constructed from significantly 
inter-correlating pretreatment Panic-Ag variables. Of the four Panic-Ag measures, 
three shared significant inter-correlations: ACQ-Frequency correlated with PASS-
ADIS (r = .44, p < .01) and MI-Alone (r = .42, p < .01). Frequency of panic attacks 
(nPA-ADIS) did not correlate significantly with any other Panic-Ag variable and 
therefore was excluded from the composite. To produce the composite, ACQ-
Frequency, PASS-ADIS and MI-Alone scores were converted to z-scores to obtain a 
common metric and then averaged. 
 
Power Analyses 
A sample size of 41 and a significance level of p < .05 (two-tailed test) was 
used for analyses based on Sample B. As argued by Cohen (1994), adjusting the 
alpha error for multiple tests to reduce the Type I error rate would result in 
unacceptably low power (hence inflating the Type II error rate) and any result 
significant at this level would represent a gross overestimation of the population 
effect size.  
Chapter 5 – Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and Outcome 
 
175 
Estimates of power to detect significant effects were extracted using formulas 
and power tables provided by Cohen (1988). By convention, at least 80% power is 
considered desirable to detect effects. Only medium and large effects were of interest 
as small effects are clinically unimportant. For repeated-measures analyses, there 
was 90% power for detecting medium effects. For correlations between knowledge, 
beliefs and outcome, there was 88% power to detect medium effects indicating 
sufficient power to detect meaningful relationships for these analyses.  
Based on power graphs provided by Miles and Shelvin (2001), there was 
sufficient power for detecting large effects for regression analyses involving up to 
four predictors; medium effects required a sample size of 8 = 90. Regressions 
involving five predictors had 75% power to detect large effects. 
 
Results 
Treatment Efficacy 
Table 5.1 displays pretreatment and posttreatment means, standard deviations 
and effect sizes for Panic-Ag symptom severity, treatment knowledge and beliefs for 
Sample B. As the distribution of panic attack frequency scores was skewed, a square-
root transformation was applied and subsequent analyses used these transformed 
scores. Results revealed significant pre- to posttreatment reductions in Panic-Ag 
symptoms and catastrophic beliefs as well as significant pre- to posttreatment 
improvements in treatment knowledge, acceptance of the treatment rationale and 
treatment self-efficacy. These findings demonstrate treatment was efficacious in 
reducing Panic-Ag symptom severity and improving treatment knowledge and 
beliefs. As seen in Table 5.1, effect sizes were large (M = 1.39).  
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Table 5.1 Pre- and Posttreatment Means, Standard Deviations and Effect Sizes for 
Panic-Ag Symptoms, Treatment Knowledge and Belief Measures for Sample B (8 = 
41) 
 Pretreatment  Posttreatment   
Variable   M   SD    M   SD      t(40) db 
Panic-Ag symptoms        
  nPA-ADISa  10.22 10.69  1.15 1.65 7.83* 1.52 
  PASS-ADIS 62.56 20.15  30.45 22.62 8.78* 1.50 
  ACQ–Frequency  35.02 9.92  26.12 9.03 6.69* 0.94 
  MI-Alone  80.85 26.70  54.16 26.92 6.64* 1.00 
Catastrophic beliefs        
  ACQ-Belief  19.51 12.35  8.22 8.06 7.23* 1.08 
Treatment knowledge        
  MC-PTKQ  19.27 10.14  30.07 6.37 -8.14* 1.28 
  Int-PTK 26.24 16.44  69.98 16.65 -16.03* 2.64 
Treatment beliefs        
  ATR-PA  33.05 10.36  45.66 9.60 -7.22* 1.26 
  ETO-PA  27.10 5.79     -    -          - - 
  TSE-PA  20.02 6.34  28.29 6.14 -6.79* 1.33 
8ote. nPA-ADIS = Number of panic attacks in the last month assessed on the ADIS-IV; 
PASS-ADIS = Panic attack sensation severity assessed on the ADIS-IV; ACQ-
Frequency = Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire-Frequency Score; MI-Alone = 
Mobility Inventory for Agoraphobia-Alone subscale; ACQ-Belief = Agoraphobic 
Cognitions Questionnaire-Belief Score; MC-PTKQ = Multiple-Choice Panic-Ag 
Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire; Int-PTK = Interview of Panic-Ag Treatment 
Knowledge; ATR-PA = Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag; ETO-PA= 
Expectancies of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag; TSE-PA = Treatment Self-Efficacy 
for Panic-Ag. 
aTo achieve normality, analyses were performed on square-root transformed panic 
frequency scores. 
bCohen’s effect size = Mpre – Mpost/SDpooled, where SDpooled = √[(SD
2
pre + SD
2
post)/2]. 
*p < .001. 
 
 
Significant reductions in Panic-Ag symptom severity were replicated in 
Sample C for nPA-ADIS: pretreatment: M = 6.80, SD = 8.63, posttreatment: M = 
2.29, SD = 3.98, t(34) = 3.17, p = .003, d = 0.68, PASS-ADIS: pretreatment: M = 
59.00, SD = 20.93; posttreatment: M = 26.23, SD = 23.23, t(34) = 7.37, p < .001, d = 
1.48, ACQ-Frequency: pretreatment: M = 35.11, SD = 10.85, posttreatment: M = 
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23.97, SD = 8.47, t(34) = 6.62, p < .001, d = 1.14, and MI-Alone: pretreatment: M = 
76.06, SD = 26.97, posttreatment: M = 47.24, SD = 24.40, t(34) = 7.93, p < .001, d = 
1.12. The mean effect size was 1.11, further supporting the efficacy of the treatment 
protocol in reducing Panic-Ag symptoms. 
 
Influence of Benzodiazepine Use on Treatment Knowledge 
As stated earlier, several studies associated benzodiazepine use with learning 
and memory impairments. As such, ANCOVAs were performed to assess whether 
Sample B participants reporting benzodiazepine (BZ) use acquired less knowledge 
relative to their non-BZ using counterparts. After controlling for pretreatment 
knowledge, no significant differences existed between the two groups on the MC-
PTKQ (BZ: M = 30.44, SD = 5.25, non-BZ: M = 29.84, SD = 7.09), F(1, 38) = 0.12, 
p > .05, d = 0.10, or Int-PTK (BZ: M = 60.75, SD = 13.68, non-BZ: M = 64.24, SD = 
18.81), F(1, 38) = 2.96, p > .05, d = 0.22. As such, benzodiazepine use was 
disregarded in subsequent analyses.  
 
Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge and Treatment Outcome 
To examine associations between treatment knowledge and outcome, partial 
correlations between posttreatment knowledge and posttreatment measures of Panic-
Ag severity were computed for Sample B, controlling for pretreatment severity and 
pretreatment knowledge scores. Greater MC-PTKQ scores were significantly 
associated with decreased frequency of catastrophic cognitions (r = -.39, p = .015) 
and agoraphobic avoidance (r = -.46, p = .003). However, the MC-PTKQ was 
unrelated to panic attack frequency (r = -.06, p > .05) or panic attack sensation 
severity (r = -.09, p > .05). Higher scores on the Int-PTK were significantly 
Chapter 5 – Relationships Between Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and Outcome 
 
178 
correlated with reduced frequency of agoraphobic cognitions (r = -.40, p = .012), yet 
unrelated to other Panic-Ag domains (nPA-ADIS: r = .08; PASS-ADIS: r = -.10, MI-
Alone: r = -.14, p > .05). 
At posttreatment, three MC-PTKQ items were answered incorrectly by more 
than 70% of Sample B participants (Items 7, 17 and 18). Item 7 assessed 
understanding that panic attacks were maintained by threatening interpretations of 
physical sensations. Item 17 required comprehension of “overestimating the 
probability” and discriminating it from “overestimating the cost”. Item 18 concerned 
methods for reducing the difficulty of exposure tasks. Partial correlations between 
these three items and indices of treatment outcome, controlling for pretreatment 
severity and knowledge of respective items were not significant, when analysed 
individually (r = .02 – -.21, p > .05, mean r = -.09) or combined (r = -.01 – -.14, p > 
.05, mean r = -.07). 
On the Int-PTK, more than 70% of participants responded at least partially 
incorrectly (i.e., scores of 3 or less out of 4) on nine items. Partial correlations 
between the sum of these nine items and treatment outcome, controlling for 
pretreatment severity and knowledge of such items, revealed no significant 
associations (r = .00 – -.31, p > .05, mean r = -.13). Of these nine items, two 
correlated significantly with frequency of catastrophic cognitions: item 1b 
concerning symptoms of the fight/flight response and their function (r = -.36, p = 
.025) and item 4 involving the identification of underlying catastrophic cognitions (r 
= -.39, p = .015). However, with 36 separate partial correlations (9 items by 4 
outcome variables), these significant results likely reflect chance findings (Type I 
errors). 
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Relationships Between Treatment Beliefs and Treatment Outcome 
Pretreatment Beliefs 
  Controlling for pretreatment symptom severity, indices of treatment outcome 
(panic attack frequency, panic attack sensation severity, frequency of catastrophic 
cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance) were not significantly associated with 
pretreatment acceptance of the rationale (r = .01 – .22, p > .05), expectancies of 
treatment outcome (r = .05 – -.13, p > .05), or treatment self-efficacy (r = .00 – -.15, 
p > .05). 
 
Posttreatment Beliefs  
Partial correlations between posttreatment acceptance of the treatment 
rationale, treatment self-efficacy and treatment outcome were performed, controlling 
for pretreatment Panic-Ag severity. Associations were stronger for Sample C than 
Sample B. Outlier analysis was performed revealing the presence of one outlier in 
Sample C which was subsequently removed from all further analyses. Consequently, 
as displayed in Table 5.2, similar correlations for Sample B and Sample C were 
observed. Acceptance of the treatment rationale was not significantly associated with 
treatment outcome for Samples B or C, although correlations were generally in the 
predicted direction. Treatment self-efficacy was significantly related to all indices of 
treatment outcome (with the exception of frequency of panic attacks in Sample B), 
where higher self-efficacy was associated with less severe symptoms.  
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Table 5.2 Partial Correlations Between Posttreatment Acceptance of the Treatment 
Rationale, Treatment Self-Efficacy and Outcome, Controlling for Pretreatment 
Severity for Samples B and C 
 Sample B 
+ = 41 
 Sample C 
+ = 34
a 
Outcome variable
b 
ATR-PA TSE-PA  ATR-PA TSE-PA 
nPA-ADIS   .02  -.21   -.28  -.38*** 
PASS-ADIS  -.16  -.46**   -.27  -.51*** 
ACQ-Frequency  -.30  -.54***   -.32  -.55*** 
MI-Alone  -.22  -.46**   -.24  -.45** 
8ote. nPA-ADIS = Number of panic attacks in the last month assessed on the ADIS-
IV; PASS-ADIS = Panic attack sensation severity assessed on the ADIS-IV; ACQ-
Frequency = Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire-Frequency Score; MI-Alone = 
Mobility Inventory for Agoraphobia-Alone subscale; ATR-PA = Acceptance of the 
Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag; TSE-PA = Treatment Self-Efficacy for Panic-Ag. 
aOne outlier was removed from analyses. 
bPosttreatment variable, controlling for pretreatment scores. 
*p < .05. **p< .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
Using Sample B, partial correlations were also computed between belief in 
catastrophic cognitions and treatment outcome, controlling for pretreatment severity 
and pretreatment catastrophic beliefs. Belief in catastrophic cognitions was 
significantly related to all outcome measures, with stronger catastrophic beliefs 
associated with greater symptom severity: frequency of panic attacks, r = .32, p = 
.048; panic attack sensation severity, r = .39, p = .013; frequency of catastrophic 
cognitions, r = .56, p < .001; and agoraphobic avoidance, r = .57, p < .001. These 
analyses were unable to be performed for Sample C due to reliance on pretreatment 
catastrophic belief data which was unavailable for this sample. 
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Inter-relationships Between Treatment Knowledge and Beliefs  
Zero-order Pearson correlations between pretreatment and posttreatment 
knowledge and belief variables for Sample B are displayed in Table 5.3. Significant 
relationships between variables were conceptually consistent. Treatment knowledge 
(MC-PTKQ, Int-PTK) and acceptance of the treatment rationale were significantly 
positively correlated when assessed concurrently such that greater knowledge was 
associated with increased rationale acceptance. In addition, greater posttreatment 
knowledge on the MC-PTKQ was significantly associated with higher posttreatment 
self-efficacy, although this relationship failed to reach significance with the Int-PTK 
(r = .30, p < .06). Of note, treatment knowledge was not significantly related to belief 
in catastrophic cognitions (ACQ-Belief). 
Higher pretreatment acceptance of the rationale was significantly related to 
higher expectations of treatment outcome and greater treatment self-efficacy (at pre- 
and posttreatment). Stronger posttreatment acceptance of the rationale correlated 
significantly with higher posttreatment self-efficacy and lower posttreatment belief in 
catastrophic cognitions. 
Significant positive associations existed between expectancy of treatment 
outcome and treatment self-efficacy such that participants who expected treatment to 
be helpful reported higher self-efficacy at pretreatment and posttreatment. Belief in 
catastrophic cognitions was significantly negatively associated with concurrent 
ratings of treatment self-efficacy, whereby participants endorsing strong belief in 
catastrophic cognitions expressed lower self-efficacy. Interestingly, pretreatment 
self-efficacy was not significantly associated with posttreatment self-efficacy 
indicating self-efficacy perceptions are flexible across treatment.  
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For Sample C, correlations between posttreatment knowledge and beliefs 
were largely similar to those observed for Sample B (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4 Zero-Order Pearson Correlations Between Posttreatment Treatment 
Knowledge and Beliefs for Sample C (8 = 34)
a 
 MC-PTKQ Int-PTK ATR-PA TSE-PA 
Int-PTK .62****** -   
ATR-PA .70****** .34***** -  
TSE-PA .21****** -.06***** .72***** - 
ACQ-Belief -.14****** .03***** -.50***** -.73***** 
8ote.  MC-PTKQ = Multiple-Choice Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire; 
Int-PTK = Interview of Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge; ATR-PA = Acceptance of 
the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag; TSE-PA = Treatment Self-Efficacy for Panic-
Ag; ACQ-Belief = Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire-Belief Score. 
aOne outlier was removed from analyses. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 
Contribution of Treatment Knowledge and Beliefs to Treatment Outcome 
Table 5.5 summarises results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
examining contributions of knowledge and beliefs to variance across the four Panic-
Ag outcome domains for Samples B and C. Analysis of residuals indicated no 
violations of assumptions. Analyses involving treatment knowledge and belief in 
catastrophic cognitions were unable to be performed in Sample C due to their 
reliance on pretreatment data which was unavailable for this sample.  
Treatment knowledge, when assessed by the MC-PTKQ, exerted significant 
effects on frequency of catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance, 
explaining an additional 9.6% and 14.8% variance after controlling for pretreatment 
severity, respectively. The Int-PTK also had a significant effect on frequency of 
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catastrophic cognitions, explaining an additional 10.1% variance, however it did not 
contribute significantly to variance in agoraphobic avoidance. Neither treatment 
knowledge measure contributed significantly to frequency of panic attacks or panic 
attack sensation severity.  
In Sample B, treatment self-efficacy exerted significant effects on three of 
four outcome indices, accounting for 17.6%, 18.9% and 15.2% additional variance in 
panic attack symptom severity, frequency of agoraphobic cognitions and 
agoraphobic avoidance, respectively. Treatment self-efficacy did not significantly 
explain additional variance for panic attack frequency. For Sample C, treatment self-
efficacy explained significant variance (12.3% to 24.4%) across all four outcome 
variables, including panic attack frequency. Acceptance of the treatment rationale did 
not significantly contribute to Panic-Ag outcome variance in either Sample B or C. 
Pretreatment expectancies of treatment outcome also failed to significantly explain 
such variability.  
Consistent with Clark’s (1986) cognitive model, belief in catastrophic 
cognitions explained significant variance across the four symptom domains: 9.0% for 
frequency of panic attacks, 11.3% for panic attack sensation severity, 19.9% for 
frequency of catastrophic cognitions, and 23.3% for frequency of agoraphobic 
avoidance.  
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Belief in Catastrophic Cognitions as a Mediator of Relationships Between 
Treatment Knowledge, Beliefs and Outcome  
Baron and Kenny (1986) described a four-stage process to establish 
mediation using regression equations. In step 1, the independent variable (treatment 
knowledge, treatment beliefs) significantly predicts the mediator (belief in 
catastrophic cognitions). In step 2, the independent variable (treatment knowledge, 
treatment beliefs) significantly predicts the dependent variable (Panic-Ag outcome). 
In step 3, the mediator (belief in catastrophic cognitions) significantly predicts the 
dependent variable (Panic-Ag outcome) after controlling for the independent variable 
(treatment knowledge, treatment beliefs). In step 4, perfect mediation arises when the 
independent variable no longer affects the dependent variable after controlling for the 
mediator. Partial mediation is indicated when the independent variable continues to 
affect the dependent variable but to a lesser degree than in step 2. 
 
Treatment Knowledge 
Associations between treatment knowledge and outcome do not appear to be 
mediated by belief in catastrophic cognitions. The first step of mediation, that 
treatment knowledge (MC-PTKQ, Int-PTK) predicted belief in catastrophic 
cognitions, was not satisfied, β = -.03 – -.25, p > .05.  
 
Treatment Self-Efficacy 
In contrast to treatment knowledge, belief in catastrophic cognitions appears 
to mediate relationships between treatment self-efficacy and outcome. Treatment 
self-efficacy significantly predicted belief in catastrophic cognitions, β = -.41, p < 
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.01, supporting the first step of mediation. The second step was confirmed through 
significant relationships between treatment self-efficacy and Panic-Ag outcomes 
(excluding panic attack frequency) as reported in Table 5.5. After controlling for 
treatment self-efficacy, belief in catastrophic cognitions significantly predicted 
frequency of catastrophic cognitions, β = .39, p < .05, and agoraphobic avoidance, β 
= .49, p < .01, thus supporting the third step of mediation; however belief in 
catastrophic cognitions did not mediate the relationship with panic attack sensation 
severity, β = .27, p = .15. Finally, after controlling for belief in catastrophic 
cognitions, treatment self-efficacy no longer significantly predicted agoraphobic 
avoidance, ∆ R2 = .045, F(4, 36) = 3.74, β = -.26, p = .06; however it continued to 
predict frequency of catastrophic cognitions, ∆ R2 = .054, F(4, 36) = 5.17, β = -.28, p  
= .029, albeit to a lesser extent than for step 2. These results indicate belief in 
catastrophic cognitions partially mediated relationships between treatment self-
efficacy and Panic-Ag outcomes, with treatment self-efficacy having an independent 
effect on frequency of catastrophic cognitions.  
Acceptance of the treatment rationale and expectancies of treatment outcome 
were excluded from these analyses as they formerly made no significant contribution 
to outcome variance (see Table 5.5).  
 
Treatment Knowledge and Beliefs According to Recovery Status 
At posttreatment, 25 of the 41 (61.0%) Sample B participants no longer met 
DSM-IV criteria for Panic Disorder and/or Agoraphobia (referred to as recovered) 
while 16 participants (39.0%) continued to meet diagnostic criteria (referred to as 
non-recovered). Figure 5.1 displays mean standardised knowledge and belief scores 
according to recovery status; raw means and standard deviations are also provided.  
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After controlling for pretreatment symptom severity, recovered participants 
demonstrated significantly higher posttreatment knowledge on the MC-PTKQ, F(1, 
37) = 4.80, p = .035, d = 0.63, acceptance of the treatment rationale, F(1, 38) = 4.93, 
p = .032, d = 0.79 and treatment self-efficacy, F(1, 38) = 13.83, p = .001, d = 1.25, 
than non-recovered participants. Moreover, recovered participants expressed 
significantly lower belief in catastrophic cognitions than their non-recovered 
counterparts, F(1, 38) = 7.49, p = .009, d = 0.86. The groups did not differ 
significantly on treatment knowledge assessed on the Int-PTK, F(1, 37) = 0.65, p > 
.05, d = 0.39, or pretreatment expectancies of outcome, F(1, 38) = 0.06, p > .05, d = 
0.17, although group means were in the predicted direction (see Figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Mean standardised scores and raw means and standard deviations of 
posttreatment knowledge (MC-PTKQ, Int-PTK), acceptance of the treatment 
rationale (ATR-PA), treatment self-efficacy (TSE-PA), belief in catastrophic 
cognitions (ACQ-B) and pretreatment expectancies of treatment outcome (ETO-PA) 
for recovered and non-recovered Sample B participants. 
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Within Sample C, 23 (67.6%) participants were classified as recovered and 
11 (32.4%) as non-recovered. Mean knowledge and belief scores (raw and 
standardised) according to recovery status are displayed in Figure 5.2. As 
pretreatment data for knowledge and catastrophic beliefs were unavailable for this 
Sample, ANCOVAs could only be performed on ATR-PA and TSE-PA. As 
displayed in Figure 5.2, although means were in predicted directions, after 
controlling for pretreatment severity, no differences existed between recovered and 
non-recovered participants on ATR-PA, F(1, 32) = 1.19, p > .05, d = 0.24 or TSE-
PA, F(1, 32) = 1.16, p > .05, d = 0.60. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean posttreatment standardised scores and raw means and standard 
deviations of treatment knowledge (MC-PTKQ, Int-PTK), acceptance of the 
treatment rationale (ATR-PA), treatment self-efficacy (TSE-PA) and belief in 
catastrophic cognitions (ACQ-B) for recovered and non-recovered Sample C 
participants. 
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Discussion 
This study examined associations between treatment knowledge, beliefs and 
outcome following CBT for patients with Panic-Ag. Treatment outcome comprised 
four major indices of Panic-Ag: frequency of panic attacks, panic attack sensation 
severity, frequency of catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance.  
Relationships between treatment knowledge and outcome revealed that 
greater improvement in scores on the multiple-choice treatment knowledge measure 
(MC-PTKQ) was associated with reductions in two of the four Panic-Ag outcome 
indices: frequency of catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance. In addition, 
after controlling for pretreatment severity and knowledge, the MC-PTKQ 
significantly explained additional variance in these two domains. Consistent with 
these results, recovered patients demonstrated significantly greater MC-PTKQ scores 
than non-recovered patients. 
In contrast, the interview measure of treatment knowledge (Int-PTK) only 
partially replicated the above findings. Increased knowledge on the Int-PTK was 
associated only with reduced frequency of catastrophic cognitions, significantly 
explaining additional variance in this Panic-Ag outcome after controlling for 
pretreatment severity and knowledge.  
Of the treatment beliefs examined in this study, posttreatment perceptions of 
treatment self-efficacy demonstrated the strongest relationship with outcome. Greater 
treatment self-efficacy was associated with reduced panic attack sensation severity, 
frequency of catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance. These results were 
replicated in an independent sample, which also found a significant relationship with 
panic attack frequency. After controlling for pretreatment severity, treatment self-
efficacy significantly contributed additional outcome variance. Further supporting 
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these relationships, recovered participants reported higher posttreatment self-efficacy 
than non-recovered participants. Taken together, these results indicate the more 
confident patients are in their ability to implement treatment recommendations the 
better their treatment outcome. In contrast, pretreatment perceptions of treatment 
self-efficacy were unrelated to Panic-Ag outcomes. 
Contrary to predictions, greater acceptance of the treatment rationale was not 
significantly associated with treatment outcome, whether assessed at pretreatment or 
posttreatment. While recovered patients showed significantly stronger posttreatment 
rationale acceptance than non-recovered patients, this difference was not replicated 
in an independent sample. Pretreatment expectancies of treatment outcome were also 
unrelated to Panic-Ag outcome. Hence, the results of this study suggest patients’ 
beliefs about treatment prior to commencing CBT have no meaningful influence on 
treatment outcome.  
Supporting Clark’s (1986) cognitive model of panic, belief in catastrophic 
cognitions was significantly associated with each domain of Panic-Ag outcome, 
explaining significant additional variance across the four outcome measures after 
controlling for pretreatment severity. In accordance with this finding, recovered 
patients reported significantly lower belief in catastrophic cognitions than non-
recovered patients. 
Mediational analyses indicated relationships between treatment self-efficacy 
and outcome were partially mediated by belief in catastrophic cognitions while 
relationships between treatment knowledge and outcome were not.  
Interestingly, panic attack frequency was generally not associated with 
treatment knowledge and beliefs. Moreover, belief in catastrophic cognitions showed 
the weakest relationship with panic attack frequency relative to other dimensions of 
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Panic-Ag. Several possibilities may account for this finding. Firstly, panic attack 
frequency was assessed retrospectively on the ADIS-IV and therefore may not have 
provided as accurate a measure as prospective ratings. Alternatively, as only DSM-
IV defined panic attacks were included in the rating, incorporating subthreshold 
panic attacks may have provided a more realistic assessment of this aspect of Panic-
Ag outcome. Cho et al. (2007) also reported reduced associations among patients’ 
cognitive appraisals and panic attack frequency relative to other Panic-Ag aspects 
using a measure that excluded subthreshold attacks.  
Panic attack frequency may be a poor measure of Panic-Ag severity in that it 
does not always differentiate between mild and severe patients and it may be 
insensitive to treatment effects. To illustrate this point, highly disabled agoraphobic 
patients can report no panic attacks prior to treatment due to extensive avoidance 
behaviour and therefore resemble milder patients who rarely experience panic 
attacks. Furthermore, for agoraphobic patients experiencing positive treatment 
responses, posttreatment panic attack frequency scores may show no change or even 
increase in response to exposure to previously avoided situations. Anticipated panic 
attack frequency may offer a preferable alternative for this aspect of Panic-Ag 
outcome as it takes into account patients’ predictions of panic attacks (without 
excluding subthreshold attacks) while also incorporating the disability associated 
with anticipation of panic. 
In summary, improved treatment knowledge and greater self-efficacy for 
implementing CBT techniques at posttreatment were associated with reductions in 
several aspects of Panic-Ag severity, namely frequency of catastrophic cognitions, 
agoraphobic avoidance and panic attack sensation severity. Acceptance of the 
rationale and treatment beliefs held prior to commencing CBT were unrelated to 
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outcome. Consistent with the cognitive model, reduced belief in catastrophic 
cognitions was highly associated with improved treatment outcome. Of theoretical 
importance, belief in catastrophic cognitions partially mediated relationships between 
treatment self-efficacy and outcome but not between treatment knowledge and 
outcome.  
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General Discussion 
This thesis aimed to investigate associations between patients’ knowledge 
and beliefs about CBT with Panic-Ag outcomes. Specifically, relative contributions 
of treatment knowledge, acceptance of the treatment rationale, pretreatment 
expectancies of outcome and treatment self-efficacy to four major Panic-Ag 
symptom domains were examined. Relationships between treatment knowledge, 
beliefs and outcome were hypothesised to be mediated by belief in catastrophic 
cognitions. The initial phase of this study involved developing measures assessing 
treatment knowledge and beliefs about CBT for Panic-Ag from the psychotherapy 
and medical literature, and extensive input from expert clinical psychologists and 
Panic-Ag patients. The psychometric properties of these measures were investigated 
using patient and clinician samples and found to be sound.  
This research has several noteworthy strengths. Firstly, it is the first to 
investigate relationships between treatment knowledge, acceptance of the rationale, 
treatment self-efficacy and CBT outcomes for Panic-Ag. It also extends previous 
research by addressing many methodological weaknesses (i.e., restricting knowledge 
items to the assessment of treatment knowledge, objective scoring criteria free from 
therapist bias, assessing treatment expectancy in the absence of credibility ratings, 
developing multi-item measures with sound psychometric properties) that putatively 
contributed to inconsistent findings among different disorders and undermined 
observed relationships between treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome. Finally, 
the use of an independent sample allowed cross-validation of findings pertaining to 
relationships between treatment self-efficacy, acceptance of the rationale and 
outcome. 
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Treatment Knowledge 
Partial support was provided for the hypothesis that improved treatment 
knowledge is associated with reduced symptom severity. Responses to the multiple-
choice knowledge questionnaire revealed significant associations with frequency of 
catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic avoidance, after controlling for pretreatment 
knowledge and severity. In addition, the hypothesis that recovered participants will 
demonstrate significantly greater treatment knowledge than non-recovered 
participants was supported through scores on the multiple-choice knowledge 
questionnaire. Within the psychotherapy literature, these associations are consistent 
with results reported by Abramowitz et al. (2002) for OCD. 
Interestingly, the interview measure of treatment knowledge only partially 
replicated results obtained from the multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire, in 
finding a significant association with reduced frequency of catastrophic cognitions 
but not agoraphobic avoidance. Moreover, recovered participants did not score 
significantly higher on the knowledge interview than non-recovered participants. As 
the two knowledge measures were highly inter-correlated (r = .67 – .72, p < .001) 
reflecting assessment of similar constructs, these discrepant findings are likely due to 
differences in measurement methods, namely recall (interview) versus recognition 
(multiple-choice).  
Recall methods were putatively postulated to offer a more valid assessment of 
patients’ knowledge because the knowledge must be accessed from memory without 
assistance from prompts or reminders that could artificially inflate scores. However, 
such a notion appears incorrect. Assessing knowledge via interview has previously 
been criticised for penalising individuals with reduced verbal skills (Beeney et al., 
1994; Dunn et al., 1984) and therefore may be a less valid measure than one which 
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allows individuals to demonstrate knowledge through recognition of previously 
learned information. Difficulties with expressive language during the knowledge 
interview may therefore have interfered with detection of the relationship with 
agoraphobic avoidance and difference between recovered and non-recovered 
participants.  
In explaining the relationship between treatment knowledge and outcome, it 
is tempting to invoke a causal explanation whereby the association is mediated 
through increased treatment compliance (specifically, decreased unintentional non-
compliance). From this perspective, knowledgeable patients are more likely to 
conduct higher quality behavioural experiments and cognitive restructuring which in 
turn improve clinical outcomes. For example, patients who understand the role of 
safety seeking behaviours in the maintenance of catastrophic beliefs are more likely 
to (a) identify and eliminate safety behaviours during behavioural experiments, and 
(b) relate outcomes from experiments to original predictions (i.e., disconfirmation of 
feared catastrophes) resulting in decreased belief in catastrophic cognitions which in 
turn reduce agoraphobic avoidance and frequency of catastrophic cognitions. As 
treatment compliance was not part of the study’s initial aims and therefore not 
assessed, this explanation is only speculative.  
Such an explanation is consistent with the results of Schmidt and Woolaway-
Bickel (2000) who reported that quality of CBT homework was a stronger predictor 
of Panic-Ag outcome than quantity of homework. Future research should examine 
homework/treatment compliance to determine whether it mediates the relationship 
between treatment knowledge and outcome. Conceptually, greater homework quality 
should encourage deeper emotional processing of information inconsistent with 
patients’ catastrophic beliefs (Schmidt & Woolaway-Bickel, 2000). Surprisingly, no 
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studies have examined whether homework compliance reduces belief in catastrophic 
cognitions in Panic-Ag.  
Contrary to expectations, the present results did not support the hypothesis 
that relationships between treatment knowledge and outcome are mediated by belief 
in catastrophic cognitions. Improving patients’ knowledge was not sufficient for 
decreasing belief in catastrophic cognitions. Although treatment provides realistic 
non-threatening information about panic symptoms, patients may continue to doubt 
this information until it has been personally disproved. Therefore, in addition to 
improving comprehension of treatment information, clinicians are encouraged to 
focus on assisting patients to challenge catastrophic beliefs through additional 
methods, for example, via behavioural experiments and/or cognitive challenging. It is 
likely a combination of treatment knowledge and treatment compliance is necessary 
to reduce belief in catastrophic cognitions; however such an assertion awaits 
empirical investigation.  
Given the correlational nature of this study, associations between treatment 
knowledge and outcome could also be explained by reverse causation whereby 
patients with better outcomes developed a deeper understanding of treatment as a 
result of symptom improvement. Depending on their symptom severity, patients 
could make post-hoc inferences about the accuracy of treatment information. For 
example, treatment responders may come to learn that panic attacks do not cause 
heart attacks through their reduced symptom profile. Multiple repeat assessments of 
symptom severity and treatment knowledge over the course of treatment and 
statistical methods incorporating time-series analyses (e.g., Bouchard et al., 2007) are 
required to clarify directions of causality.  
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A third explanation for the association is that greater improvement in 
treatment knowledge may reflect other patient variables. For example, patients keen 
to learn new coping skills or those with stronger therapeutic alliances may be more 
receptive to learning new information. Indeed, willingness to learn new coping skills 
and therapeutic alliance have positively predicted treatment outcomes in CBT for 
patients with anxiety and depression (Arnow et al., 2003; Burns & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Vogel et al., 2006). Inclusion of these variables in future studies should help 
determine whether the treatment knowledge-outcome association is mediated by such 
non-specific effects. 
Given the observed association between improved treatment knowledge and 
outcome, it would seem reasonable for clinicians to regularly assess patients’ 
comprehension of treatment information and correct areas of confusion to further 
improve Panic-Ag outcomes. Consistent with past research, this study found 
patients’ treatment knowledge was imperfect. At 6-months posttreatment, patients 
scored an average of 75.2% on the multiple-choice knowledge questionnaire and 
72.9% on the knowledge interview, indicating approximately one quarter of 
treatment information was forgotten, poorly comprehended or misunderstood.  
Clinicians are advised to assume patients do not have a clear understanding of 
treatment information until they can explain it back in their own words (Addis & 
Carpenter, 2000; Pulliam, Gatchel, & Robinson, 2003; Roter & Hall, 1994; Sanson-
Fisher, Campbell, Redman, & Hennrikus, 1989). Strategies such as providing written 
information (Cox, Tisdelle, & Culbert, 1988; Ellis et al., 1979; Helbig & Fehm, 
2004; Ivens & Sabin, 2006; Ley, 1998; Raynor, 1998), audiotaping therapy sessions 
(Macaskill, 1996), checking comprehension (Pulliam et al., 2003; Roter & Hall, 
1994; Sanson-Fisher et al., 1989) and standardised quizzes (Abramowitz et al., 2002) 
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have been recommended to increase patient knowledge to improve compliance and 
treatment outcome. Offering patients forced-choice responses (e.g., “True or false: 
The fight or flight response is a harmless survival response”) may prove more useful 
for assessing knowledge in individuals with reduced verbal fluency. In addition, 
clinicians are advised to pay particular attention to assessing treatment 
comprehension of older patients, and those with less education and lower IQs based 
on the associations found in this study between treatment knowledge and age, 
education and intelligence.  
A further clinical implication arising from the treatment knowledge-outcome 
association concerns improving clinician-patient communication of treatment 
information. Guided by literature from cognitive and educational psychology 
(Chandler & Sweller, 1991; Kalyuga, 2007; Mayer & Moreno, 2003; Moreno, 2007), 
future research could investigate teaching methods that enhance clinicians’ delivery 
of CBT to foster patients’ understanding of treatment. Presenting CBT treatment 
material to patients has the potential to cause cognitive overload; patients are 
required to cognitively process considerable amounts of information yet may lack 
sufficient cognitive resources to do so, contributing to reduced treatment 
comprehension. When designing treatment programs, factors such as information 
media type (written and/or spoken words, illustrations, videos), proportion of 
didactic versus interactive learning, information segmentation and session duration 
may need to be considered to optimise engagement with treatment and minimise 
cognitive load.  
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Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale 
 Contrary to the hypothesis, findings across two independent samples 
indicated no significant relationship between patients’ acceptance of the treatment 
rationale and Panic-Ag outcomes. This finding is inconsistent with previous studies 
reporting significant associations for patients with depression (Addis & Jacobson, 
1996, 2000; Fennell & Teasdale, 1987). Although it is possible that this relationship 
is simply weaker for Panic-Ag, an alternative explanation may be due to differences 
between studies regarding measurement of rationale acceptance.  
The present study assessed acceptance of the treatment rationale by obtaining 
a sum total of patients’ beliefs about specific aspects of CBT for Panic-Ag. In 
contrast, the studies of Fennell and Teasdale (1987) and Addis and Jacobson (1996, 
2000) assessed rationale acceptance based on patients’ overall representations of the 
rationale. Consistent with gestalt theory (Wertheimer, 2003) that states psychological 
representations of a unified whole cannot be derived from summation of its parts, 
patients’ overall or gestalt representations of the rationale may be more highly 
associated with clinical outcome than ratings derived from the sum of its 
components. To better determine whether acceptance of the rationale is associated 
with outcome for Panic-Ag, future research should incorporate multi-item measures 
assessing acceptance of the rationale as a whole.  
 
Treatment Self-Efficacy 
The hypothesis that stronger treatment self-efficacy at posttreatment is 
associated with reduced Panic-Ag severity was strongly supported. These results are 
consistent with those reported for other disorders (e.g., Bélanger et al., 2005; Gerber 
et al., 2006; Iannotti et al., 2006; Nagia, 1999). Across two independent samples, 
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posttreatment ratings of treatment self-efficacy explained additional variance in panic 
attack sensation severity, frequency of catastrophic cognitions and agoraphobic 
avoidance, after controlling for pretreatment severity. The hypothesis that recovered 
participants will report higher self-efficacy than their non-recovered counterparts was 
also supported. Finally, as hypothesised, mediational analyses confirmed 
relationships between treatment self-efficacy and outcome were partially mediated 
by belief in catastrophic cognitions. This result suggests participants who were 
confident in implementing CBT directives had lower belief in catastrophic cognitions 
and in turn lower symptom severity following treatment. 
Associations between treatment self-efficacy, belief in catastrophic 
cognitions and outcome are presumably influenced by treatment compliance. That is, 
individuals with greater confidence for implementing treatment instructions are 
likely to be more compliant with treatment (i.e., exhibit less intentional non-
compliance). Increased compliance in turn provides additional opportunities for 
correcting catastrophic misinterpretations of physical sensations resulting in 
decreased Panic-Ag symptoms. As compliance was not investigated in this study, 
mediational studies are necessary for determining whether treatment compliance 
mediates relationships between treatment self-efficacy, belief in catastrophic 
cognitions and Panic-Ag outcomes. 
Although belief in catastrophic cognitions partially mediated relationships 
between treatment self-efficacy and outcome, after controlling for belief in 
catastrophic cognitions a significant independent relationship existed between 
treatment self-efficacy and frequency of catastrophic cognitions. As previously 
discussed in chapter 1, researchers have emphasised panic self-efficacy (confidence 
in managing Panic-Ag symptoms) as central to the aetiology and maintenance of 
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Panic-Ag (Barlow, 1988; Casey, Oei, Newcombe et al., 2004; Rachman et al., 1986; 
Richards et al., 2002; Sanderson et al., 1989; Telch et al., 1996), with changes in 
panic self-efficacy mediating treatment outcome (Hoffart, 1995a; Williams et al., 
1989; Zane & Williams, 1993). Treatment self-efficacy may promote greater panic 
self-efficacy, which in turn reduces Panic-Ag symptoms. Incorporation of panic self-
efficacy as a mediating variable between treatment self-efficacy and outcome would 
be useful in elucidating this relationship. Alternatively, treatment self-efficacy may 
simply reflect broader underlying patient characteristics such as internal locus of 
control or agency expectancy (believing oneself is capable of change) which have 
both been predictive of CBT outcomes for patients with anxiety, depression and 
stress (Biswas & Chattopadhyay, 2001; Dozois & Westra, 2005; Hooke & Page, 
2002). 
Given the correlational nature of this study, it is also conceivable that patients 
educed their level of treatment self-efficacy from their degree of symptom 
impairment and/or strength of catastrophic beliefs. That is, patients no longer 
experiencing Panic-Ag symptoms or believing previously held catastrophic thoughts 
are likely to have higher confidence in applying treatment recommendations 
involving the testing of catastrophic outcomes (behavioural experiments, graded 
exposure) than more symptomatic patients. Longitudinal studies incorporating 
multiple assessments of treatment self-efficacy, belief in catastrophic cognitions and 
Panic-Ag symptoms during the course of treatment would be useful to clarify 
directions of causality.  
While posttreatment ratings of treatment self-efficacy were related to 
outcome, exploratory analyses revealed that pretreatment ratings were not. This latter 
finding is consistent with results reported by Bélanger et al. (2005) and Heapy et al. 
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(2005). Self-efficacy theory maintains self-efficacy is a dynamic construct that 
changes in response to feedback. Patients’ experiences with CBT can positively or 
negatively affect ongoing confidence for implementing treatment directives. On 
average, patients’ self-efficacy ratings increased significantly after receiving 
treatment, hence low pretreatment self-efficacy ratings are responsive to treatment 
experiences. However, treatment self-efficacy ratings which remain low and those 
found to decrease over treatment are cause for concern and should be addressed.  
Should treatment self-efficacy exert a causal influence on treatment outcome, 
monitoring treatment self-efficacy ratings across therapy sessions would be useful to 
alert clinicians to patients’ doubts about their ability to comply with treatment 
recommendations (Bélanger et al., 2005). Clinicians could explore reasons 
contributing to low self-efficacy and implement strategies to enhance it.  
To increase self-efficacy, Bandura (1977) asserted individuals’ self-efficacy 
beliefs are primarily derived from four sources: performance accomplishments, 
vicarious experience, verbal persuasion and emotional/physiological arousal. 
Individuals process information obtained from these sources to determine their level 
of self-efficacy for specific tasks. Performance accomplishments are considered to be 
the most influential in modifying self-efficacy beliefs, as such direct personal 
experiences contain highly salient and believable information about one’s 
capabilities.  
In CBT for Panic-Ag, performance accomplishments take the form of 
exposure therapy or behavioural experiments. Patients’ doubts about their ability to 
implement treatment directives could be viewed as predictions requiring testing 
through behavioural experiments. When assigning and reviewing treatment 
recommendations (homework), pro-compliance behaviours (e.g., partial attempts) 
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could be highlighted as evidence to contradict patients’ negative predictions to instil 
treatment self-efficacy. Principles of graduated exposure would also apply whereby 
treatment directives could be graded in difficulty to promote early successes to 
further increase treatment self-efficacy. 
In addition to verbal persuasion, which is deemed only as strong as the 
patient’s confidence in the clinician, another method for enhancing treatment self-
efficacy may involve using successfully treated past patients. These ex-patients could 
function as guest speakers during early sessions of group CBT where their treatment 
experiences are discussed with group members. This vicarious experience may boost 
patients’ treatment self-efficacy by encouraging them to think, “If they can do it, so 
can I”. Indeed, the United Kingdom National Health Service developed the Expert 
Patients Programme, a self-management support group for individuals with chronic 
diseases run exclusively by ex-patients that effectively improved treatment self-
efficacy and problems solving skills (Kennedy et al., 2007; Kennedy, Rogers, & 
Gately, 2005). In addition, an earlier study by Verinis (1970) examined perceptions 
of ex-patients as lay therapists in a group therapy program and found they were rated 
as very helpful by patients. He argued ex-patients provide inspiration and model 
appropriate behaviour more effectively than professionally trained therapists.  
 
Expectancies of Treatment Outcome 
 Exploratory analyses revealed that treatment outcome expectancies assessed 
prior to CBT were not associated with Panic-Ag treatment outcomes. As previous 
research reported outcome expectancies assessed early in treatment are predictive of 
clinical improvement, the present findings suggest pretreatment outcome 
expectancies are not rigidly maintained but responsive to information presented early 
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in therapy that confirms or confutes original beliefs. Hence, pretreatment counselling 
to raise outcome expectancies for patients with negative beliefs about treatment 
helpfulness is unnecessary. Nevertheless, given research highlighting associations 
between outcome and treatment expectancies assessed within the first few therapy 
sessions, attending to factors contributing to poor outcome expectancies early in 
therapy is still warranted. 
 
Methodological Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, small sample sizes limit the 
generalisability of findings. The absence of pretreatment data for Sample C 
prevented some findings obtained with Sample B from being replicated, although 
results for treatment self-efficacy and acceptance of the treatment rationale were 
generally consistent between the two samples. Studies using larger samples are 
required to replicate observed findings. In addition, larger samples would generate 
greater power allowing for multivariate statistical analyses. 
Second, although the reliability and validity of the knowledge and belief 
measures were satisfactory using data from Sample B, and similar reliability 
estimates were found for Sample C, additional work is needed to cross-validate the 
psychometric properties of these measures using larger independent samples. Cross 
validation is particularly important because Sample B data was used throughout 
multiple phases of the study, from development and refinement of measures, 
examination of psychometric properties, to analysis of relationships with treatment 
outcome. Moreover, as previously discussed, Sample B was a higher functioning 
sample that represented only half of the eligible Panic-Ag patients referred to the 
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clinic, hence the psychometric properties of the knowledge and belief scales cannot 
be generalised to the wider Panic-Ag population.  
Third, concurrent assessments of knowledge, beliefs and Panic-Ag severity 
and the correlational design of the study limit interpretation of causal relationships. 
As previously mentioned, multiple assessments of treatment knowledge and beliefs 
during treatment would allow more detailed analysis to determine directions of 
causality.  
Fourth, the order of measures administered to participants was not 
counterbalanced. Intelligence tests were administered prior to assessment of 
participants’ knowledge, which in turn were administered prior to assessment of 
beliefs. Administration of the intelligence tests may have increased participants’ 
anxiety which potentially could have affected performance on the treatment 
knowledge tests. Furthermore, completion of the knowledge measures may have 
influenced participants’ treatment beliefs in some way. The issue of counterbalancing 
therefore needs to be addressed in future research. 
Finally, treatment compliance was not assessed in this study. As previously 
stated, it would be important for future researchers investigating relationships 
between treatment knowledge, beliefs and outcome to include measures of treatment 
compliance to determine whether such relationships are mediated via patients’ 
compliance with treatment recommendations.  
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Conclusions 
The present study found patients’ treatment knowledge and treatment self-
efficacy were significantly associated with several aspects of Panic-Ag outcome. 
Belief in catastrophic cognitions partially mediated relationships between treatment 
self-efficacy and outcome, suggesting improved confidence in implementing 
treatment was useful in decreasing catastrophic beliefs which in turn reduced Panic-
Ag symptoms.  Acceptance of the treatment rationale as assessed in the present study 
and pretreatment outcome expectancies were unrelated to Panic-Ag severity. 
The measures developed in this thesis and the obtained findings may have 
clinical value by assisting clinicians in identifying patients with insufficient 
knowledge and/or poor confidence in following treatment recommendations who 
consequently may be at risk of unintentional and intentional non-compliance and 
poor clinical outcomes. Future research using larger representative samples of Panic-
Ag patients is required to further assess the measures’ psychometric properties so as 
to strengthen their clinical utility.  
Although causal relationships cannot be ascertained, this study represents the 
first step in investigating patient knowledge and beliefs as means for improving 
treatment outcomes for Panic-Ag and paves the way for exciting new research 
examining associations with treatment compliance as a potential mediator of these 
relationships. Furthermore, in light of the findings obtained in this thesis, future 
research could also explore relationships between treatment knowledge, self-efficacy 
and outcome for other anxiety and related psychological disorders in an effort to 
enhance patient outcomes following CBT.  
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Appendix A - 39-item Draft Multiple-Choice Knowledge 
Questionnaire 
 
Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia Knowledge Scale 
 
1. Title 
 Clinical Psychologist 
 Other (please specify) __________________________________________ 
 
2. Years of clinical experience ________________ 
 
3. Self-rated level of expertise with CBT for Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia (PD-Ag) 
 Very low (I would not feel at all confident in treating a person with PD-Ag) 
 Low 
 Medium 
 High 
 Very High (I would feel very confident in treating a person with PD-Ag) 
 
 
Instructions for participants 
 
Below are a number of multiple-choice questions designed to assess patient knowledge of 
the fundamental principles underlying cognitive behaviour therapy for Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia (PD-Ag). Please read each question carefully and using the scales provided 
please rate: 
a) The relevance of each question to the cognitive behavioural treatment of PD-Ag 
b) The comprehensibility or wording of each question and its respective answers (please 
feel free to make changes to the wording of items as you see fit.) 
c) Whether or not you agree with the answer provided (answer highlighted in italics). 
 
Relevance 
0 1 2 
Not at all relevant to the 
treatment of PD-Ag 
 
 Very relevant to the 
treatment of PD-Ag 
Comprehensibility 
0 1 2 
Difficult for patients 
to understand 
 
 Easy for patients  
to understand 
Agreement 
Yes  No 
I agree with the answer 
provided 
 I do not agree with the 
answer provided 
 
 
There is space in each question for you to make additional comments or suggestions if you 
wish. 
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m
p
to
m
 o
f 
h
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
?
 
a
. 
C
h
e
s
t 
p
a
in
 
b
. 
F
e
e
lin
g
 o
f 
c
h
o
k
in
g
 o
r 
b
e
in
g
 s
m
o
th
e
re
d
 
c
. 
T
in
g
lin
g
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 (
e
.g
.,
 i
n
 t
h
e
 h
a
n
d
s
 a
n
d
 f
e
e
t)
 
d
. 
S
o
re
 t
h
ro
a
t 
e
. 
M
u
s
c
le
 s
ti
ff
n
e
s
s
 
f.
 
D
o
n
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2
) 
In
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
a
 h
is
to
ry
 o
f 
s
u
c
h
 p
ro
b
le
m
s
, 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 
li
k
e
ly
 t
o
 c
a
u
s
e
 
a
. 
H
e
a
rt
 d
is
e
a
s
e
 o
r 
h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 
b
. 
S
tr
o
k
e
 
c
. 
In
s
a
n
it
y
 o
r 
m
e
n
ta
l 
ill
n
e
s
s
 (
e
.g
.,
 s
c
h
iz
o
p
h
re
n
ia
) 
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
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 C
o
m
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e
n
ts
 
 
R
e
le
v
a
n
c
e
 t
o
 
th
e
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re
a
tm
e
n
t 
o
f 
P
D
-A
g
 
 
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
s
ib
il
it
y
 
o
f 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
a
n
s
w
e
rs
 
 
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
s
w
e
r  
1
3
) 
W
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
fa
in
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 i
s
 
m
o
s
t 
c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
A
 s
u
d
d
e
n
 d
ro
p
 i
n
 b
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 i
s
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 t
o
 f
a
in
t.
 B
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 d
ro
p
s
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
p
a
n
ic
, 
s
o
 y
o
u
’r
e
 m
o
re
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 f
a
in
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
b
. 
A
 s
u
d
d
e
n
 d
ro
p
 i
n
 b
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 i
s
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 t
o
 f
a
in
t.
 B
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 r
is
e
s
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 p
a
n
ic
, 
s
o
 y
o
u
’r
e
 l
e
s
s
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 f
a
in
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
c
. 
A
 s
u
d
d
e
n
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
 i
n
 b
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 i
n
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 t
o
 f
a
in
t.
 B
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 r
is
e
s
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 p
a
n
ic
 s
o
 y
o
u
’r
e
 m
o
re
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 f
a
in
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
d
. 
A
 s
u
d
d
e
n
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
 i
n
 b
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 i
s
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 t
o
 f
a
in
t.
 B
lo
o
d
 p
re
s
s
u
re
 d
ro
p
s
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 p
a
n
ic
, 
s
o
 y
o
u
’r
e
 l
e
s
s
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 f
a
in
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
e
. 
D
iz
z
in
e
s
s
 a
n
d
 f
e
e
lin
g
 l
ig
h
th
e
a
d
e
d
 a
re
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 o
f 
a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
If
 y
o
u
 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 t
h
e
s
e
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 i
t 
m
e
a
n
s
 y
o
u
 a
re
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 
fa
in
t.
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) 
W
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 r
e
g
a
rd
in
g
 h
e
a
rt
 d
is
e
a
s
e
 a
n
d
 p
a
n
ic
 
a
tt
a
c
k
s
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
T
h
e
 c
h
e
s
t 
p
a
in
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 i
s
 i
n
d
is
ti
n
g
u
is
h
a
b
le
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e
 c
h
e
s
t 
p
a
in
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s
 o
f 
s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
. 
b
. 
S
y
m
p
to
m
s
 o
f 
b
re
a
th
le
s
s
n
e
s
s
 a
n
d
 c
h
e
s
t 
p
a
in
 c
a
n
 o
c
c
u
r 
d
u
ri
n
g
 b
o
th
 a
 h
e
a
rt
 
a
tt
a
c
k
 a
n
d
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
b
u
t 
h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 t
e
n
d
 t
o
 b
e
 r
e
la
te
d
 t
o
 
e
ff
o
rt
 a
n
d
 w
il
l 
g
o
 a
w
a
y
 o
n
c
e
 y
o
u
 r
e
s
t 
w
h
e
re
a
s
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 o
f 
a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 c
a
n
 
h
a
p
p
e
n
 a
t 
a
n
y
 t
im
e
. 
c
. 
A
n
 E
C
G
 (
e
le
c
tr
o
c
a
rd
io
g
ra
m
) 
is
 a
n
 i
n
s
tr
u
m
e
n
t 
u
s
e
d
 t
o
 d
e
te
c
t 
th
e
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
a
 
h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
If
 t
h
e
 E
C
G
 w
a
s
 c
o
n
d
u
c
te
d
 a
ft
e
r 
th
e
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 h
a
d
 f
in
is
h
e
d
, 
it
 w
ill
 n
o
t 
b
e
 a
b
le
 t
o
 d
e
te
c
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
a
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
 h
a
d
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
d
. 
 
d
. 
T
h
e
 h
e
a
rt
 i
s
 n
o
t 
d
e
s
ig
n
e
d
 t
o
 c
o
p
e
 w
it
h
 e
x
tr
e
m
e
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 p
a
n
ic
. 
P
ro
lo
n
g
e
d
 
p
e
ri
o
d
s
 o
f 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 c
a
u
s
e
 s
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 t
o
 t
h
e
 h
e
a
rt
 r
e
s
u
lt
in
g
 i
n
 h
e
a
rt
 d
is
e
a
s
e
. 
e
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
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5
) 
W
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
h
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t 
a
. 
H
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
ib
le
 f
o
r 
m
a
n
y
 o
f 
th
e
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
It
 i
s
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
to
 d
e
lib
e
ra
te
ly
 s
lo
w
 d
o
w
n
 y
o
u
r 
b
re
a
th
in
g
 r
a
te
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 i
n
 o
rd
e
r 
to
 p
re
v
e
n
t 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 t
e
rr
ib
le
 f
ro
m
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
 (
e
.g
.,
 c
o
lla
p
s
e
, 
s
tr
o
k
e
, 
h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
lo
s
in
g
 c
o
n
tr
o
l)
 a
s
 h
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 i
f 
u
n
c
o
n
tr
o
lle
d
. 
b
. 
T
h
e
 f
ig
h
t 
o
r 
fl
ig
h
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 i
s
 a
n
 i
n
b
u
il
t 
s
u
rv
iv
a
l 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 t
h
a
t 
p
ro
te
c
ts
 y
o
u
 
fr
o
m
 d
a
n
g
e
r.
 H
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 a
n
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 f
ig
h
t 
o
r 
fl
ig
h
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
 i
s
 n
o
t 
d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
. 
T
h
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 p
ro
d
u
c
e
d
 b
y
 
h
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 a
re
 i
n
te
n
s
e
 a
n
d
 u
n
p
le
a
s
a
n
t 
b
u
t 
c
o
m
p
le
te
ly
 h
a
rm
le
s
s
. 
c
. 
H
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 a
n
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 f
ig
h
t 
o
r 
fl
ig
h
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
 i
s
 
n
o
t 
d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
. 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r 
if
 t
h
e
 f
ig
h
t 
o
r 
fl
ig
h
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 i
s
 a
c
ti
v
a
te
d
 a
t 
th
e
 w
ro
n
g
 t
im
e
, 
h
y
p
e
rv
e
n
ti
la
ti
n
g
 c
a
u
s
e
s
 i
n
te
n
s
e
 p
h
y
s
ic
a
l 
s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
 t
h
a
t 
m
a
y
 r
e
s
u
lt
 i
n
 p
h
y
s
ic
a
l 
a
n
d
/o
r 
m
e
n
ta
l 
h
a
rm
. 
d
. 
a
 a
n
d
 b
 
e
. 
a
 a
n
d
 c
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) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 b
e
s
t 
e
x
p
la
in
s
 
th
e
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
, 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
n
d
 f
e
e
li
n
g
?
  
a
. 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 f
e
e
lin
g
s
. 
T
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
lin
g
s
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 t
h
e
 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
. 
b
. 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
n
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 f
e
e
lin
g
s
. 
T
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
lin
g
s
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 t
h
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
. 
c
. 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
n
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 f
e
e
li
n
g
s
. 
T
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
li
n
g
s
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
. 
d
. 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 f
e
e
lin
g
s
 a
n
d
 f
e
e
lin
g
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
. 
T
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
lin
g
s
. 
e
. 
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
n
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 f
e
e
lin
g
s
. 
T
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
lin
g
s
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 t
h
in
k
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
ly
. 
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7
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 i
s
 N
O
T
 c
o
rr
e
c
t 
a
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 t
h
a
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 y
o
u
’ll
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 f
e
a
rf
u
l 
o
f 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 w
ill
 b
e
 m
o
re
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 h
a
v
e
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 f
u
tu
re
. 
b
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 t
h
a
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 u
n
p
le
a
s
a
n
t 
b
u
t 
c
o
m
p
le
te
ly
 h
a
rm
le
s
s
, 
y
o
u
’ll
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
 l
e
s
s
 f
e
a
rf
u
l 
o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
n
d
 w
ill
 b
e
 l
e
s
s
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 t
h
e
m
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
fu
tu
re
. 
c
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 y
o
u
’ll
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 f
e
a
rf
u
l 
o
f 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
w
ill
 w
a
n
t 
to
 a
v
o
id
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 t
h
a
t 
a
re
 a
s
s
o
c
ia
te
d
 w
it
h
 s
u
c
h
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
. 
d
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 y
o
u
’ll
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 f
e
a
rf
u
l 
o
f 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
w
ill
 w
a
n
t 
to
 a
v
o
id
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 t
h
a
t 
tr
ig
g
e
r 
s
u
c
h
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 (
e
.g
.,
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
, 
d
ri
n
k
in
g
 
c
a
ff
e
in
e
 e
tc
) 
e
. 
It
 i
s
 h
e
lp
fu
l 
to
 t
h
in
k
 t
h
a
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 a
s
 i
t 
m
a
k
e
s
 y
o
u
 r
e
s
p
o
n
d
 
in
 a
 w
a
y
 t
h
a
t 
k
e
e
p
s
 y
o
u
 s
a
fe
 f
ro
m
 d
a
n
g
e
r 
(e
.g
.,
 d
y
in
g
, 
g
o
in
g
 c
ra
z
y
).
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g
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h
 a
n
s
w
e
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8
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 d
is
o
rd
e
r 
a
n
d
 a
g
o
ra
p
h
o
b
ia
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 a
im
e
d
 a
t 
e
lim
in
a
ti
n
g
 p
a
n
ic
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 i
f 
y
o
u
 d
id
n
’t
 
h
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 y
o
u
’d
 s
to
p
 f
e
e
lin
g
 a
n
x
io
u
s
. 
b
. 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 a
im
e
d
 a
t 
c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 
d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 a
s
 l
o
ts
 o
f 
n
o
rm
a
l 
a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 a
n
d
 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 (
e
.g
.,
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
, 
in
te
n
s
e
 e
m
o
ti
o
n
s
) 
tr
ig
g
e
r 
s
im
il
a
r 
s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
s
 
p
a
rt
 o
f 
e
v
e
ry
 d
a
y
 l
if
e
. 
c
. 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
s
h
o
u
ld
 n
o
t 
b
e
 a
im
e
d
 a
t 
c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
, 
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 
c
a
n
 c
o
m
e
 o
n
 o
u
t 
o
f 
th
e
 b
lu
e
 e
v
e
n
 w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
’r
e
 n
o
t 
th
in
k
in
g
. 
d
. 
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
s
h
o
u
ld
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
 r
e
la
x
a
ti
o
n
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
s
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 
c
a
u
s
e
d
 b
y
 e
x
c
e
s
s
iv
e
 s
tr
e
s
s
. 
e
. 
P
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 t
h
e
 r
e
s
u
lt
 o
f 
a
 c
h
e
m
ic
a
l 
im
b
a
la
n
c
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 b
ra
in
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
 
tr
e
a
tm
e
n
t 
s
h
o
u
ld
 a
lw
a
y
s
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
 m
e
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
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9
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
to
 r
e
d
u
c
e
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
r 
o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 
a
n
d
 p
a
n
ic
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
: 
 
a
. 
Y
o
u
 m
u
s
t 
fi
rs
tl
y
 s
lo
w
 d
o
w
n
 y
o
u
r 
b
re
a
th
in
g
 t
o
 r
e
d
u
c
e
 t
h
e
 i
n
te
n
s
it
y
 o
f 
th
e
 
s
y
m
p
to
m
s
. 
b
. 
Y
o
u
 m
u
s
t 
p
ra
c
ti
c
e
 r
e
la
x
a
ti
o
n
 e
x
e
rc
is
e
s
 r
e
g
u
la
rl
y
 t
o
 r
e
d
u
c
e
 t
h
e
 s
tr
e
s
s
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
(t
h
e
 f
ig
h
t 
o
r 
fl
ig
h
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
).
 
c
. 
Y
o
u
 m
u
s
t 
fi
rs
tl
y
 i
d
e
n
ti
fy
 t
h
e
 u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
th
a
t 
is
 c
a
u
s
in
g
 y
o
u
 t
o
 b
e
 
fe
a
rf
u
l 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
n
 c
o
ll
e
c
t 
e
v
id
e
n
c
e
 t
o
 t
e
s
t 
o
u
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
o
r 
n
o
t 
th
e
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
is
 t
ru
e
. 
d
. 
Y
o
u
 m
u
s
t 
p
ro
b
e
 i
n
to
 y
o
u
r 
p
a
s
t 
to
 d
is
c
o
v
e
r 
is
s
u
e
s
 f
ro
m
 y
o
u
r 
e
a
rl
y
 c
h
ild
h
o
o
d
 t
h
a
t 
w
ill
 e
x
p
la
in
 t
h
e
 r
o
o
t 
o
f 
y
o
u
r 
fe
a
r.
 
e
. 
Y
o
u
 m
u
s
t 
le
a
rn
 t
o
 i
d
e
n
ti
fy
 y
o
u
r 
p
a
tt
e
rn
s
 o
f 
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 t
h
in
k
in
g
 a
n
d
 s
u
b
s
ti
tu
te
 t
h
e
m
 
w
it
h
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 t
h
in
k
in
g
. 
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) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
n
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 i
s
 N
O
T
 
c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
A
ll 
p
e
o
p
le
 w
it
h
 p
a
n
ic
 d
is
o
rd
e
r 
o
r 
a
g
o
ra
p
h
o
b
ia
 h
a
v
e
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
ir
 p
a
n
ic
 
s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 b
e
in
g
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 i
n
 s
o
m
e
 w
a
y
 (
e
it
h
e
r 
p
h
y
s
ic
a
lly
 o
r 
p
s
y
c
h
o
lo
g
ic
a
lly
 
d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
).
 
b
. 
T
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 k
e
e
p
 t
h
e
 f
e
a
r 
o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 
a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
liv
e
. 
c
. 
P
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 c
a
n
 c
o
m
e
 o
n
 s
o
 q
u
ic
k
ly
, 
e
v
e
n
 “
o
u
t 
o
f 
th
e
 b
lu
e
,”
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
re
’s
 n
o
 
ti
m
e
 f
o
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
. 
T
h
is
 m
e
a
n
s
 t
h
a
t 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
re
n
’t
 a
lw
a
y
s
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
d
. 
d
. 
If
 y
o
u
 d
o
n
’t
 h
a
v
e
 a
n
y
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
y
o
u
r 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
, 
it
 m
e
a
n
s
 t
h
a
t 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 
a
re
 n
o
t 
in
v
o
lv
e
d
. 
 
e
. 
c
 a
n
d
 d
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1
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
if
 y
o
u
’r
e
 h
a
v
in
g
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
y
 i
d
e
n
ti
fy
in
g
 
y
o
u
r 
u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
C
 
a
. 
It
 m
e
a
n
s
 t
h
e
re
 a
re
 s
im
p
ly
 n
o
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 t
h
e
re
 a
n
d
 a
 m
e
d
ic
a
l 
e
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 i
s
 
re
q
u
ir
e
d
 t
o
 e
x
p
la
in
 t
h
e
 c
a
u
s
e
 o
f 
y
o
u
r 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
n
d
 a
n
x
ie
ty
. 
 
b
. 
It
’s
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 p
a
n
ic
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 a
u
to
m
a
ti
c
a
lly
 a
s
s
o
c
ia
te
d
 w
it
h
 d
a
n
g
e
r,
 s
o
 
th
a
t 
y
o
u
 r
e
s
p
o
n
d
 w
it
h
 f
e
a
r 
to
 t
h
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
n
e
e
d
in
g
 t
o
 a
c
tu
a
lly
 h
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 
th
o
u
g
h
t 
th
a
t 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
 i
s
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
. 
c
. 
Y
o
u
 c
a
n
 r
e
p
e
a
te
d
ly
 a
s
k
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 w
h
a
t 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 s
o
 b
a
d
 i
f 
th
e
 w
o
rs
t 
th
in
g
 
h
a
p
p
e
n
e
d
 u
n
ti
l 
y
o
u
 g
e
t 
to
 t
h
e
 c
o
re
 o
f 
th
e
 p
ro
b
le
m
 (
e
.g
.,
 I
f 
th
a
t 
h
a
p
p
e
n
e
d
 w
h
a
t 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 s
o
 b
a
d
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
a
t?
 A
n
d
 i
f 
th
a
t 
h
a
p
p
e
n
e
d
, 
w
h
a
t 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 s
o
 b
a
d
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
a
t?
).
 
d
. 
Y
o
u
 c
a
n
 o
b
s
e
rv
e
 y
o
u
r 
o
w
n
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
’r
e
 a
n
x
io
u
s
 t
o
 l
o
o
k
 f
o
r 
c
lu
e
s
 t
h
a
t 
w
o
u
ld
 h
e
lp
 t
o
 e
x
p
la
in
 t
h
e
 u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t.
 
e
. 
b
, 
c
 a
n
d
 d
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B
T
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 y
o
u
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e
 f
e
e
li
n
g
 a
n
x
io
u
s
 i
n
 a
 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
h
a
t 
m
o
s
t 
p
e
o
p
le
 d
o
n
’t
 f
in
d
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 (
e
.g
.,
 c
a
tc
h
in
g
 
p
u
b
li
c
 t
ra
n
s
p
o
rt
 o
r 
w
a
it
in
g
 i
n
 a
 l
in
e
),
 i
t 
is
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 m
e
a
n
: 
a
. 
Y
o
u
 b
e
lie
v
e
 t
h
e
re
 i
s
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
 o
r 
s
c
a
ry
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
y
o
u
 
b
. 
Y
o
u
r 
b
e
lie
fs
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 a
re
 n
o
t 
b
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 t
h
e
 r
e
a
lit
y
 o
f 
th
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 
c
. 
Y
o
u
 a
re
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 b
e
 o
v
e
re
s
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 l
ik
e
lih
o
o
d
 o
f 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 b
a
d
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
 
d
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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3
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
  
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 a
re
 a
 m
e
th
o
d
 f
o
r 
te
s
ti
n
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
. 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
 p
u
tt
in
g
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 i
n
 a
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
e
s
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
o
r 
n
o
t 
y
o
u
r 
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
a
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 i
s
 t
ru
e
. 
a
. 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
 s
u
b
je
c
ti
n
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 t
o
 r
e
a
lit
y
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 
a
re
 a
n
 e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 m
e
th
o
d
 f
o
r 
m
a
k
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 m
o
re
 r
e
a
lis
ti
c
. 
b
. 
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 a
re
 a
n
 e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 w
a
y
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
fe
e
lin
g
s
 a
n
d
 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r.
 
c
. 
P
e
o
p
le
 w
it
h
 p
a
n
ic
 d
is
o
rd
e
r 
o
r 
a
g
o
ra
p
h
o
b
ia
 s
h
o
u
ld
 a
v
o
id
 c
o
n
d
u
c
ti
n
g
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
ts
 a
s
 i
t 
c
o
u
ld
 r
e
s
u
lt
 i
n
 s
e
ri
o
u
s
 h
a
rm
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
s
tr
o
k
e
, 
in
s
a
n
it
y
, 
fa
in
ti
n
g
) 
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
a
 a
n
d
 b
 o
n
ly
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2
4
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 i
s
 
c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
T
h
e
 p
u
rp
o
s
e
 b
e
h
in
d
 c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 i
s
 t
o
 h
e
lp
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
ly
 a
b
o
u
t 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
ly
, 
y
o
u
 w
o
n
’t
 f
e
e
l 
a
n
x
io
u
s
 i
n
 f
e
a
re
d
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
b
. 
T
h
e
 p
u
rp
o
s
e
 b
e
h
in
d
 c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 i
s
 t
o
 h
e
lp
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 
re
a
li
s
ti
c
a
ll
y
 a
b
o
u
t 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 r
e
a
li
s
ti
c
a
ll
y
, 
y
o
u
r 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
 w
il
l 
b
e
 
a
p
p
ro
p
ri
a
te
 f
o
r 
th
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
. 
c
. 
T
h
e
 p
u
rp
o
s
e
 b
e
h
in
d
 c
h
a
n
g
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 i
s
 t
o
 h
e
lp
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
ly
 
a
b
o
u
t 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
If
 y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
ly
, 
y
o
u
 w
ill
 b
e
 p
re
p
a
re
d
 f
o
r 
th
e
 w
o
rs
t 
w
h
ic
h
 
w
ill
 h
e
lp
 y
o
u
 r
e
s
p
o
n
d
 q
u
ic
k
ly
 i
f 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 t
e
rr
ib
le
 h
a
p
p
e
n
s
. 
 
d
. 
T
h
e
re
’s
 n
o
 p
o
in
t 
tr
y
in
g
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
re
 
u
n
c
o
n
tr
o
lla
b
le
. 
e
. 
If
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 h
a
v
e
 b
e
e
n
 a
ro
u
n
d
 f
o
r 
a
 l
o
n
g
 t
im
e
 t
h
e
y
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 a
 b
a
d
 h
a
b
it
 
a
n
d
 c
a
n
n
o
t 
b
e
 c
h
a
n
g
e
d
. 
f.
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5
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
“
O
v
e
re
s
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
”
 
re
fe
rs
 t
o
: 
 
a
. 
T
h
in
k
in
g
 a
b
o
u
t 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 t
h
a
t 
h
a
s
 h
a
p
p
e
n
e
d
 a
n
d
 m
a
k
in
g
 i
t 
o
u
t 
to
 b
e
 m
u
c
h
 
w
o
rs
e
 t
h
a
n
 i
t 
is
 i
n
 r
e
a
lit
y
. 
b
. 
T
h
in
k
in
g
 t
h
a
t 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 i
s
 v
e
ry
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 w
h
e
n
 i
n
 r
e
a
li
ty
 i
t 
is
 v
e
ry
 
u
n
li
k
e
ly
 t
o
 o
c
c
u
r.
 
c
. 
E
x
a
g
g
e
ra
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
r 
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
a
n
 e
v
e
n
t.
 
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
b
 a
n
d
 c
 
f.
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6
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
“
O
v
e
re
s
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 c
o
s
t”
 r
e
fe
rs
 t
o
: 
a
. 
T
h
in
k
in
g
 t
h
a
t 
s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 b
a
d
 w
ill
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 w
h
e
n
 i
n
 r
e
a
lit
y
 t
h
is
 i
s
 v
e
ry
 u
n
lik
e
ly
 t
o
 
o
c
c
u
r.
 
b
. 
B
e
lie
v
in
g
 t
h
a
t 
if
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 w
a
s
 t
o
 o
c
c
u
r 
it
 w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 a
 d
is
a
s
te
r 
w
h
e
n
 i
n
 
re
a
lit
y
 t
h
e
 c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
th
a
t 
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 e
v
e
n
t 
h
a
s
 l
it
tl
e
 o
r 
n
o
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
n
 y
o
u
r 
lif
e
. 
c
. 
B
lo
w
in
g
 t
h
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
r 
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 e
v
e
n
ts
 o
u
t 
o
f 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
. 
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
b
 a
n
d
 c
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) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
if
 y
o
u
 a
re
 v
e
ry
 f
e
a
rf
u
l 
o
f 
h
a
v
in
g
 a
 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 i
n
 p
u
b
li
c
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 y
o
u
 b
e
li
e
v
e
 t
h
a
t 
s
tr
a
n
g
e
rs
 w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 
th
in
k
in
g
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
ly
 o
f 
y
o
u
, 
th
e
 b
e
s
t 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 f
o
r 
o
v
e
rc
o
m
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
n
 t
h
is
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 t
o
: 
 
a
. 
L
o
o
k
 f
o
r 
c
le
a
r 
e
v
id
e
n
c
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 s
tr
a
n
g
e
rs
’ 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
th
a
t 
w
o
u
ld
 e
it
h
e
r 
c
o
n
fi
rm
 o
r 
d
is
p
ro
v
e
 y
o
u
r 
b
e
lie
f 
s
o
 t
h
a
t 
y
o
u
 c
a
n
 l
e
a
rn
 w
h
e
th
e
r 
o
r 
n
o
t 
y
o
u
r 
b
e
lie
f 
is
 a
c
tu
a
lly
 
tr
u
e
. 
 
b
. 
E
x
a
m
in
e
 t
h
e
 c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
th
e
ir
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 o
p
in
io
n
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
lif
e
 a
n
d
 p
u
t 
th
e
ir
 
o
p
in
io
n
 i
n
 p
e
rs
p
e
c
ti
v
e
 w
it
h
 o
th
e
r 
b
a
d
 t
h
in
g
s
 t
h
a
t 
c
o
u
ld
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
a
v
in
g
 a
 
c
a
r 
a
c
c
id
e
n
t,
 b
e
c
o
m
in
g
 a
 p
a
ra
p
le
g
ic
, 
y
o
u
r 
fa
m
ily
 b
e
in
g
 k
ill
e
d
).
 
c
. 
T
e
ll 
y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 t
h
a
t 
y
o
u
 d
o
n
’t
 c
a
re
 w
h
a
t 
p
e
o
p
le
 t
h
in
k
 o
f 
y
o
u
 e
v
e
n
 i
f 
y
o
u
 d
o
 c
a
re
 
(i
.e
. 
th
in
k
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
ly
).
  
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
a
 a
n
d
 b
 
f.
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8
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
to
 m
a
n
a
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
n
 a
 
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 w
a
it
in
g
 i
n
 a
 l
in
e
, 
e
x
e
rc
is
e
, 
d
ri
v
in
g
 i
n
 t
ra
ff
ic
),
 i
t’
s
 
b
e
s
t 
to
: 
a
. 
U
s
e
 p
o
s
it
iv
e
 s
e
lf
-t
a
lk
 (
e
.g
.,
 “
D
o
n
’t
 w
o
rr
y
, 
e
v
e
ry
th
in
g
’s
 f
in
e
”)
. 
b
. 
A
v
o
id
 o
r 
le
a
v
e
 t
h
e
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
 c
a
s
e
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 t
e
rr
ib
le
 h
a
p
p
e
n
s
. 
c
. 
H
a
v
e
 s
o
m
e
o
n
e
 a
ro
u
n
d
 t
h
a
t 
c
a
n
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 o
r 
h
e
lp
 y
o
u
, 
o
r 
c
a
rr
y
 s
o
m
e
th
in
g
 w
it
h
 
y
o
u
 t
o
 k
e
e
p
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 s
a
fe
 (
e
.g
.,
 m
o
b
ile
 p
h
o
n
e
, 
m
e
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
, 
b
o
tt
le
 o
f 
w
a
te
r)
. 
d
. 
A
ll 
o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 i
s
 a
 f
o
rm
 o
f 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
?
  
a
. 
R
u
s
h
in
g
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 t
h
e
 s
h
o
p
p
in
g
 c
e
n
tr
e
 t
o
 g
e
t 
to
 t
h
e
 c
a
r 
o
r 
o
u
ts
id
e
 a
s
 s
o
o
n
 a
s
 
p
o
s
s
ib
le
 f
o
r 
fe
a
r 
o
f 
h
a
v
in
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
 
b
. 
R
e
ly
in
g
 o
n
 a
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 p
e
rs
o
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 s
p
o
u
s
e
, 
p
a
re
n
t,
 c
h
ild
, 
fr
ie
n
d
) 
to
 a
c
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
y
o
u
 t
o
 p
la
c
e
s
 t
h
a
t 
y
o
u
 f
e
a
r 
m
a
y
 t
ri
g
g
e
r 
a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
c
. 
D
e
c
lin
in
g
 a
 s
o
c
ia
l 
in
v
it
a
ti
o
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 a
 p
a
rt
y
) 
fo
r 
fe
a
r 
o
f 
h
a
v
in
g
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
. 
d
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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0
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 i
s
 a
 f
o
rm
 o
f 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
?
  
a
. 
N
o
t 
e
n
g
a
g
in
g
 i
n
 p
h
y
s
ic
a
l 
e
x
e
rt
io
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 l
if
ti
n
g
 h
e
a
v
y
 o
b
je
c
ts
, 
ru
n
n
in
g
 u
p
 t
h
e
 
s
ta
ir
s
, 
s
e
x
u
a
l 
a
c
ti
v
it
y
) 
fo
r 
fe
a
r 
o
f 
tr
ig
g
e
ri
n
g
 p
a
n
ic
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s
 
b
. 
D
is
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 t
o
 a
v
o
id
 b
ri
n
g
in
g
 o
n
 a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 
c
. 
C
a
rr
y
in
g
 l
o
lli
e
s
, 
m
in
ts
, 
s
n
a
c
k
s
 o
r 
a
 b
o
tt
le
 o
f 
w
a
te
r 
w
it
h
 y
o
u
 a
ll 
th
e
 t
im
e
 i
n
 c
a
s
e
 
y
o
u
 f
e
e
l 
a
n
x
io
u
s
 o
r 
p
a
n
ic
k
y
. 
d
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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1
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 i
s
 a
 s
a
fe
ty
 
s
e
e
k
in
g
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r?
  
a
. 
S
lo
w
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
b
re
a
th
in
g
 t
o
 p
re
v
e
n
t 
a
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
 f
ro
m
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
. 
b
. 
C
a
rr
y
in
g
 (
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
a
c
tu
a
lly
 t
a
k
in
g
) 
a
n
ti
-a
n
x
ie
ty
 m
e
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 y
o
u
 w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 
e
n
te
r 
a
n
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
. 
 
c
. 
C
a
rr
y
in
g
 a
 p
a
p
e
r 
b
a
g
 
d
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
e
. 
N
o
n
e
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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P
D
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C
o
m
p
re
h
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n
s
ib
il
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y
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q
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s
ti
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 a
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w
e
rs
 
 
A
g
re
e
m
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n
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
s
w
e
r  
3
2
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
s
a
fe
ty
 s
e
e
k
in
g
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
rs
 i
s
 N
O
T
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
  
U
s
in
g
 a
 s
a
fe
ty
 s
e
e
k
in
g
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 a
re
 i
n
 a
n
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
: 
a
. 
is
 a
 h
e
lp
fu
l 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 t
o
 o
v
e
rc
o
m
in
g
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
s
 i
t 
s
e
rv
e
s
 t
o
 p
re
v
e
n
t 
th
e
 
te
rr
ib
le
 t
h
in
g
 f
ro
m
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
fa
in
ti
n
g
, 
e
m
b
a
rr
a
s
s
in
g
 
s
e
lf
 i
n
 p
u
b
li
c
) 
b
. 
is
 a
 f
o
rm
 o
f 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
  
c
. 
s
to
p
s
 y
o
u
 f
ro
m
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 o
u
t 
y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
  
d
. 
k
e
e
p
s
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
 a
liv
e
 
e
. 
is
 a
 p
ro
b
le
m
 b
e
c
a
u
s
e
 i
f 
th
e
 b
a
d
 t
h
in
g
 d
id
n
’t
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
lo
s
s
 o
f 
c
o
n
tr
o
l,
 f
a
in
ti
n
g
 e
tc
),
 y
o
u
 s
ti
ll 
b
e
lie
v
e
 i
t 
w
o
u
ld
 h
a
v
e
 h
a
p
p
e
n
e
d
 i
f 
y
o
u
 h
a
d
n
’t
 u
s
e
d
 
th
e
 s
a
fe
ty
 s
e
e
k
in
g
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r.
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1 
 C
o
m
m
e
n
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R
e
le
v
a
n
c
e
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e
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a
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e
n
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o
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P
D
-A
g
 
 
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
s
ib
il
it
y
 
o
f 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
a
n
s
w
e
rs
 
 
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
s
w
e
r  
3
3
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
  
a
. 
W
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 a
v
o
id
 a
n
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
, 
y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 l
e
v
e
l 
ra
p
id
ly
 
d
e
c
re
a
s
e
s
. 
Y
o
u
 l
e
a
rn
 t
h
a
t 
it
 f
e
e
ls
 g
o
o
d
 t
o
 a
v
o
id
 a
n
d
 s
o
 y
o
u
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
 t
o
 a
v
o
id
 
w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 f
in
d
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 f
a
c
e
d
 w
it
h
 s
im
ila
r 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
In
 t
h
is
 w
a
y
, 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 
re
in
fo
rc
e
s
 o
r 
s
tr
e
n
g
th
e
n
s
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
. 
b
. 
A
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 q
u
ic
k
ly
 r
e
d
u
c
e
s
 y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 c
a
n
 p
re
v
e
n
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 f
ro
m
 
o
c
c
u
rr
in
g
. 
A
s
 s
u
c
h
, 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 r
e
d
u
c
e
s
 y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
n
 t
h
e
 s
h
o
rt
 t
e
rm
. 
 
c
. 
A
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 s
to
p
s
 y
o
u
 f
ro
m
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 o
u
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 
a
re
 r
e
a
lis
ti
c
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
re
fo
re
 k
e
e
p
s
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
 a
liv
e
. 
  
d
. 
W
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 a
v
o
id
, 
y
o
u
 n
o
ti
c
e
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 b
a
d
 t
h
in
g
 y
o
u
 w
e
re
 w
o
rr
y
in
g
 a
b
o
u
t 
(e
.g
.,
 
h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
fa
in
ti
n
g
, 
lo
s
in
g
 c
o
n
tr
o
l)
 d
o
e
s
n
’t
 o
c
c
u
r.
 T
h
is
 t
e
a
c
h
e
s
 y
o
u
 t
h
a
t 
in
 
o
rd
e
r 
to
 k
e
e
p
 p
re
v
e
n
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 b
a
d
 t
h
in
g
 f
ro
m
 h
a
p
p
e
n
in
g
 y
o
u
 n
e
e
d
 t
o
 k
e
e
p
 
a
v
o
id
in
g
. 
In
 t
h
is
 w
a
y
, 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 k
e
e
p
s
 y
o
u
 f
e
e
lin
g
 a
n
x
io
u
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 l
o
n
g
 t
e
rm
. 
e
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
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 C
o
m
m
e
n
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R
e
le
v
a
n
c
e
 t
o
 
th
e
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
o
f 
P
D
-A
g
 
 
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
s
ib
il
it
y
 
o
f 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
a
n
s
w
e
rs
 
 
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
s
w
e
r  
3
4
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 N
O
T
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
a
. 
F
a
c
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
 c
a
n
 c
a
u
s
e
 i
n
te
n
s
e
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 e
v
e
n
 p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
. 
b
. 
E
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 n
o
t 
re
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
e
d
 f
o
r 
th
e
 t
re
a
tm
e
n
t 
o
f 
P
a
n
ic
 D
is
o
rd
e
r 
o
r 
A
g
o
ra
p
h
o
b
ia
 a
s
 d
u
ri
n
g
 e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 l
e
v
e
ls
 c
a
n
 b
e
c
o
m
e
 s
o
 
s
e
v
e
re
 a
s
 t
o
 c
a
u
s
e
 s
e
ri
o
u
s
 p
h
y
s
ic
a
l 
h
a
rm
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
s
tr
o
k
e
, 
fa
in
ti
n
g
) 
o
r 
m
e
n
ta
l 
h
a
rm
 (
e
.g
.,
 s
c
h
iz
o
p
h
re
n
ia
, 
in
s
a
n
it
y
).
  
c
. 
T
h
e
 m
o
re
 o
ft
e
n
 y
o
u
 c
o
n
fr
o
n
t 
y
o
u
r 
fe
a
r,
 t
h
e
 l
e
s
s
 y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 w
ill
 r
is
e
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 
fa
s
te
r 
y
o
u
r 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 w
ill
 f
a
ll.
  
d
. 
E
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 a
n
 e
x
c
e
lle
n
t 
m
e
th
o
d
 f
o
r 
te
s
ti
n
g
 o
u
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 a
tt
a
c
k
s
 a
re
 c
o
rr
e
c
t.
 
e
. 
B
y
 f
a
c
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
 y
o
u
 l
e
a
rn
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 t
h
in
g
 y
o
u
 f
e
a
re
d
 d
id
 n
o
t 
h
a
p
p
e
n
 (
o
r 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t 
th
a
t 
b
a
d
).
 T
h
is
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
s
 y
o
u
r 
c
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 a
b
o
u
t 
fa
c
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
r 
in
 t
h
e
 
fu
tu
re
. 
f.
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5
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
T
h
e
 a
im
 o
f 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 t
o
: 
a
. 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 y
o
u
r 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 d
a
n
g
e
ro
u
s
n
e
s
s
 o
f 
p
a
n
ic
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 
b
. 
L
e
a
rn
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 u
n
p
le
a
s
a
n
t 
b
u
t 
h
a
rm
le
s
s
 
c
. 
H
e
lp
 y
o
u
 l
e
a
rn
 t
h
a
t 
w
h
a
t 
y
o
u
 f
e
a
r 
d
o
e
s
n
’t
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 o
r 
is
 n
o
t 
th
a
t 
b
a
d
 
d
. 
B
re
a
k
 t
h
e
 a
s
s
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
r 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 f
e
a
re
d
 
s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
/s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
 
e
. 
A
ll
 o
f 
th
e
 a
b
o
v
e
 
f.
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o
m
m
e
n
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R
e
le
v
a
n
c
e
 t
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e
 t
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a
tm
e
n
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o
f 
P
D
-A
g
 
 
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
s
ib
il
it
y
 
o
f 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
a
n
s
w
e
rs
 
 
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 a
n
s
w
e
r  
3
6
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 t
h
e
ra
p
y
 i
s
 N
O
T
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
 
W
h
e
n
 f
a
c
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
fe
a
rs
: 
a
. 
It
’s
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
to
 c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
t 
a
n
 e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 h
ie
ra
rc
h
y
 o
f 
fe
a
re
d
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
/s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 
fr
o
m
 m
ild
ly
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
d
u
c
in
g
 t
o
 s
e
v
e
re
ly
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
d
u
c
in
g
. 
b
. 
It
’s
 b
e
s
t 
to
 s
ta
rt
 e
x
p
o
s
in
g
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 t
o
 f
e
a
re
d
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
/s
e
n
s
a
ti
o
n
s
 i
n
 a
 g
ra
d
e
d
 
w
a
y
, 
s
ta
rt
in
g
 o
ff
 w
it
h
 m
ild
ly
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 o
n
ly
 m
o
v
in
g
 o
n
 t
o
 
m
o
re
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
s
 w
h
e
n
 y
o
u
’v
e
 m
a
s
te
re
d
 t
h
e
 e
a
s
ie
r 
o
n
e
s
. 
c
. 
It
’s
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
to
 p
re
d
ic
t 
w
h
a
t 
y
o
u
 t
h
in
k
 w
ill
 h
a
p
p
e
n
 i
f 
y
o
u
 d
id
n
’t
 d
o
 a
n
y
th
in
g
 t
o
 
k
e
e
p
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 f
e
e
lin
g
 s
a
fe
, 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
n
 t
e
s
t 
th
is
 p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 b
y
 c
o
n
d
u
c
ti
n
g
 a
 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
ra
l 
e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t.
 
d
. 
It
’s
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
to
 r
e
m
in
d
 y
o
u
rs
e
lf
 a
t 
th
e
 e
n
d
 o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 s
e
s
s
io
n
 w
h
e
th
e
r 
o
r 
n
o
t 
th
e
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
 y
o
u
 f
e
a
re
d
 (
e
.g
.,
 h
e
a
rt
 a
tt
a
c
k
, 
fa
in
ti
n
g
, 
in
s
a
n
it
y
, 
v
o
m
it
in
g
 e
tc
) 
c
a
m
e
 t
ru
e
. 
e
. 
 I
t’
s
 b
e
s
t 
to
 c
o
n
fr
o
n
t 
y
o
u
r 
m
o
s
t 
fe
a
re
d
 s
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 f
ir
s
t.
 O
n
c
e
 y
o
u
 f
a
c
e
 y
o
u
r 
w
o
rs
t 
fe
a
r,
 a
ll
 y
o
u
r 
o
th
e
r 
fe
a
rs
 w
il
l 
d
is
a
p
p
e
a
r.
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p
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3
7
) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
 o
f 
C
B
T
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
 
a
b
o
u
t 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 g
o
a
ls
 i
s
 N
O
T
 c
o
rr
e
c
t?
  
W
h
e
n
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 y
o
u
r 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 g
o
a
ls
: 
a
. 
Y
o
u
r 
g
o
a
ls
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 v
e
ry
 s
p
e
c
if
ic
 i
n
 n
a
tu
re
 (
e
.g
.,
 T
o
 g
o
 t
o
 t
h
e
 m
o
v
ie
s
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
 
c
ro
w
d
e
d
 p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 s
it
 i
n
 t
h
e
 m
id
d
le
 o
f 
th
e
 c
in
e
m
a
).
 
b
. 
Y
o
u
r 
g
o
a
ls
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 q
u
it
e
 b
ro
a
d
 i
n
 n
a
tu
re
 a
n
d
 a
im
 t
o
 e
li
m
in
a
te
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 
(e
.g
.,
 I
 w
a
n
t 
to
 b
e
 a
b
le
 t
o
 g
o
 o
u
t 
a
n
d
 n
o
t 
fe
e
l 
a
n
x
io
u
s
 o
r 
p
a
n
ic
k
y
) 
c
. 
Y
o
u
r 
g
o
a
ls
 s
h
o
u
ld
 v
a
ry
 i
n
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
y
 f
ro
m
 m
ild
ly
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
 t
o
 e
x
tr
e
m
e
ly
 
a
n
x
ie
ty
 p
ro
v
o
k
in
g
. 
d
. 
Y
o
u
r 
g
o
a
ls
 s
h
o
u
ld
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
 b
o
th
 s
h
o
rt
-t
e
rm
 a
n
d
 l
o
n
g
-t
e
rm
 g
o
a
ls
. 
e
. 
Y
o
u
r 
g
o
a
ls
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 a
b
le
 t
o
 b
e
 b
ro
k
e
n
 d
o
w
n
 i
n
to
 s
m
a
ll,
 a
c
h
ie
v
a
b
le
 s
te
p
s
. 
f.
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) 
A
c
c
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e
 t
e
a
c
h
in
g
s
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Appendix B – Multiple-Choice Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia 
Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Below are some questions exploring what people know about Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy (CBT) for Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia. Some of the questions are 
quite difficult and you are not expected to know all of the answers. It does not matter 
if you do not know any of the answers or if you know them all. This is not a test or 
exam, we are just interested in what you currently know about CBT for Panic 
Disorder and Agoraphobia. The information obtained will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and used only for research. 
 
 
Important Instructions 
 Read each question carefully before answering. 
 Make sure you read all the options before making your selection. 
 Circle the letter of the answer that you think is most correct. 
 Circle only one answer per question. 
 If you think you do not know the answer to a question, circle ‘Don’t know’ 
rather than simply guess. 
 Do not spend too long on any question. 
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1) In individuals without a history of such problems, panic attacks are likely 
to cause: 
a. Heart disease and/or heart attacks 
b. Stroke 
c. Insanity (e.g., schizophrenia) 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
2) According to the CBT approach, to reduce your fear of having panic 
attacks and panic sensations:  
a. You must firstly slow down your breathing to reduce the intensity of the 
symptoms. 
b. You must practice relaxation exercises regularly to reduce the stress response 
(the fight or flight response). 
c. You must firstly identify the underlying thought that is causing you to be fearful 
about the sensations and then collect evidence to test out whether or not the 
thought is true. 
d. You must probe into your past to discover issues from your early childhood 
that will explain the root of your fear. 
e. You must learn to identify your patterns of negative thinking and substitute 
them with positive thinking. 
f. Don’t know 
 
3) Which of the following reactions does NOT occur during the fight or 
flight response? 
a. The face may go pale as blood is diverted away from parts of the body that do 
not immediately require nutrition. 
b. Heart rate and blood pressure increases so that oxygen and nutrients can be 
transported quickly to where they are needed. 
c. Breathing speeds up to increase the amount of oxygen available to the 
muscles. 
d. Muscles relax to help you stay calm and perform at your best. 
e. Sweating increases to cool the body to prevent it from overheating during 
strenuous physical activity. 
f. Don’t know 
 
4) According to the CBT approach, if you are feeling anxious in a situation 
that most people do not find anxiety provoking (e.g., catching public 
transport or waiting in a line), it is likely to mean: 
a. You believe there is something threatening about the situation for you. 
b. Your beliefs about the situation are not based on the reality of the situation. 
c. You are overestimating the likelihood of something bad happening. 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know  
 
Appendix B – Multiple-Choice Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge Questionnaire (MC-PTKQ) 
269 
5) According to the CBT approach, which of the following is a form of 
avoidance?  
a. Not engaging in physical exertion (e.g., lifting heavy objects, running up the 
stairs, sexual activity) for fear of triggering panic symptoms. 
b. Using distraction to prevent a panic attack from occurring. 
c. Relying on a support person (e.g., spouse, parent, child, friend) to accompany 
you to places that you fear may trigger a panic attack. 
d. Carrying lollies, mints, snacks or a bottle of water with you all the time in case 
you feel anxious or panicky. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
6) Which of the following statements about the fight or flight response is 
false? 
a. The fight or flight response can get activated whenever you think you are in 
danger. 
b. If you believe something to be dangerous (even if it is not), your fight or flight 
response can be triggered. 
c. Worrying about appearing stupid or foolish in front of others can trigger off the 
fight or flight response.  
d. The body does not always distinguish between physical and psychological 
dangers when reacting with the fight or flight response. 
e. The fight or flight response only gets activated when you are in real physical 
danger. 
f. Don’t know 
 
7) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
panic attacks is false? 
a. If you do not have any thoughts about your panic attacks, it means that you do 
not perceive panic sensations to be threatening.  
b. All people with panic disorder or agoraphobia interpret their panic symptoms to 
be dangerous or threatening in some way. 
c. Threatening interpretations of panic symptoms are responsible for keeping the 
fear of panic attacks alive. 
d. Panic attacks can come on so quickly, even “out of the blue,” that there is no 
time for thoughts about the sensations. This means that panic sensations have 
become associated with danger so that you automatically respond with fear 
without consciously having any thoughts.   
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
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8) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements is 
false?  
When planning your treatment goalsJ 
a. Your goals should be very specific in nature (e.g., to go to the movies during a 
crowded performance and sit in the middle of the cinema). 
b. Your goals should be quite broad in nature and aim to eliminate anxiety (e.g., 
to be able to go out and not feel anxious or panicky). 
c. Your goals should vary in difficulty from mildly anxiety provoking to extremely 
anxiety provoking. 
d. Your goals should involve both short-term and long-term goals. 
e. Your goals should be able to be broken down into small, achievable steps. 
f. Don’t know 
 
9) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
deliberately bringing on the feared panic sensations (interoceptive 
exposure) is correct? 
The aim of deliberately bringing on panic sensations is toJ 
a. Change your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic sensations. 
b. Learn that panic sensations are unpleasant but harmless. 
c. Help you become less anxious when you experience such sensations (e.g., 
dizziness, heart palpitations) as part of your every day life. 
d. Break the association between your fear response and the feared sensation. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
10) Which of the following is NOT a symptom of hyperventilation? 
a. Dizziness 
b. Tingling sensations (e.g., in the hands and feet) 
c. Swollen feet (oedema) 
d. Blurred vision 
e. Chest pain 
f. Don’t know 
 
11) According to the CBT approach, to manage your anxiety in an anxiety 
provoking situation (e.g., waiting in a line, exercise, driving in traffic), it 
is best to: 
a. Distract yourself. 
b. Avoid or leave the situation in case something terrible happens. 
c. Have someone around that can support or help you, or carry something with 
you to keep yourself safe (e.g., mobile phone, medication, bottle of water). 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
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12) Which of the following statements regarding heart disease and panic 
attacks is correct? 
a. The chest pain experienced during a panic attack is exactly the same as the 
chest pain experienced during a heart attack in terms of sensations and 
duration. 
b. Symptoms of breathlessness and chest pain can occur during a heart attack 
and a panic attack, but heart attack symptoms tend to be related to effort and 
will go away once you rest whereas symptoms of a panic attack can happen at 
any time. 
c. An ECG (electrocardiogram) is an instrument used to detect the occurrence of 
a heart attack. If the ECG was conducted after the panic attack had finished, it 
will not be able to detect whether a heart attack had occurred.  
d. The heart is not designed to cope with extreme anxiety and panic. Prolonged 
periods of anxiety cause structural changes to the heart resulting in heart 
disease. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
13) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements 
involving facing your fears is false? 
a. Behavioural experiments that involve facing your fears can cause intense anxiety 
and even panic attacks. 
b. Facing your fears is not recommended for the treatment of Panic Disorder or 
Agoraphobia as anxiety levels can become so severe as to cause serious physical 
harm (e.g., heart attack, stroke, fainting) or mental harm (e.g., insanity).  
c. The more often you confront your fear, the less your anxiety will rise and the faster 
your anxiety will fall.  
d. Confronting a feared situation is an excellent method for testing out whether your 
thoughts about the dangerousness of panic attacks are correct. 
e. By facing your fears you learn that the thing you feared did not happen (or was not 
that bad). This increases your confidence about facing your fear in the future. 
f. Don’t know 
 
14) Which of the following statements about hyperventilation is false? 
a. Hyperventilation is responsible for many of the symptoms experienced during a 
panic attack. The sensations produced by hyperventilation may be intense and 
unpleasant but are completely harmless. 
b. Hyperventilation is an important part of the fight or flight response and therefore is 
not dangerous.  
c. It is important to deliberately slow down your breathing rate during a panic attack 
in order to prevent something terrible from happening (e.g., collapse, stroke, heart 
attack, losing control) as hyperventilation is dangerous if uncontrolled. 
d. If the fight or flight response is activated at the wrong time, hyperventilating 
causes intense physical sensations that may result in physical and/or mental 
harm. 
e. c and d 
f. Don’t know 
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15) According to the CBT approach, which of the following is a safety 
seeking behaviour?  
a. Slowing your breathing to prevent a panic attack from developing 
b. Carrying (but not actually taking) anti-anxiety medication with you when you 
enter an anxiety provoking situation 
c. Carrying a paper bag 
d. All of the above 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
16) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
the treatment of panic disorder and agoraphobia is correct? 
a. Treatment should be aimed at changing your interpretation of panic symptoms 
because if you think that they are unpleasant but harmless, you will become 
less fearful and less likely to experience them in the future. 
b. If you think panic attacks are dangerous you will become fearful of the 
sensations and will feel an urge to avoid situations or activities associated with 
such symptoms. 
c. Treatment should be aimed at changing your thoughts about the 
dangerousness of panic symptoms as lots of normal activities and situations 
can trigger similar sensations as part of every day life.  
d. Treatment should not be aimed at changing your thoughts about panic 
symptoms, because panic attacks can come on “out of the blue” even when 
you are not thinking. Instead, treatment should be aimed at eliminating panic 
sensations because if you did not have the sensations you would stop feeling 
anxious. 
e. a, b and c 
f. Don’t know 
 
17) According to the CBT approach, “Overestimating the probability” refers 
to:  
a. Thinking about something that has happened and making it out to be much 
worse than it is in reality. 
b. Thinking that something is more likely to happen than it is in reality.  
c. Exaggerating the importance or significance of an event. 
d. All of the above 
e. b and c 
f. Don’t know 
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18) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements is 
false? 
If your anxiety is very high when you are attempting to face one of your fears and 
you are having difficulty completing itJ 
a. You could vary an aspect of the situation to decrease the difficulty of the task 
(e.g., vary the number of people present, time of day, distance from home etc). 
b. You could vary the amount of time you spend in the situation (e.g., 1 minute, 3 
minutes, 10 minutes, 30 minutes etc). 
c. You could initially incorporate a safety seeking behaviour to help get you 
started, remembering to take it out later on.  
d. It means that you believe panic sensations are dangerous in some way. 
e. None of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
19) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements are 
correct?  
If you are having difficulty identifying why you are feeling panickyJ 
a. It means there are simply no thoughts there and a medical explanation is 
required to explain the cause of your panic attacks and anxiety.  
b. It is likely that the panic sensations or situation have become associated with 
danger (probably because of past experiences), so that you now automatically 
respond with fear without consciously having thoughts about the sensations. 
c. You can repeatedly ask yourself what would be so bad if the worst thing 
happened until you get to the core of the problem (Downward Arrow 
Technique). 
d. You can observe your own behaviour when you are anxious to look for clues 
that would help to explain the underlying thought. 
e. b, c and d 
f. Don’t know 
 
20) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
behavioural experiments is correct? 
The aim of behavioural experiments is toJ 
a. Change your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic sensations. 
b. Learn that panic sensations are unpleasant but harmless. 
c. Help you learn that what you fear does not happen or is not that bad. 
d. Break the association between your fear response and the feared situation. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
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21) According to the CBT approach, “Overestimating the cost” refers to: 
a. Thinking that something bad will happen when in reality this is very unlikely to 
occur. 
b. Believing that if the bad thing did occur it would be a disaster when in reality 
the consequence would have little or no effect on your life. 
c. Blowing the importance or significance of negative events out of proportion. 
d. All of the above 
e. b and c 
f. Don’t know 
 
22) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements is 
correct? 
a. The purpose behind changing your thoughts is to help you think positively 
about situations. If you think positively, you will not feel anxious in feared 
situations. 
b. The purpose behind changing your thoughts is to help you think realistically 
about situations. If you think realistically, your emotion will be appropriate for 
the situation. 
c. The purpose behind changing your thoughts is to help you think negatively 
about situations. If you think negatively, you will be prepared for the worst 
which will help you respond quickly if something terrible happens.  
d. Attempting to change your thoughts is pointless because thoughts are 
uncontrollable. 
e. If negative thoughts have been around for a long time they become a bad 
habit and cannot be changed. 
f. Don’t know 
 
23) According to the CBT approach, if you worry that other people (e.g., 
strangers) may be thinking negatively of you, the best approach for 
overcoming your anxiety in this situation would be to:  
a. Look for clear evidence in the stranger’s behaviour that would either confirm or 
disprove your belief so that you can learn whether or not your belief is actually 
true.  
b. Examine the consequence of their negative opinion on your life and put their 
opinion in perspective with other bad things that could happen (e.g., having a 
car accident, becoming a paraplegic, your family being killed). 
c. Tell yourself that you do not care what people think of you even if you do care 
(i.e. think positively).  
d. All of the above 
e. a and b 
f. Don’t know 
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24) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
safety seeking behaviours is false?  
Using a safety seeking behaviour when you are in an anxiety provoking situationJ 
a. is a sensible approach to overcoming anxiety as it can help prevent the terrible 
thing from happening (e.g., heart attack, fainting, embarrassing self in public). 
b. is a form of avoidance. 
c. stops you from testing out your thoughts about the dangerousness of panic. 
d. keeps your fears alive. 
e. is a problem because you will still believe that something bad would have 
happened if you had not used the safety seeking behaviour. 
f. Don’t know 
 
25) Which of the following statements about the fight or flight response is 
correct? 
a. The fight or flight response is a natural reaction aimed to protect you from 
danger. 
b. Symptoms from the fight or flight response may be unpleasant but they are 
harmless. 
c. A panic attack is harmless as it is the fight or flight response being activated 
when there is no real danger. 
d. The fight or flight response is a mechanism that does not need to be controlled 
or stopped and it will go away on it is own. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
26) Which of the following statements about fainting and panic attacks is 
most correct? 
a. A sudden drop in blood pressure is needed to faint. Blood pressure drops 
during panic, so you are more likely to faint during a panic attack. 
b. A sudden drop in blood pressure is needed to faint. Blood pressure rises 
during panic, so you are less likely to faint during a panic attack. 
c. A sudden increase in blood pressure is needed to faint. Blood pressure rises 
during panic so you are more likely to faint during a panic attack. 
d. A sudden increase in blood pressure is needed to faint. Blood pressure drops 
during panic, so you are less likely to faint during a panic attack. 
e. Dizziness and feeling lightheaded are symptoms of a panic attack. If you 
experience these symptoms during a panic attack it means you are likely to 
faint. 
f. Don’t know 
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27) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
avoidance is correct?  
a. When you avoid an anxiety provoking situation, your anxiety decreases. In this 
way, avoidance reinforces or strengthens your fears. 
b. Avoidance can prevent panic attacks from occurring.  
c. Avoidance stops you from testing out whether your thoughts about panic 
attacks are true and therefore keeps your unrealistic fears alive.   
d. Avoidance reduces your anxiety in the short-term but increases your anxiety in 
the long-term. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
 
28) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
facing your fears is false? 
a. It is important to construct a graded hierarchy of feared situations from mildly 
anxiety producing to severely anxiety producing. 
b. It is important to predict what you think will happen if you did not do anything 
to keep yourself feeling safe, and then test this prediction by conducting a 
behavioural experiment. 
c. After confronting a feared situation, it is important to remind yourself at the end 
whether or not your fear came true. 
d. It is important to regularly and repeatedly confront a feared situation until you 
no longer believe the situation to be dangerous. 
e. It is best to confront your most feared situation first. Once you face your worst 
fear, all your other fears will disappear.  
f. Don’t know 
 
29) According to the CBT approach, which of the following statements about 
behavioural experiments is correct? 
When conducting behavioural experiments to a particular taskJ 
a. It is not necessary to go out of your daily routine. It is best to just fit it in around 
your other commitments as this makes the experiment more realistic to your 
individual lifestyle.  
b. It does not matter what you do to help yourself feel safe during the experiment 
(e.g., sit down, carry medication, mobile phone, support person), the most 
important thing is that you remain in the situation. 
c. You only need to conduct the behavioural experiment once. Repeating the 
experiment again is unnecessary. You are now ready to move on to the next 
situation. 
d. The more practice you do, the easier it gets and the more progress you will 
make. 
e. All of the above 
f. Don’t know 
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Appendix C – Interview of Panic Disorder-Agoraphobia 
Treatment Knowledge (Int-PTK) 
 
A. PSYCHOEDUCATION 
 
1. Fight Flight Response  
 
1a. What is the Fight or Flight Response? What is its purpose? 
 
1b. Name 3 symptoms of the Fight or Flight Response and their function. 
 
2. Hyperventilation 
 
2a. What is Hyperventilation?  
 
2b. Is hyperventilation dangerous? Why/Why not? 
 
2c. Name 5 symptoms that can be caused by hyperventilating. 
 
B. COGNITIVE THERAPY 
 
3. Cognitive Model 
 
3a. According to the CBT approach, why are panic attacks/panic sensations 
so frightening? 
 
3b. What is responsible for keeping the fear of panic alive over time? 
 
3c. According to the CBT approach, what do you need to do to reduce your 
fear of panic attacks/panic sensations? 
 
4. Identification of the Causal Thought 
 
4. According to the CBT approach, describe a method for uncovering the 
thought that is at the core of your fears. Give an example. 
 
5. Probability & Cost 
 
5a. What does “Overestimating the Probability” mean? 
 
5b. According to the CBT approach, if you are overestimating the probability, 
how could you go about decreasing your probability estimates? 
 
5c. What does “Overestimating the Cost” mean? 
 
5d. According to the CBT approach, if you were overestimating the cost, how 
could you go about decreasing your cost estimates? 
Appendix C – Interview of Panic-Ag Treatment Knowledge (Int-PTK) 
278 
C. ROLE OF AVOIDANCE 
 
6a. According to the CBT approach, how does avoidance maintain fear and 
anxiety? 
 
6b. According to the CBT approach, what is a safety seeking behaviour?  
 
6c. Give an example of a safety seeking behaviour. 
 
6d. According to the CBT approach, what is the problem with using safety 
seeking behaviours? 
 
D. EXPOSURE THERAPY 
 
7. Behavioural Experiments  
 
7a. According to the CBT approach, what is a behavioural experiment?  
 
7b. Give an example of a behavioural experiment. 
 
7c. What is the purpose of behavioural experiments in the treatment of Panic 
Disorder and Agoraphobia? 
 
7d. According to the CBT approach, if your behavioural experiment was too 
hard, describe 3 ways to make it easier for yourself. 
 
8. Interoceptive Exposure 
 
8a. According to the CBT approach, what is the purpose of deliberately 
bringing on panic sensations (e.g., dizziness, heart palpitations, 
lightheadedness, shortness of breath)?  
 
8b. Give an example of an exercise you could do to deliberately bring on 
panic sensations and its purpose.  
 
8c. Why is it important to reduce your fear of panic sensations (e.g., 
dizziness, lightheadedness etc)? 
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Appendix D – Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for 
Panic-Ag – 68 Item Version (ATR-PA-68) 
 
*Reverse scored 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
 
Psychoeducation Items      
1. *Panic attacks are dangerous (i.e., can cause heart attacks, 
stroke, insanity). 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. Hyperventilation can cause symptoms such as dizziness, 
lightheadedness and blurred vision. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. Hyperventilation can cause tingling sensations (e.g., in hands, 
feet, face), breathlessness, chest pain and heart palpitations.  
0 1 2 3 4 
4. *If you feel faint during a panic attack you are likely to faint. 0 1 2 3 4 
5. Hyperventilation is harmless. 0 1 2 3 4 
6. Symptoms of the fight or flight response are the same as panic 
attack symptoms.  
0 1 2 3 4 
7. A panic attack is just the fight or flight response coming on 
when there is no real danger. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. The fight or flight response can get activated just by thinking of 
something frightening. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. *I do not believe it when people tell me that panic attacks are 
not dangerous. The sensations are so intense that they must 
be dangerous. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. *Excessive anxiety and panic causes heart problems (e.g., 
heart disease, heart attacks). 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. *Hyperventilation cannot cause the sharp chest pain 
sometimes experienced during a panic attack. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. Symptoms from the fight or flight response may be unpleasant 
but are harmless. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. *Feelings of unreality or the inability to think clearly during a 
panic attack is dangerous in that it can result in loss of control 
or insanity. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. *Chest pain experienced during panic indicates that a heart 
attack is likely to occur if the panic continues uncontrolled.  
0 1 2 3 4 
15. *Hyperventilation if uncontrolled is dangerous and may cause 
physical and/or mental harm. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. *It is important to slow your breathing rate down during a panic 
attack as hyperventilating can be dangerous if uncontrolled. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. Hyperventilation may cause unpleasant and intense physical 
symptoms (heart palpitations, dizziness etc) but they are 
completely harmless. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
 
Cognitive Therapy Items      
18. To overcome the fear of panic attacks and panic sensations, 
you must first identify the thought that is causing you to be 
fearful because panic attacks are a result of your thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. Identifying and testing out threatening interpretations of panic 
is the best treatment for overcoming panic disorder and 
agoraphobia. 
0 1 2 3 4 
20. If I worry a lot about what other people are thinking of me 
when I am panicking, it means I am overestimating the cost of 
negative evaluation. 
0 1 2 3 4 
21. During a panic attack, I am overestimating the likelihood of 
something bad happening. 
0 1 2 3 4 
22. *Treatment of Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia should just 
focus on eliminating panic symptoms and not on changing 
your thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
23. *Interpreting panic symptoms as threatening has very little to 
do with panic attacks. 
0 1 2 3 4 
24. *Thoughts have very little to do with keeping my panic going. A 
chemical imbalance in the brain is responsible for the 
occurrence of panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
25. Some panic symptoms are likely to occur as part of everyday 
life (e.g., during exercise, fatigue, hunger, temperature 
change), therefore it is important to change the way you think 
about such symptoms so that you do not fear them when they 
occur. 
0 1 2 3 4 
26. *There is no point in identifying and testing out my underlying 
thoughts about my panic symptoms as the symptoms can 
come on even when I am not having any thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
27. Treatment of Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia should focus on 
changing your thoughts, not on eliminating panic symptoms. 
0 1 2 3 4 
28. *You should be concerned by the views strangers are having 
of you when you are panicking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
29. It is the thoughts about the physical or psychological danger 
associated with panic that keeps the fear of panic alive.  
0 1 2 3 4 
30. Behavioural experiments are a useful method for testing out 
the truth about my thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
31. The fear of panic is kept alive by my thoughts or 
interpretations of my symptoms. 
0 1 2 3 4 
32. Testing out my thoughts will make me more confident that 
what I fear will not happen.  
0 1 2 3 4 
33. *There is no point trying to change my thoughts. My panic 
attacks sometimes come on out of the blue so they do not 
have anything to do with my thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
 
34. Changing the way I interpret my panic symptoms will help me 
overcome my panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
35. Comparing the consequences of negative evaluation from 
strangers with the consequences of having a terminal illness is 
a good way of putting things into perspective to reduce your 
anxiety about what people may think of you if they see you 
panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
36. Testing out the way I interpret my panic symptoms is a 
sensible approach for overcoming my panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
37. By testing out my thoughts I will be able to overcome my fears. 0 1 2 3 4 
38. *Attempting to change your thoughts is pointless because 
thoughts are uncontrollable. 
0 1 2 3 4 
39. *If negative thoughts have been around for a long time they 
become a bad habit and cannot be changed. 
0 1 2 3 4 
40. If I feel anxious in a situation it means I perceive that 
something threatening could occur. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Avoidance Items      
41. Avoidance is responsible for keeping my panic attacks alive. 0 1 2 3 4 
42. *Avoiding things that make me feel anxious and panicky is the 
only way to manage my anxiety. 
0 1 2 3 4 
43. *Carrying items such as medication, lollies, water, mobile 
phone, support person or using slow breathing or distraction 
are good ways to protect yourself from something bad 
happening if a panic attack occurred. 
0 1 2 3 4 
44. *Using distraction or keeping busy is a helpful treatment 
approach for my anxiety and panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
45. Relying on a support person to accompany me to a feared 
situation is a form of avoidance. 
0 1 2 3 4 
46. *Slow breathing and/or relaxation exercises are the best 
methods for treating my panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
47. Safety seeking behaviours keep your fears alive. 0 1 2 3 4 
48. Using or carrying items such as lollies, water, paper bag, 
medication or a mobile phone when you feel panicky are 
safety seeking behaviours. 
0 1 2 3 4 
49. *Controlling my breathing keeps me safe.  0 1 2 3 4 
50. Avoidance stops you from testing out whether your thoughts 
about panic are true and therefore keeps your fears alive. 
0 1 2 3 4 
51. Using a safety seeking behaviour is a problem because you 
will still believe that something bad would have happened if 
you had not used it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
 
Exposure Therapy Items      
52. Deliberately bringing on the sensations I fear is a helpful 
method for reducing my fear of the symptom. 
0 1 2 3 4 
53. Confronting avoided situations in a gradual fashion (from 
mildly to highly anxiety provoking) is a sensible approach for 
overcoming my fears. 
0 1 2 3 4 
54. Using a safety seeking behaviour during a behavioural 
experiment interferes with a person’s ability to learn how 
dangerous the situation actually is. 
0 1 2 3 4 
55. *Facing my fears could cause my anxiety to become so severe 
as to cause serious physical or mental harm. 
0 1 2 3 4 
56. *Completing a behavioural experiment once is usually 
sufficient to overcome your fear. Repeating the experiment is 
therefore unnecessary.  
0 1 2 3 4 
57. Deliberately bringing on symptoms of panic is a helpful way of 
testing out my fears.  
0 1 2 3 4 
58. After completing a behavioural experiment it is important to 
remind yourself at the end whether or not your prediction came 
true. 
0 1 2 3 4 
59. *Deliberately bringing on panic sensations can be dangerous. 0 1 2 3 4 
60. Deliberately bringing on panic sensations is a helpful way to 
become less anxious when I experience such sensations as 
part of everyday life. 
0 1 2 3 4 
61. Facing my fears is a necessary part of treatment. 0 1 2 3 4 
62. Treatment goals should vary in difficulty from mildly anxiety 
provoking to extremely anxiety provoking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
63. In order to reduce my fear, I need to regularly and repeatedly 
confront the situation until I no longer believe the situation is 
dangerous. 
0 1 2 3 4 
64. *Deliberately bringing on panic sensations is unhelpful. 0 1 2 3 4 
65. Deliberately bringing on panic sensations is a helpful method 
to learn that the sensations may be unpleasant but harmless. 
0 1 2 3 4 
66. When planning treatment goals it is important to make them 
very specific in nature. 
0 1 2 3 4 
67. If I am having difficulty facing one of my fears, it means I 
believe there is something dangerous about panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
68. Facing my fears helps me to learn that panic symptoms are 
harmless even if they are unpleasant. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix E – Treatment Belief Scales 
 
For the purposes of administration, items from the ATR-PA, ETO-PA and TSE-PA 
scales were intermixed.  
Acceptance of the Treatment Rationale for Panic-Ag (ATR-PA) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
1.  Confronting avoided situations in a gradual fashion (from 
mildly to highly anxiety provoking) is a sensible approach for 
overcoming my fears. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  Deliberately bringing on symptoms of panic is a helpful way of 
testing out my fears.  
0 1 2 3 4 
3.  Some panic symptoms are likely to occur as part of everyday 
life (e.g., during exercise, fatigue, hunger, temperature 
change), therefore it is important to change the way you think 
about such symptoms so that you do not fear them when they 
occur. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.  A panic attack is just the fight or flight response coming on 
when there is no real danger. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  *There is no point in identifying and testing out my underlying 
thoughts about my panic symptoms as the symptoms can 
come on even when I am not having any thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6.  Deliberately bringing on panic sensations is a helpful way to 
become less anxious when I experience such sensations as 
part of everyday life. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.  Facing my fears is a necessary part of treatment. 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  Treatment goals should vary in difficulty from mildly anxiety 
provoking to extremely anxiety provoking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9.  In order to reduce my fear, I need to regularly and repeatedly 
confront the situation until I no longer believe the situation is 
dangerous. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10.  Avoidance stops you from testing out whether your thoughts 
about panic are true and therefore keeps your fears alive. 
0 1 2 3 4 
11.  Deliberately bringing on panic sensations is a helpful method 
to learn that the sensations may be unpleasant but harmless. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12.  *Chest pain experienced during panic indicates that a heart 
attack is likely to occur if the panic continues uncontrolled.  
0 1 2 3 4 
13.  Testing out the way I interpret my panic symptoms is a 
sensible approach for overcoming my panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14.  Facing my fears helps me to learn that panic symptoms are 
harmless even if they are unpleasant. 
0 1 2 3 4 
* Reverse scored 
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Expectancies of Treatment Outcome for Panic-Ag (ETO-PA) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
1.  *When it comes to my panic/anxiety, I believe there is nothing 
that can be done to treat my problem 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  *When it comes to my panic/anxiety, I believe I will never be 
able to overcome it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.  *I do not believe CBT will be helpful for me. 0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I believe CBT is the right treatment approach for my panic. 0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I made the right decision in attending therapy. 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  CBT will help me overcome my panic. 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  CBT can be helpful to manage even the most distressing panic 
symptoms. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8.  *CBT is too simplistic to be helpful for treating my panic. 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  CBT helps me understand why I panic and what I can do 
about it. 
0 1 2 3 4 
* Reverse scored 
Treatment Self-Efficacy for Panic-Ag (TSE-PA) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
1.  During the early stages of a panic attack I can apply the skills I 
have learned to reduce the attack. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I can take the necessary steps to manage my anxiety 
effectively. 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.  *The only way I can feel truly safe from my panic attacks is if I 
take medication. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I feel as though I am well informed about my anxiety and 
panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  *I can only control my panic with medication. 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  I feel that I have learned strategies to effectively manage my 
anxiety and panic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7.  I feel that understanding my panic symptoms has helped me 
manage my anxiety. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel I can implement the techniques recommended by my 
therapist. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I feel that I have enough information about my panic to allow 
me to effectively manage my anxiety. 
0 1 2 3 4 
* Reverse scored
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Appendix F – Aetiology, Alternative Non-CBT Treatments and 
Treatment Barriers Belief Scales 
 
Below is a list of beliefs that some people have about Panic Disorder and 
Agoraphobia. Sometimes people’s beliefs match what they have previously been 
told, and sometimes they differ. We are interested in what you truly or secretly 
believe (not what you think you should believe). Please read each item and circle 
the number using the scale below to rate the extent YOU believe the item to be true 
for you. Do not spend too long on any item. There are no right or wrong answers. 
We are interested in what you really believe. 
Aetiology 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
 
I believe my panic/anxiety is caused byC 
1.  Something physically wrong with me 0 1 2 3 4 
2.  A medical condition that the doctors have not yet found 0 1 2 3 4 
3.  A chemical imbalance in my brain  0 1 2 3 4 
4.  A hormonal imbalance 0 1 2 3 4 
5.  Using prescription drugs 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  Using illicit drugs  0 1 2 3 4 
7.  Using alcohol 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  Taking too much caffeine 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  Exposure to environmental contaminants (e.g., toxic fumes, 
radiation, asbestos) 
0 1 2 3 4 
10.  Inheriting anxious genes from my parents (genetics) 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  Early traumatic experiences from my childhood or adolescence 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  A traumatic experience (e.g., assault, rape, accident, disaster, 
war) 
0 1 2 3 4 
13.  Stress from personal or family problems/stressful circumstances 
(e.g., death of a family member/friend, relationship conflict/ 
break-up, financial problems) 
0 1 2 3 4 
14.  Physical stress to my body (e.g., illness, virus, fatigue, childbirth) 0 1 2 3 4 
15.  A supernatural or spiritual force 0 1 2 3 4 
16.  Punishment from God for my past sins 0 1 2 3 4 
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Alternative Non-CBT Treatments 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
In order to properly treat my anxiety disorder I believe I need to..      
1.  Rely on alcohol  0 1 2 3 4 
2.  Rely on tranquilizers (e.g., Valium, Xanax, Serapax, Ativan, 
Lexotan) 
0 1 2 3 4 
3.  Rely on antidepressant medication (e.g., Zoloft, Prozac, Aropax, 
Cipramil, Avanza, Efexor-XR, Aurorix, Prothiaden) 
0 1 2 3 4 
4.  Treat the underlying medical problem 0 1 2 3 4 
5.  Have further medical tests conducted 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  Address underlying issues from my childhood/ adolescence 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  Probe into my past to discover the cause of my fear 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  Talk about my personal problems with a counsellor 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  Talk about my problem with someone who has had similar 
experiences with anxiety  
0 1 2 3 4 
10.  Stay away from stressful things 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  Avoid people, places or situations that trigger my anxiety 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  Avoid foods or substances that trigger my anxiety 0 1 2 3 4 
13.  Slow my breathing down or practice breathing exercises 0 1 2 3 4 
14.  Undergo spiritual cleansing 0 1 2 3 4 
15.  Distract myself 0 1 2 3 4 
16.  Practice yoga, meditation or exercise 0 1 2 3 4 
17.  Have my sins forgiven by a religious/spiritual leader 0 1 2 3 4 
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Treatment Barriers 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
Do not believe  
at all 
Slightly believe Somewhat 
believe 
Mostly  believe Completely 
believe 
 
I believe the following factors will interfere in the treatment of 
my panic/anxiety 
     
1.  My age 0 1 2 3 4 
2.  My physical health 0 1 2 3 4 
3.  My level of intelligence 0 1 2 3 4 
4.  The intensity/severity of my symptoms 0 1 2 3 4 
5.  My level of anxiety  0 1 2 3 4 
6.  My depression 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  Presence of my other emotional/psychological problem(s) 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  Chemical imbalance in my brain 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  The previous effects of drugs/alcohol/toxins on my system 0 1 2 3 4 
10.  The hereditary nature of my problem (genetics) 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  The length of time I have had the problem 0 1 2 3 4 
12.  My previous failure to respond to treatment 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
